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  INTRODUCTION   
When the United States Congress passed a new mental 
health parity law in 2008, then Speaker of the House Nancy 
Pelosi announced that henceforth, “illness of the brain must be 
treated just like illness anywhere else in the body.”1 Such sen-
timent is becoming more common, as policymakers and the 
public increasingly recognize the biological basis for, and the 
gravity of, “mental” and “emotional” disabilities.2
In insurance and personal injury litigation, the definition 
of bodily injury is already being challenged.
 
3 For instance, a 
court in 2008 reasoned that because the brain is a part of the 
body, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) alone, with no 
other physical manifestations, constituted bodily injury under a 
Michigan statute.4 Similarly, in 2011, a court found that emo-
tional injury sustained from witnessing a car accident consti-
tuted bodily injury under an insurance contract.5 And in the 
United Kingdom, an increasing number of insurance claims 
“seek to stretch the boundaries of what constitutes bodily inju-
ry.”6
Consider also efforts to hold governments accountable for 
mental as well as physical torture.
 These efforts to remove the mind-body distinction as a 
barrier to insurance coverage and tort recovery suggest that 
neuroscientific understandings of mental injury are already 
having legal effect.  
7
 
 1. Robert Pear, House Approves Bill on Mental Health Parity, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008, at A14. 
 The definition of physical 
pain and suffering was a central issue in legal interpretations 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Appendix A. 
 4. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811 (2008). This 
case is discussed further in Francis X. Shen, Monetizing Memory Science: Neu-
roscience and the Future of PTSD Litigation, in MEMORY AND LAW 325 (Lynn 
Nadel & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012) [hereinafter Shen, Monetiz-
ing Memory Science]. 
 5. See Lipsky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 41 A.3d 1288 (Pa. 2012). 
 6. Phil Bell, The Social Construction of Bodily Injury, 31 GENEVA PA-
PERS ON RISK & INS.—ISSUES & PRAC. 340, 350 (2006). 
 7. See David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Eras-
ures in U.S. Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 823 (2012). 
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of the now infamous torture memos.8 And some scholars have 
argued that because the mind is enabled by the brain, and be-
cause the brain is physical matter, mental torture is physical 
torture as well.9
Developments such as these, which are revisiting the 
mind-brain-body distinction in legally relevant ways, provide 
motivation to carefully examine the fundamental role that the 
distinction between mind and body plays in the criminal law. 
Even a cursory glance at penal codes finds that “bodily injury” 
is an element for a vast number of offenses against the per-
son.
 
10 For instance, simple assault, the most common crime 
against the person, is defined under the Model Penal Code in 
this way: “a person is guilty of [simple] assault if he attempts to 
cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury 
to another.”11
Infliction of bodily injury or serious bodily injury is typical-
ly an element in aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, 
resisting arrest, unlawful arrest, and a good number of similar 
crimes. Moreover, the concept may also be invoked in civil 
commitment hearings when determining whether an individual 
is at risk of committing serious bodily injury. The categoriza-
tion of a crime victim’s harms as bodily or not-bodily thus may 
have important consequences because it triggers culpability 
and may trigger stiffer criminal sanctions. 
 
For instance, in a 1998 case alleging criminal maltreat-
ment of boys in a group home (who later developed PTSD), the 
State of Washington argued that “PTSD is a psychological dis-
order that has measurable neurobiologic or chemical effects on 
the brain . . . [and] that because PTSD alters the sufferer’s 
brain chemistry, it is the impairment of a physical condition.”12
 
 8. See id. 
 
 9. See id. at 829 n.22 (“Thus, to think that psychological torture is not an 
assault on the body is a conceptual error from the outset. [W]hat all torture 
has in common, regardless of physical or mental appearances, is its assault on 
the brain. . . . Extreme fear and despair . . . are emotional states that are an-
chored in brain states.” (quoting Uwe Jacobs, Documenting the Neurobiology of 
Psychological Torture: Conceptual and Neuropsychological Observations, in 
THE TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE 163, 164–65 (Almerindo E. Ojeda 
ed., 2008))). 
 10. As seen in Table A2, the majority of states use the phrase “bodily inju-
ry,” but others use “physical injury.” For ease of exposition, I use “bodily inju-
ry” throughout this Article. See infra at Table A2 (explaining how bodily injury 
is typically defined as physical injury, thus conflating the two). 
 11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (1981). 
 12. State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14, 19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
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The court in that case found against the State, and it is a rarity 
to see this argument made. But it may become less rare as our 
understanding of mental disorders such as PTSD continues to 
evolve. 
Taken to its logical extreme, parity between mental injury 
and physical injury in criminal law could lead to a tremendous 
expansion of criminal liability because a large number of (suffi-
ciently severe) emotional injuries could be deemed “bodily” in-
jury given that bodily injury is defined as physical injury, and 
emotional distress is produced by physical changes in the cells 
of the brain.13
What is the criminal law’s backstop to prevent such a slip-
pery slope? One solution would be for the criminal law to suffi-
ciently define the concept, as it does with other legal terms of 
art, in such a way as to clearly delineate what does and does 
not count as bodily injury. But, as the first part of this Article 
will show, the criminal law does not at present take this path.  
 
When courts have confronted the question, there is an im-
plicit assumption that the definition of bodily injury is intui-
tive—a matter of common sense, and clear on its face to the lay 
juror. Conventional wisdom thus seems to be that the concept 
of “bodily injury” is uncontroversial. One court has asserted 
that “[c]learly the term ‘bodily injury’ is not a phrase which re-
quires an elaborate explanation in order to be understood.”14 
And another writes that “[w]e can think of no phenomenon of 
more common experience and understanding than the concepts 
of ‘bodily injury’ and ‘physical pain.’”15
In light of these assumptions, and the challenge that a 
neuroscientific perspective on mental injuries presents, this Ar-
ticle revisits bodily injury through a series of original experi-
ments designed to answer three questions. First, do lay citizens 
share a common understanding of the term “bodily injury”? 
More specifically, is there a common understanding about 
whether “mental” injuries are clearly excluded from the bodily 
 Bodily injury, say the 
courts, is not a legal term of art but an everyday term of com-
mon understanding. 
 
 13. Of course a distinction could still be drawn based on the word “injury,” 
such as distinguishing injury from “offense.” See infra Part IV. 
 14. Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 15. Rogers v. State, 396 N.E.2d 348, 352 (Ind. 1979); see also Payne v. 
State, 484 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. 1985) (citing the conclusion in Rogers and writ-
ing that “[d]efendant presents no persuasive reason for us to change these 
conclusions in this case”). 
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injury category as the criminal law implicitly assumes there is? 
Second, if lay understandings of bodily injury are indeed fluid, 
can jury instructions (containing different definitions) reliably 
demarcate the contours of the bodily injury category? Third, 
how might the introduction of neuroscientific evidence affect 
lay judgments about what is and is not bodily injury?  
The empirical results reported in this Article suggest that 
the concept of bodily injury is more malleable than at least 
some courts have posited. First, the analysis finds that lay peo-
ple share a common understanding of bodily injury only when 
the injury is akin to a broken leg or cracked ribs. When asked 
to categorize injuries such as recurring headaches, memory 
loss, PTSD, and depression, lay people exhibit much confusion 
and disagreement about whether these are “bodily” injuries. 
For example, I find that although 98% of lay subjects agree 
that a broken leg probably or definitely constitutes bodily inju-
ry, in the case of PTSD, subjects are split: 27% think that 
PTSD is probably or definitely bodily injury; 25% choose may-
be; 25% say probably not; and 22% choose definitely not.  
Second, the analysis suggests that there is a simple, effec-
tive tool at the legislature’s disposal for communicating the 
bodily injury concept: jury instructions.16 Variance in bodily in-
jury determination is sensitive to the jury instructions provid-
ed, and to the brain-based arguments and evidence presented.17 
For instance, jury instructions that include the 1990 Black’s 
Law Dictionary definition of bodily injury—“pertaining to or 
concerning the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical 
constitution; not mental, but corporeal”—generate different 
subject behavior than do jury instructions that include one of 
the definitions utilized in the federal criminal code: “(A) a cut, 
abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C) 
illness; (D) impairment of the function of a bodily member, or-
gan, or mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no 
matter how temporary.”18
When asked whether a crime victim’s mental injuries were 
“bodily,” those who had been exposed to the Black’s definition 
  
 
 16. These results run counter to some literature on evidentiary instruc-
tions which tends to find that such instructions are ineffective. See, e.g., David 
Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). My instructions are of a different type and were not 
employed in actual trial settings. 
 17. I use “subject determination” in this Article to mean whether experi-
mental subjects determined the crime victim’s injuries to be “bodily” or not. 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(4) (2006). 
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generally were more likely to say no; those exposed to the fed-
eral definitions were generally more likely to say yes.  
Third, the analysis finds that the effect of neuroscientific 
evidence on lay determination of bodily injury is potentially 
powerful—but can also readily restricted by jury instructions 
that explicitly exclude mental injury. In experimental condi-
tions where prosecutors made explicitly brain-based arguments 
and presented brain evidence (to argue that mental injury is 
brain injury and thus bodily injury), subjects were more likely 
to assess a mental injury as “bodily” when they did not have 
the restrictive Black’s Law Dictionary definition.  
Taken together, the findings in this Article suggest that if 
the criminal law were to one day recognize the biological (and 
thus physical) basis for mental injury, then the bodily injury 
concept will need to be better defined. How should this be done? 
The Article suggests that legislatures have six primary options. 
Legislatures can: (1) do nothing (which would then require dif-
ficult statutory interpretation by courts); (2) explicitly include 
mental injuries within the bodily injury category (as they often 
already do in the case of child and elder abuse); (3) explicitly 
exclude mental injuries from the bodily injury category (as 
many insurance policies now do); (4) eliminate the “bodily” cat-
egory altogether and focus solely on severity of injury (as the 
Iowa criminal code does); (5) develop crime-specific criteria for 
bodily injury (as the federal sentencing guidelines do in the 
case of forcible rape); or (6) eliminate the bodily injury element 
from particular crimes against the person to focus solely on of-
fender conduct (as in stalking or harassment). 
Whether and how legislatures choose to criminalize behav-
ior that inflicts purely non-physical injury is a policy question 
requiring state-specific and crime-specific analyses beyond the 
scope of this paper. Perhaps some legislatures will opt not to 
have parity of injuries in the criminal context, and maybe oth-
ers will choose to carve out exceptions for extremely bad mental 
injuries. But whatever a legislature’s intention about the mean-
ing of bodily injury, that intention should be clearly communi-
cated. If society increasingly comes to see mental injuries as 
real, biological-based physical injuries, then the criminal law 
will have to explain why it differentiates between injuries to 
the body and injuries to the mind. There are good reasons to 
maintain such dualism within this area of law, but so too are 
there good reasons to eliminate it. Now is the moment to have 
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that debate, before courts are forced to reconcile old definitions 
with new science and societal norms.  
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the his-
tory and scope of the bodily injury element in criminal law. 
Part II provides a short summary of the recent and rapid 
growth of neurolaw, and also discusses recent civil litigation 
concerning the issue of PTSD as a “bodily” injury. Part III de-
scribes the design of and results from new experiments on lay 
persons’ understanding of bodily injury. Part IV discusses the 
implications of these results. Part V concludes. 
I.  “BODILY INJURY” IN CRIMINAL LAW   
In this Part, I discuss the importance of the concept of bod-
ily injury in criminal law.19 This Part offers a brief history of 
the origins of the bodily injury element; illustrates the perva-
siveness of the bodily injury element in contemporary offenses 
against the person; discusses standard dictionary definitions of 
the term; presents a fifty-state review of how state codes define 
bodily injury and use it as an element in assault; and reviews 
case law in which the definition of bodily injury has been chal-
lenged in criminal contexts. I argue that, when faced with the 
issue, courts have relied on ad hoc generalizations about a 
shared common understanding of what constitutes bodily inju-
ry. Subsequent Parts of the Article test these generalizations.20
 
 19. Although this Article focuses on criminal law, the bodily injury issue 
is pervasive across law. Appendix A discusses the issue in the tort context. 
Mind-body dualism even comes up in the U.S. Tax Code. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 104(A)(2) (2006) (excluding from gross income compensatory damages that a 
taxpayer received for physical injuries). Prior to 1996, the word “physical” was 
not included, and the allowed injuries “[included] ‘affecting the emotions,’ 
‘emotional distress,’ ‘mental pain and suffering,’ ‘distress, humiliation, and 
mental anguish,’ [and] ‘intentional infliction of emotional distress.’” G. Chris-
topher Wright, Taxation of Personal Injury Awards: Addressing the 
Mind/Body Dualism that Plagues § 104(A)(2) of the Tax Code, 60 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 211, 212, 220 (2011). In 1996, the Code was amended to include the word 
“physical” and to expressly exclude emotional distress from the definition. 
However, the terms “physical” and “emotional distress” are not defined, which 
often leads to litigation. 
 
 20. The empirical approach is a complement to, nor a substitute for, the 
philosophical debate over dualism. This Article does not endeavor to engage 
the extensive philosophy of mind literature surrounding the “mind-body prob-
lem.” Indeed, one of the reasons that the criminal law might abandon the bodi-
ly/non-bodily distinction is in part because the ongoing philosophical debates 
suggest that it is a seemingly intractable, conceptual problem. For discussion 
of different viewpoints on the mind-body problem, see generally WILLIAM 
BECHTEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: AN OVERVIEW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
(1988); MIND AND COGNITION: AN ANTHOLOGY (William G. Lycan & Jesse J. 
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A. PERVASIVENESS OF BODILY INJURY IN CRIMINAL LAW 
Criminal law draws lines between conduct that can be pun-
ished by the state, and conduct that (while perhaps frowned 
upon) will not incur criminal sanction.21
The historical roots for this conceptualization can be found 
in early English common law, in which the crime of mayhem 
required that victim be disfigured or disabled to the extent that 
it made him less useful in combat.
 In a variety of criminal 
and quasi-criminal contexts, this legislative line drawing be-
tween criminal and non-criminal behavior invokes the concept 
of “bodily” (or “physical”) injury. 
22
 
Prinz eds., 3d ed. 1999); Howard Robinson, Dualism, in THE BLACKWELL 
GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 85 (Stephen S. Stich & Ted A. Warfield eds., 
2003). It is also important to note that the argument I advance here does not 
rest on a conflation of mind and brain (and indeed, I have argued elsewhere 
that such a conflation is problematic), but it does rely on the presumption that 
brain enables mind. In this sense, mind is “physical” (even if we do not know 
with precision exactly how). The mind-brain approach of most neuroscientists 
is captured in this explanation from the introduction to a popular neuroscience 
text: “In neuroscience, there is no need to separate mind from brain; once we 
fully understand the individual and concerted actions of brain cells, we will 
understand the origins of our mental abilities. The organization of this book 
reflects this ‘neurophilosophy.’” MARK F. BEAR ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE: EX-
PLORING THE BRAIN 23 (2d ed. 2001). For a discussion of the dangers of con-
flating mind and brain for purposes of law, see Michael S. Pardo & Dennis 
Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1211 (2010). I agree with Luban and Shue, who write in the context of 
distinguishing mental from physical torture that “[t]hat A causes B, or even 
that A invariably causes B, does not imply that A and B are indistinguisha-
ble.” Luban & Shue, supra note 7, at 831. But to make the distinction requires, 
as they suggest, “intellectual rigor,” and to date such rigor has not been ap-
plied to this question in the context of defining bodily injury in the criminal 
law. See id. 
 The rationale for criminal-
 21. Scholars debate whether harm must actually occur in order to justify 
punishment. See Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1994). In this Article, I focus purely on those instanc-
es in which a victim has experienced a setback to interest. For more on the de-
bate over attempts, see Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of 
the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679 (1994) (“Whether the harm 
doctrine can be justified is, as George Fletcher has said, a ‘deep, unresolved 
issue in the theory of criminal liability.’”). For a classic statement of the case 
for the irrelevance of resultant harm for culpability, see Michael S. Moore, The 
Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
237 (1994).  
 22. See Louis A. Ambrose, Darrell F. Cook & Van C. Durrer, II, Survey: 
Developments in Maryland Law, 1990–91, 51 MD. L. REV. 612, 643 n.270 (“The 
punishment of this crime was designed to preserve the King’s right to the use-
fulness of his subjects in battle. Any injury that rendered a subject of the King 
less valuable in battle was considered an offense against the King. The earli-
est punishment for this crime was therefore severe; the perpetrator was sub-
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izing mayhem was to preserve the usefulness of the King’s sol-
diers in battle.23 English statutes began to change in 1403 with 
the inclusion of some permanent injuries that did not affect the 
usefulness of subjects in battle (e.g., severing of the ear, cutting 
out of the tongue).24
Mayhem (maiming) as a distinct crime survives today pri-
marily in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
 
25 Outside of the 
military, however, few jurisdictions recognize mayhem as a 
crime.26
Bodily injury is a part of many aspects of the criminal and 
quasi-criminal code, including simple assault;
 But the requirement of physical injury to the victim 
has carried down to contemporary statutes. 
27 aggravated as-
sault;28 unlawful arrest;29 aggravated robbery;30 menacing;31
 
jected to the same harm he inflicted upon his victim.” (citations omitted)).  
 civ-
 23. See id.  
 24. An assault upon Lord Coventry in the 1660s (in which several people 
attacked the Lord for statements made in Parliament) provided the impetus 
for disfigurement to be included within the scope of the charge, as well. The 
new disfigurement element required that the injury be permanent and created 
limits on what injuries would qualify: the loss of a front tooth would qualify as 
mayhem because of the effect on appearance, though the loss of a tooth on the 
back of the lower jaw would not qualify. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 121 (“Among these de-
fensive members are reckoned not only arms and legs, but a finger, an eye, 
and a fore-tooth and also some others. But the loss of one of the jaw teeth, the 
ear or the nose, is no mayhem at common law, as they can be of no use in 
fighting.”).  
 25. See Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 124, 10 U.S.C. § 924 (2006). 
The injury required by the UCMJ is set forth as “an injury which—(1) serious-
ly disfigures his person by any mutilation thereof; (2) destroys or disables any 
member or organ of his body; or (3) seriously diminishes his physical vigor by 
the injury of any member or organ.” 
 26. In those jurisdictions that do recognize mayhem, emphasis is placed 
on preservation of normal appearance and completeness. In keeping with the 
history of the offense, the Court of Appeals in D.C. has specifically stated that 
“what is important now is not the victim’s capacity for attack or defense, but 
the integrity of his person.” United States v. Cook, 462 F.2d 301, 303 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); see also State v. Quintana, 748 N.W.2d 447, 463 (Wis. 2008). 
 27. “A person is guilty of assault if he: (a) attempts to cause or purposely, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (b) negligently 
causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (c) attempts by phys-
ical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (1981) (emphasis added). 
 28. In the Model Penal Code and in many state codes, aggravated assault 
is defined as an assault in which the defendant causes, or attempts to cause, 
“serious bodily injury.” See id. § 211.1(2) (emphasis added). 
 29. “Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, 
Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
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il commitment;32 and the burden of proof for release from civil 
commitment after finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.33 
This list could go on for some length, and is illustrative of the 
many ways in which bodily injury is an element in defining 
crimes.34
 
ties secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to 
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an 
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment 
of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation 
of this section . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (emphasis added).  
  
 30. In many states, a defendant is guilty of aggravated robbery if, during 
the course of robbery, the defendant inflicts or intends to inflict death or seri-
ous physical injury. As cited in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 236–37 
(1999), see ALA. CODE § 13A-8-41(a)(2) (1994) (robbery in the first degree de-
fined in part by the causing of “serious physical injury”); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.500(a)(3) (1996) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-12-103 (1997) (aggravated 
robbery; “[i]nflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury”); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-134(a)(1) (1994) (robbery in the first degree; “[c]auses 
serious physical injury”); IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1993) (robbery in the first de-
gree; “purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious injury”); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 515.020(1)(a) (LexisNexis 1990) (robbery in the first degree; “causes 
physical injury”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 636:1(III)(c) (1996) (class A felony of 
robbery; “[i]nflicted or attempted to inflict death or serious injury”); N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW § 160.15 (1988) (robbery in the first degree; “[c]auses serious physical 
injury”); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.415(1)(c) (1990) (robbery in the first degree; 
“[c]auses or attempts to cause serious physical injury”); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 29.03(a)(1) (West 1994) (aggravated robbery; “causes serious bodily in-
jury”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302(1)(b) (West 1995) (aggravated robbery; 
“causes serious bodily injury”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.200(1)(a)(iii) (1994) 
(robbery in the first degree, “[i]nflicts bodily injury”). 
 31. “A person is guilty of menacing in the third degree when, by physical 
menace, he or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in 
fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury.” N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 120.15 (2012). In Alabama, too, one is guilty of menacing “if, by physical 
action, he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of 
imminent serious physical injury.” ALA. CODE § 13A-6-23(A) (2012). 
 32. Courts can commit a person if “the court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect 
as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury 
to another person or serious damage to property of another.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4246(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 33. If the offense is one “involving bodily injury to, or serious danger to 
the property of, another person, or involving a substantial risk of such injury 
or damage,” then the person found not guilty by reason of insanity has the 
burden of proof of “by clear and convincing evidence” (instead of “by a prepon-
derance of the evidence”). 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 34. The bodily injury distinction also arises in federal statutes in other, 
related ways. For instance, the Prison Litigation Reform Act holds that pris-
oners cannot make claims for mental or emotional injury during their incar-
ceration unless they also suffer physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2006) (“No 
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B. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS 
Having established that bodily injury is central to defining 
many crimes, how is the concept defined in U.S. criminal codes? 
I look first at two instances within the federal code, and then 
turn my attention to the states. 
In federal sentencing guidelines, bodily injury “means any 
significant injury; e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or 
is of a type for which medical attention ordinarily would be 
sought.”35 On the other hand, the provision of the United States 
Code that criminalizes tampering with consumer products de-
fines bodily injury as including “illness,” “impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty,” and 
“any other injury to the body no matter how temporary.”36
We see variation as well in the definition of bodily injury in 
state statutes. This data is presented in Table A2.
  
37 The most 
common definition of bodily injury, employed by over ten states, 
is “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condi-
tion.”38 Several states also include the word pain in their defini-
tion: “‘physical injury’ means a physical pain or an impairment 
of physical condition.”39 Arizona is the only state to define phys-
ical injury simply as “impairment of physical condition.”40
Several states insert severity language into the definition 
when they define bodily injury to mean “substantial physical 
 
 
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or 
other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in cus-
tody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). 
 35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §  2B1.1 cmt. n.1(B) (Nov. 1, 
2010). 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(4) (2006).  
 37. A number of states provide no definition in their criminal statutes for 
bodily injury. 
 38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-901(c) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 
(2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.02(7) (2012); NEB. REV. ST. § 28-109(4) (2012); N.J. 
REV. STAT. 2C:11-1(a) (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(8) (2012); UTAH CODE 
§ 76-1-601 (3) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. § 3251(5) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE 
9A.04.110(4)(a) (2012); WISC. STAT. 939.22(4) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-
104(a)(i) (2012). Maine slightly modifies this language, inserting the word 
“physical” in front of “illness.” See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 2 (2012). 
 39. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.220 (2012); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-3(3) 
(2012); IND. CODE § 35-41-1-4 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (2012). 
Even when pain is not explicitly included in the definition, it may be allowed 
as part of a jury instruction. See State v. Coleman, 709 A.2d 590, 595 (Conn. 
1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument “that the concept of ‘pain’ is sepa-
rate and distinct from the concept of bodily ‘injury’”). 
 40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-105(33) (2012). 
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pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.”41 In 
Maryland, physical injury “means any impairment of physical 
condition, excluding minor injuries.”42 Arkansas includes “in-
fliction of bruising, swelling, or a visible mark associated with 
physical trauma.”43 Ohio also varies the standard definition 
somewhat, defining bodily injury as “physical harm to persons,” 
and “any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, re-
gardless of its gravity or duration.”44
Several states recognize some type of “mental” harm with-
in their definition of bodily or physical injury. In Tennessee, 
bodily injury “includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfig-
urement, and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment 
of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”
  
45 
Montana defines bodily injury to mean “physical pain, illness, 
or an impairment of physical condition and includes mental ill-
ness or impairment.”46
Taken together, this review of bodily injury definitions 
suggests that there is variation across the states, and with only 
a few exceptions, mental injury is not explicitly included under 
the bodily injury umbrella.
  
47
C. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS 
  
To better understand the language used in various stat-
utes, it is useful to consider dictionary definitions.48
 
 41. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(9) (2012); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2301 (2012). 
 Looking 
 42. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-203(c)(1) (West 2012). 
 43. ARK. CODE § 5-1-102 (14) (2010). 
 44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(3) (West 2012). 
 45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106 (2) (2010). 
 46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(5) (2011). 
 47. The variation in definitions also raises a question about the effects of 
language used to describe similar harms. For instance, does using the word 
“injury” as opposed to an “illness” affect our categorization of harm? Similarly, 
how do the words “disease” versus “disorder” affect public (and potentially ju-
ror) views? Such questions are ripe for additional analysis in future research.  
 48. Courts increasingly turn to dictionaries for assistance in statutory in-
terpretation. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary 
Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 277 (1998); A. Raymond 
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (1994); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become A Fortress: The United States Supreme 
Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 228–29 (1999); Note, Look-
ing It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 
(1994). Though as legal scholar William Popkin notes, today’s dictionaries are 
better described as “descriptive word-books that do not deal adequately with 
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first at the current version of Black’s Law Dictionary, bodily in-
jury is defined simply as “physical damage to a person’s body.”49 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is similar in de-
fining the term “bodily” as “having a body or a material form: 
physical, corporeal.” In both cases, these definitions simply 
change the question from “What constitutes bodily injury?” to 
“What constitutes physical injury?” Webster’s includes the fol-
lowing definitions for “physical”:50
2a: of or belonging to all created existences in nature: relating to or in 
accordance with the laws of nature 
 
2b: of or relating to natural or material things as opposed to things 
mental, moral, spiritual, or imaginary 
3a: of, relating to, concerned with, or devoted to natural science 
3b: of or relating to physics: characterized or produced by the forces 
and operations of physics: employed in the processes of physics 
4a: of or relating to the body—often opposed to mental 
4b: concerned or preoccupied with the body and its needs
51
As can be seen in the Webster’s entry, one way to define 
bodily/physical is through an exclusionary route—describing 
what bodily is not. To the extent that physical is defined as 
that which is not mental, it would suggest that “mental” inju-
ries are not physical injuries. But to the extent that physical is 
not spiritual, mental injuries might be included. The sixth edi-
tion of Black’s Law Dictionary used a “not mental” approach 
when it defined “bodily” as “pertaining to or concerning the 
body; of or belonging to the body or the physical constitution; 




statutory interpretation.” WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION xv (2007). 
 Similarly, the Random House Dic-
tionary of the English Language defines bodily as “1. of or per-
 49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009). The entry for “serious 
bodily injury” reads: “Serious physical impairment of the human body; esp., 
bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious, 
permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any body part or organ. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (1981). Typically, the 
fact-finder must decide in any given case whether the injury meets this gen-
eral standard. Generally, an injury meets this standard if it creates a substan-
tial risk of fatal consequences or, when inflicted, constitutes mayhem. This can 
be compared with mayhem, which is also termed serious bodily harm; grievous 
bodily harm; great bodily injury. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 857. 
 50. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (archaic defi-
nitions omitted). 
 51. Id. 
 52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (6th ed. 1990). 
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taining to the body. 2. corporeal or material, as contrasted with 
spiritual or mental.”53
The first, now obsolete, definition of “bodily” in the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED) provides a different sort of contrast: 
“Of the nature of body, corporeal, material, physical; as opposed 
to spiritual.”
 
54 Here, “physical” has more a sense of non-
spiritual as opposed to non-mental. If we then read the OED 
entry for “body” we find that body refers, in the first instance, 
to “the complete physical form of a person or animal; the as-
semblage of parts, organs, and tissues that constitutes the 
whole material organism.”55 While one way to contrast the body 
is with the soul, an alternative is to contrast the body with the 
head, as seen in a later OED entry defining the body as “the 
main portion of the animal frame, to which the head, neck, ex-
tremities, etc., are attached; the trunk. Freq. opposed to the 
limbs or to the head.”56
These definitions are a useful starting point, and suggest 
that the body may be contrasted with the soul or with the 
mind. But the definitions give little guidance in the way of def-
initely resolving whether, if recognized as brain-based, mental 
injuries should be considered bodily injury in criminal law.
 
57
D. CHALLENGES TO BODILY INJURY DEFINITIONS IN CRIMINAL 
LAW CASES 
 
Appendix A provides additional discussion, and additional defi-
nitions, of bodily injury as the term arises in the insurance and 
tort contexts. In those other legal contexts, too, the term is 
sometimes ambiguous. Unlike in criminal law, however, there 
is now a growing body of civil case law litigating the bodily in-
jury term.  
We have now seen that bodily injury is pervasive in law, 
and that bodily injury is defined in different, and often ambigu-
 
 53. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 232 (2d ed. 
2001). 
 54. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 962 (1st ed. 1933). The second defini-
tion in the OED, “of or belonging to the body or physical nature of man,” is 
akin to the entry in Black’s.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. To be sure, the problem of ambiguity is a general one. As William 
Eskridge, the leading proponent of dynamic statutory interpretation, has ar-
gued, “for any statute of consequence, the legislative drafting process ensures 
textual ambiguities, which only multiply over time.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994). 
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ous, ways. In this sub-Part, I examine cases in which the bodily 
injury definition has been challenged. Analysis of the cases 
finds first that existing definitions of bodily injury can be diffi-
cult to interpret in borderline cases, and second that judicial fi-
at about the clarity of the term has not been empirically test-
ed.58
The inadequacy of traditional bodily injury definitions was 
evident in the 1997 Iowa Supreme Court case State v. Gordon.
 
59 
In Gordon, the defendant was convicted by a jury of assault 
causing bodily injury.60 The case arose when, with several peo-
ple present, the defendant Thomas Gordon kicked the victim 
Jeremiah Fry unprovoked, leaving “a red mark to the right of 
Fry’s sternum.”61 The Iowa Supreme Court considered the issue 
of whether “a red mark or bruise constitute[s] a per se impair-
ment of physical condition.”62
During the trial, prosecution and defense counsel argued 
over the proper jury instruction on the bodily injury question. 
 
 
 58. I focus here on the issue of bodily versus non-bodily injury, and do not 
reach the related issue of what constitutes “serious” in “serious bodily injury.” 
But to be sure, the issue of determining how “serious” a bodily injury has been 
is of enormous interest, given that serious bodily injury is very often an aggra-
vating factor in modern criminal codes. See, e.g., Tracy A. Bateman, Annota-
tion, Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of Aggravated Assault, 5 
A.L.R.5th 243 (1992) (consisting of a nearly 300-page compendium of cases re-
lating to the question of how much injury is required to constitute serious bod-
ily injury). Where to draw the line between serious and non-serious, or sub-
stantial and non-substantial, is a matter for the jury. People v. Cross, 45 
Cal.4th 58, 64 (Cal. 2008) (“This court has long held that determining whether 
a victim has suffered physical harm amounting to great bodily injury is not a 
question of law for the court but a factual inquiry to be resolved by the jury. A 
fine line can divide an injury from being significant or substantial from an in-
jury that does not quite meet the description. Where to draw that line is for 
the jury to decide.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 59. 560 N.W.2d 4 (Iowa 1997). 
 60. Id. The issue has arisen in other criminal contexts in Iowa as well. 
See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 136 (Iowa 2004) (finding that evi-
dence was sufficient to support finding that defendant's conduct of breaking 
into vehicle and pulling victim out of vehicle caused victim, who was defend-
ant’s wife, bodily injury); State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 494–95 (Iowa 1999) 
(holding evidence that victim, who was struck in the chest with defendant’s 
fist, had the wind knocked out of him and momentarily felt pain was sufficient 
proof of bodily injury notwithstanding that victim had no visible injuries and 
did not require medical treatment), vacated, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). 
 61. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d at 5. 
 62. Id. at 4. The Iowa Supreme Court, in a later decision, found that a ba-
sis for bodily injury can be found when a victim suffered a sprained jaw, minor 
concussion, and a probable broken nose. State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d 283, 
287–88 (Iowa 2009). 
  
2052 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2036 
 
The following exchange occurred between defense counsel and 
the judge: 
THE COURT: Are you going to argue to the jury that a red mark on 
the skin is not a bodily injury? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I may. 
THE COURT: All right. Then I’ll tell the jury that a red mark on the 
skin is a bodily injury because they have a right to know that, and if 
there’s a dispute, then I’ll clear it up.63
Then, with defense objecting, the court gave the following in-
struction to the jury: 
 
A “bodily” injury means a bodily or physical pain, illness, or any im-
pairment of physical condition. A red mark or bruise on the skin 
would constitute an impairment of physical condition, and therefore 
an injury.64
The first part of the Gordon jury instruction is the defini-
tion of bodily injury as used in the Model Penal Code (MPC). 
The court’s use of the MPC definition was upheld as constitu-




At issue here is the ambiguity of the definition of bodily in-
jury in the MPC. As the court observed, “[n]either the Model 
Penal Code nor the Iowa Code defines impairment of physical 
condition.”
 But the second sentence of the jury in-
struction gave the Iowa Supreme Court pause. 
66 Because of this, judges cannot give instructions as 
to what, specifically, constitutes impairment of physical condi-
tion. Rather, as the court held, these are questions of fact “pe-
culiarly within the jury’s common experience and for them to 
decide.”67
Even though jurors’ common experience may not actually 
lead to a shared understanding of the term, still some courts 
refuse to offer instruction as to the definition of “bodily injury.” 
For instance, when asked whether he would define “serious 
bodily injury,” a Virginia judge said to the attorneys in the case 
that: 
 
I believe that Virginia is a state . . . [in which] words that don’t need 
defining we don’t define, words like preponderance of the evidence we 
do because it’s not an ordinary parlance meaning word. But constant-
ly the jury comes back and asks about the meaning of words in our 
instructions and we constantly tell them to their everlasting distress, 
 
 63. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d at 5. 
 64. Id.  
 65. State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1981) (citing MODEL PE-
NAL CODE commentary § 210.0(2) (1980)). 
 66. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d at 6 (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. 
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words are given their ordinary meaning in [E]nglish and we don’t de-
fine them.68
The judge’s phrase—that we don’t define “words that don’t 
need defining”—is indicative of other courts’ rulings as well. 
For instance, more than one Pennsylvania court has found that 
a failure to provide a bodily injury instruction is not prejudicial 
because “while ‘bodily injury’ is a legal term, its meaning is 
comprehensible to laymen without judicial guidance.”
 
69
Consider too the case of an inmate charged with third-
degree assault against a deputy jailer.
 
70 At trial, the court did 
not include a definition of physical injury in the jury instruc-
tions, and the defendant argued on appeal that “without the 
statutory definition of ‘physical injury,’ the jury was unaware of 
the proper standard to apply to the facts of the case.”71
The court’s analysis hinged on the court’s assessment of ju-
ror ability to understand and apply the physical injury element. 
The government and defendant offered competing claims: 
 The 
court found that this was in error, and then moved to an analy-
sis of whether the error was prejudicial. 
[T]he Commonwealth contends a reasonable jury could conclude 
Palmer suffered a “physical injury,” even without the assistance of 
the legal definition; hence, the error cannot be viewed as affecting the 
verdict. In contrast, Claus characterizes [the deputy jailer’s] testimo-
ny as “vague,” and he contends he suffered prejudice from the error 
because the jurors relied on their own opinions regarding the mean-
ing of physical injury and possibly applied an incorrect standard.72
On the facts of the particular case—in which the deputy 
jailer testified that the defendant hit him upon entering the de-
fendant’s cell following an altercation—the court ruled that 
there was no prejudice from the missing instruction because 
“the verdict would have been the same even if the statutory def-
inition of ‘physical injury’ had been included in the instruc-
 
 
 68. Brewster v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 288, 289 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
The Judge in this case did not allow an extra jury instruction to define “seri-
ous bodily injury.” Id.  
 69. Commonwealth v. Mott, 539 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. 1988); see also Braley 
v. State, 572 S.E.2d 583, 590 (Ga. 2002) (“‘Bodily injury’ is a term that is 
‘commonly understood’” (quoting Ferguson v. State, 438 S.E.2d 682, 684 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1993))); Commonwealth v. Goins, 501 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1985).  
 70. Claus v. Commonwealth, No. 2009 CA 000555 MR, 2010 WL 3717243, 
at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2010) (“An individual confined to a detention facil-
ity is guilty of third-degree assault when he intentionally or wantonly causes, 
or attempts to cause, physical injury to an employee of the facility.”). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at *2. 
  
2054 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2036 
 
tions.”73
The assumption has also been on display in cases in which 
defendants have challenged the constitutionality of bodily inju-
ry definitions on the grounds that they are too vague. While I 
do not suggest that confusion over bodily injury necessarily ris-
es to the level of unconstitutional vagueness, these cases are 
nevertheless instructive because they reveal underlying judicial 
attitudes. 
 Here, as before, the justice system assumes that lay ju-
rors share a common, correct understanding of bodily injury.  
For instance, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected the 
vagueness contention, reasoning first that “‘physical pain’ is not 
an ambiguous term, as any human being who has ever suffered 
such pain is obviously aware,” and second that “words of com-
mon usage in the English language need not be defined.”74
In Indiana, a court ruled that the term “bodily injury,” 
when challenged for being unconstitutionally vague, was clear-
ly understood by the common person: “We can think of no phe-
nomenon of more common experience and understanding than 
the concepts of ‘bodily injury’ and ‘physical pain.’ Likewise, we 
do not find the concept of ‘impairment of physical condition’ to 
be so esoteric as to avoid a consensus of meaning among per-
sons of common intelligence.”
 
75
Such pronouncements about a consensus of meaning rest, 
to date, solely on judicial assessments of jurors’ ordinary and 
common experience. These judicial assessments, of course, may 
be accurate, especially in easy cases such as injuries to append-
ages. And I do not claim that it is only with bodily injury that 




 73. Id. at *3. 
 
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the analysis above rests 
on a narrow set of decisions mostly related to vagueness chal-
lenges. Were prosecutors to regularly advance bodily injury ar-
guments of the type I explore in this paper, it could well be that 
judges might offer more detailed instructions. But whether and 
how they would craft such instructions would surely depend in 
part on assumptions about how ordinary people would concep-
 74. State v. Hart, No. 95-320, slip op. at 7 (Mont. Jan. 9, 1997). 
 75. Rogers v. State, 396 N.E.2d 348, 352 (Ind. 1979). 
 76. Indeed, as legal scholar Lawrence Solan has suggested, “During most 
of American judicial history, the predominant methodology for discovering or-
dinary meaning has been introspection. Without fanfare, judges simply rely 
upon their own sense of how common words are typically used.” Lawrence M. 
Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2054 (2005). 
  
2013] MIND, BODY, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 2055 
 
tualize the crime victim’s mental injuries, especially in light of 
the emergence of a neuroscientific understanding of “mental” 
illness and injury. I now turn to this emerging body of 
neuroscientific knowledge. 
II.  BRAIN INJURY AS BODILY INJURY: THE VIEW FROM 
NEUROSCIENCE   
Bodily injury elements in criminal law have not yet been 
challenged on the grounds of new neuroscientific findings. In 
this Part, I explain why, at least theoretically, this may change 
sometime in the future. I first discuss the general rise of 
neurolaw, pointing out how the focus of most research has been 
on the defendant’s and not the victim’s brain.77 I then discuss 
the Michigan governmental immunity case of Allen v. Bloom-
field Hills78
A. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE CRIMINAL VICTIM’S BRAIN 
 as an example of the types of brain-based bodily in-
jury arguments that might bleed into the criminal law. Appen-
dix B provides an illustrative example of how a “mental” injury, 
PTSD, can be understood and explained in biochemical and 
brain-based language. 
This sub-part briefly reviews the rise of neurolaw, discuss-
es how neuroscientific research has led to increasing recogni-
tion of mental illness as a brain-based injury, and offers evi-
dence suggesting that brain-based arguments in the context of 
bodily injury are likely to increase in future years. 
 
 77. In this Article, the phrases “Law and Neuroscience,” “Neuroscience 
and Law,” and “Neurolaw” will be used interchangeably to refer to the applica-
tion of neuroscience findings to law. For general introductions to law and neu-
roscience, see OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE (forthcoming 2013); STEPHEN J. MORSE & ADINA L. ROSKIES, A 
PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. 
Roskies eds., 2012); Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on 
Neuroscience, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (Fed. Judicial 
Ctr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 61 (2010); Owen D. Jones et al., 
Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 5 (2009); Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Nav-
igating the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L. J. LEGAL INFO. 352 (2010); 
Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions 
for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007). For additional resources, 
see MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON LAW & NEUROSCIENCE, 
www.lawneuro.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).  
 78. 760 N.W.2d 811 (2008). 
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1. The Emergence of Law and Neuroscience 
Many indicators suggest that neuroscientific evidence is 
rapidly becoming more prevalent and prominent in criminal 
proceedings across the country. Although the absolute number 
of neurolaw cases remains small, data collected by law profes-
sor Nita Farahany indicate a rapid rate of growth, with twice 
as many reported cases involving neuroscientific evidence in 
2009 than in 2006.79 The emerging intersection of neuroscience 
and law follows the quite rapid and large growth of the field of 
neuroscience more generally. In 1969 the Society for Neurosci-
ence (SfN) formed with 500 members.80 Today it numbers over 
40,000 members and hosts an annual conference attended by 
more than 31,000 members.81
The potential implications of neuroscience, for many areas 
of law and policy, are quite broad.
 The consistent and rapid growth 
of the neuroscience field suggests that the field is continuing on 
a trajectory to become even more important in the years to 
come. 
82 For example, scholars have 
debated both the theoretical and practical implications of neu-
roscience for law by addressing issues related to free will, de-
terminism, and compatabilism.83
In addition to generating much theoretical debate, 
neuroscientific evidence is rapidly becoming more prevalent 
 
 
 79. Nita A. Farahany, An Empirical Study of Brains and Genes in U.S. 
Criminal Law (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 80. What We Do: History of SfN, SOC’Y FOR NEUROSCIENCE, http://www 
.sfn.org/About/What-We-Do/History-of-SfN (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See generally LAW AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough 
eds., 2006) (discussing new opportunities for law resulting from the integra-
tion of law and neuroscience); Bruce A. Arrigo, Punishment, Freedom, and the 
Culture of Control: The Case of Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 457 (2007) (examining the application of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging brain-scanning technology to criminal justice); Nita A. Farahany & 
James E. Coleman, Jr., Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal Responsibility, 
in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 183 (Nita A. 
Farahany ed., 2009); LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2010 
(Michael Freeman ed., 2010); LAW, MIND AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oli-
ver R. Goodenough eds., 2009) (analyzing the intersection of law, justice, and 
neuroscience).  
 83. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neurosci-
ence Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 
LONDON BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004); Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the 
Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 
9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2008); Michael S. Pardo, Philosophical Founda-
tions of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211 (2010). 
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and prominent in criminal proceedings across the country. For 
instance, the federal courts have seen their first Daubert hear-
ing on the admissibility of functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) lie-detection evidence;84 a jury in Florida was in part 
persuaded by quantitative electroencephalography (QEEG) 
brain evidence to give a defendant a life sentence instead of the 
death penalty;85 and the United States Supreme Court has 
made reference to the science of adolescent brain development 
in multiple rulings regarding life without parole for juveniles.86 
In the courtroom, neuroimaging evidence has been offered in 
criminal, constitutional, disability benefit, and contract cases, 
among others.87 A growing number of conferences and symposia 
around the country have been launched to introduce judges and 
attorneys to these new developments.88
 
 84. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2010). 
 
 85. State v. Nelson, F05-846 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2010). 
 86. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464–66 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010). 
 87. Jones et al., supra note 77; Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law 
and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW 349 
(Tade M. Spranger ed., 2011). 
 88. For example, in 2007, the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral 
Research ran a conference titled Law, Biology and the Brain. In 2008, the 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society and the Petrie-Flom Center for 
Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics of Harvard Law School co-
hosted a roundtable panel titled Should Criminal Law Be Reconsidered in 
Light of Advances in Neuroscience?; the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law at 
Baylor College of Medicine hosted an event the Neuroscience and Law Confer-
ence; the University of California Riverside Extension Law & Science Program 
and the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research hosted Seminar on 
Law and Neuroscience. In 2009, the University of Akron School of Law hosted 
a law review symposium titled Neuroscience, Law, and Government; the Mac-
Arthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project sponsored a symposium ti-
tled Psychopathy and the Law; the Stanford Technology Law Review hosted a 
symposium titled Neuroscience and the Courts: The Implications of Advances 
in Neurotechnology; and the Vermont Law Review published a special issue 
about the intersection of emotions and legal institutions. Symposium, Emo-
tions in Context: Exploring the Interaction Between Emotions and Legal Insti-
tutions, 33 VT. L. REV. 3 (2009). In 2010, the American Enterprise Institute 
hosted an event titled Understanding Humans Through Neuroscience; Mercer 
Law Review hosted a conference titled The Brain Sciences in the Courtroom. 
In 2011, the Denver University Law Review hosted a symposium entitled 
Guilty Minds: Neuroscience and Criminal Law Symposium; and the Dana 
Foundation hosted a meeting titled Neuroscience and the Law in New York. 
Also in 2011, the National Academy of Sciences and the U.K. Royal Society co-
sponsored a forum titled Neuroscience and the Law. The MacArthur Founda-
tion Research Network on Law and Neuroscience continues to run such events 
See Education and Outreach, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON LAW & 
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/outreach.php (last visited Apr. 21, 
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Legislators are also already proposing new laws based on 
neuroscience findings. New York Assemblyman Michael Ben-
jamin introduced legislation to “ban the use of magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) brain scans in a criminal proceedings” 
where a defendant’s or witness’s truthfulness or knowledge of a 
specific event is at issue” during the 2009 legislative session.89
In 2009 Alabama State Representative Arthur Payne pro-
posed House Bill 785, providing that “a person commits the 
crime of assault in the second degree if the person, with intent 
to cause any physical injury to another person, causes serious 
physical injury to the brain of the other person.”
 
90 Representa-
tive Payne’s bill, which died in committee, proposed a definition 
of “serious physical injury to the brain” as “impairment of a 
person’s brain which creates a substantial risk of death, or 
which causes death or protracted impairment of health or pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of the brain.”91
Despite the increased attention to neuroscience and crimi-
nal law, comparatively little scholarship has examined the pos-
sible effects of neuroscientific evidence on our understanding of 





 This Article thus turns next to a brief 
review of the psychology and neuroscience of crime victim 
trauma. 




 90. H.R. 785, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2009). 
 91. Id.  
 92. There are exceptions; for example, in a short essay on the possible ap-
plications of law and neuroscience for prosecutors, I speculated that “one fu-
ture possibility is that neuroscience offers us more effective ways to communi-
cate the long-lasting and often devastating effects of crime on the brains of 
crime ‘victims.’” Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience: Possibilities for Pros-
ecutors, 33 CAL. DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N PROSECUTOR’S BRIEF 17, 23 n.41 (2011). 
To be sure, examination of the victim’s brain has been carried out in some 
neuroscience and tort law scholarship. See, e.g., Howard Fields, Can Neurosci-
ence Identify Pain?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO NEUROSCIENCE 32 (2010); Betsy J. 
Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the Ameri-
can Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND NEU-
ROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 203 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010); Betsy J. 
Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort Claims, 7 
AM. J. BIOETHICS 65 (2007); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the 
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011); Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Priva-
cy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007); Shen, Monetizing 
Memory Science, supra note 4; Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages 
and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 553 (2010). 
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2. Brain-Based Explanations for Crime Victims’ Mental 
Injuries 
Although assessment of the psychological costs of crime 
has not been a central concern of emerging law and neurosci-
ence scholarship, there is an extensive research literature on 
these costs.93 This research base finds that there is much varia-
tion in how individual crime victims will react psychologically 
to their victimization experience, but it is well established that 
common disorders arising from criminal assault include de-
pression, anxiety, and PTSD.94
Contemporary research on the cost of crime victimization 
has focused on crime’s effect on victims’ quality of life.
 
95 A re-
cent review of the research concludes: “findings from the well-
established literature on general trauma and the emerging re-
search on crime victimization indicate significant functional 
impact on the quality of life for victims.”96
 
 93. See, e.g., LAURENCE MILLER, COUNSELING CRIME VICTIMS: PRACTICAL 
STRATEGIES FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (2008); MARLENE A. 
YOUNG, Psychological Trauma of Crime Victimization, in VICTIM ASSISTANCE: 
FRONTIERS AND FUNDAMENTALS 1 (1993); Irene Hanson Frieze, Sharon 
Hymer & Martin S. Greenberg, Describing the Crime Victim: Psychological 
Reactions to Victimization, 18 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOL.: RESEARCH & PRAC. 
299 (1987); Patricia A. Resick, Psychological Effects of Victimization: Implica-
tions for the Criminal Justice System, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 468 (1987); 
Philip W. Wirtz & Adele V. Harrell, Assaultive Versus Nonassaultive Victimi-
zation: A Profile Analysis of Psychological Response, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIO-
LENCE 264 (1987). For discussion of victimology more generally, see ANDREW 
KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY (7th ed. 2010). 
 Victimology research 
 94. Ted R. Miller et al., Victim Costs of Violent Crime and Resulting Inju-
ries, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS 186, 196 (1993). For discussion in the context of rape, 
see Francis X. Shen, How We Still Fail Rape Victims: Reflecting on Responsi-
bility and Legal Reform, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2011); Shen, Monetizing 
Memory Science, supra note 4; Francis X. Shen, Assessing the Harms of Rape, 
Dissertation Chapter, Harvard University (2008) (on file with author). 
 95. See, e.g., Rochelle F. Hanson, Genelle K. Sawyer, Angela M. Begle & 
Grace S. Hubel, The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of Life, 23 J. 
TRAUMATIC STRESS 189 (2010). One way of conceptualizing the costs is by fo-
cusing on different domains such as: “(a) role functioning [i.e., difficulties in 
social, occupational, and interpersonal functioning], (b) life satisfaction and 
well-being, and (c) social–material conditions” (i.e., health costs, health care 
utilization, and employer costs). Id. at 190 (citing Madeline M. Gladis et al., 
Quality of Life: Expanding the Scope of Clinical Significance, 67 J. CONSULT-
ING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 320 (1999)). 
 96. Id. at 194. Additional psychological externalities include the possible 
negative psychological consequences for those who must regularly observe vio-
lence in their communities. Naomi Breslau & Glenn C. Davis, Migraine, Major 
Depression and Panic Disorder: A Prospective Epidemiologic Study of Young 
Adults, 12 CEPHALALGIA 85, 85 (1992); Naomi Breslau et al., Traumatic 
Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in an Urban Population of Young 
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has established that a large percentage of the costs of crime for 
victims is psychological.97
We can look to other policy domains to see momentum for 
recognizing these psychological injuries as bodily. Echoing the 
quote at the outset of this paper from Speaker Pelosi, in 2009 
on the floor of the United States House of Representatives, 
Congressman Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) argued that insurance 




As neuroscience discovers more about the biochemical pro-
cesses that correlate with mental phenomena, the distinction 
between “physical” and “mental” injury is being revisited in 
many legal and policy contexts.
  
99 In health law, for instance, 
there has been a sustained effort to enact mental health parity 
laws that recognize “biologically based mental illness.”100
There is an increased understanding that the mind/body split that 
18th century philosophers detailed is a fiction. The brain is a real 
part of the body and the brain and other organs of the body interact 
 Mark 
Anderson, who served as the late Senator Paul Wellstone’s sen-
ior mental health policy advisor in the Senate, describes the 
emerging policy position this way:  
 
Adults, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSCYCHOL. 216, 216 (1991). 
 97. Mark A. Cohen & Roger Bowles, Estimating Costs of Crime, in HAND-
BOOK OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 143 (Alex R. Piquero & David Weisburd 
eds., 2010); Miller et al., supra note 94, at 196.  
 98. 155 CONG. REC. H8188 (daily ed. July 16, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Patrick Kennedy).  
 99. See Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too—The Case for Equal 
Insurance Coverage for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 365 (1993); 
Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 
AKRON L. REV. 469, 489–97 (2009); see also Martha Chamallas, Removing 
Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751, 752 (2001) 
(arguing that “[i]n the hierarchy of torts, emotional and relational harms are 
not as fully protected as physical injury and property damage”); Martha 
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 463 (1998); John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for 
Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789 (2007); State Laws Mandating or 
Regulating Mental Health Benefits, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14352 (last updated Dec. 2012). In the area 
of mental health, due to both interest group pressure and new scientific re-
search, many states have redefined mental illness as “biologically based.” 
Marcia C. Peck & Richard M. Scheffler, An Analysis of the Definitions of Men-
tal Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1089, 1091–
93 (2002). There is evidence that this is happening in the United Kingdom as 
well. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 6. 
 100. Shannon, supra note 99; Tovino, supra note 99; see also NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 99.  
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in numerous ways so that a health care system that does not treat the 
brain with the body is outmoded.101
Survey data finds that there is widespread support for 
mental health parity. When respondents in a nationally repre-
sentative sample were asked, “Is mental health care just as im-
portant to cover as physical health care?,” an overwhelming 
78% said yes.
 
102 In a different national poll, 82% of U.S. citizens 
agreed with the statement that “[t]reatment for mental illness 
should be included in the President’s proposal to the same ex-
tent as treatment for physical illnesses.”103 Additional data find 
that in the period from 1996 to 2006 the percentage of citizens 
viewing depression as a neurobiological disease increased from 
54% to 67%.104
This shift toward a neurobiological understanding of men-
tal illness is due in part to the concerted efforts of mental 
health advocacy organizations to educate the public. For in-
stance, the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) spon-
sors a number of educational programs, including a program 
created in 1999 called “Breaking the Silence: Teaching the Next 
Generation About Mental Illness.”
 
105
Campaigns to end stigmatization of mental illness have re-
lied in large part on brain evidence, and have argued that there 
is no neuroscientific basis for differentiating insurance cover-




 101. Mark Anderson & Lynda Cannova, 50 Years of Mental Health Hope 
and Struggle: 1957–2007, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://www 
.crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=54 (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
 And these 
 102. Kristina W. Hanson, Public Opinion and the Mental Health Parity De-
bate: Lessons from the Survey Literature, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1059 
(1998) (citing NATIONAL SURVEY OF 800 REGISTERED VOTERS CONDUCTED FOR 
THE BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MELLMAN-LAZARUS-LAKE, 
INC. (1994)). 
 103. Id. at tbl. 1 (citing NATIONAL TELEPHONE SURVEY OF 1,006 ADULTS 
CONDUCTED FOR NBC NEWS AND THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, HART & TEE-
TER RESEARCH CO. (1993)). 
 104. Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., “A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of 
Change in Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol De-
pendence, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1321 (2010). 
 105. Breaking the Silence: Teaching School Kids About Mental Illness, 
NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://tinyurl.com/3kcwpxv (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2013). 
 106. Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Cov-
erage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 63, 65–70 (1997); see also Pescosolido et al., supra note 104, at 1327 
(“[n]euroscientific advances are fundamentally transforming the landscape of 
mental illness and psychiatry”). New neuroscientific evidence may further 
erode the physical/mental barrier. For instance, in one functional magnetic 
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campaigns have been ongoing since the 1990s. For instance, in 
1996 in testimony before Congress, Dr. Steven Hyman—a Har-
vard neuroscientist, and then director of the National Institute 
of Mental Health—said:  
I can state without reservation that research shows no biomedical 
justification for differentiating serious mental illness from other seri-
ous and potentially chronic disorders of the nervous system such as 
stroke, brain tumor, or paralysis. There is absolutely no biomedical 
justification for policies that judge mental disorders as being in any 
way less real or less deserving of treatment . . . .107
While many policymakers have now embraced Dr. Hy-
man’s position in the context of mental health parity policies, 
the criminal justice system still relies in critical ways on dis-
tinctions between a victim’s mental and physical injuries.
 
108
An illustrative example can be seen in how one California 
law firm (specializing in criminal defense) explains the state’s 
 To 
be clear, and as I will argue later in the Article, there are good 
arguments for and against maintaining these distinctions, even 
as they dissolve in other legal arenas. But before turning to 
those arguments, we must understand how the distinctions 
matter. 
 
resonance imaging (fMRI) study from 2011, a team of neuroscientists led by 
Ethan Kross found that the brain activation patterns of social rejection (hav-
ing subjects view the photo of an ex-partner who recently rejected them) were 
similar to the brain activation patterns of physical pain (putting painful heat 
on subjects’ forearms). Ethan Kross, Marc G. Berman, Walter Mischel, Ed-
ward E. Smith & Tor D. Wager, Social Rejection Shares Somatosensory Repre-
sentations with Physical Pain, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. OF AMERICA 
6270, 6270 (2011); see also Naomi I. Eisenberger, Matthew D. Lieberman & 
Kipling D. Williams, Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion, 
302 SCI. 290 (2003) (examining the neural correlates of social exclusion and 
testing the hypothesis that the brain bases of social pain are similar to brain 
bases of physical pain). 
 107. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before Subcomm. of the 
Comm. on Appropriations, 104th CONG. 377 (1996) (statement of Steven Hy-
man, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health) [hereinafter Hear-
ings]. 
 108. In tort law, there is a longer history of recognizing and evaluating 
non-physical harm. It had already been said in 1955 that “the literature on the 
subject [of distinguishing mental from physical harm] is voluminous, if not ex-
haustive.” Kaufman v. W. Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1955). As 
far back as 1993, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that “the medical commu-
nity now knows that ‘every emotional disturbance has a physical aspect and 
every physical disturbance has an emotional aspect.’” Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hugh, 
501 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Comment, Negligently Inflicted 
Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 
n.24 (1971) (citation omitted)). The court concluded that an insurance policy’s 
definition of “bodily injury” provided coverage for emotional distress. Id. 
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domestic violence law to its potential clients.109 The firm poses 
the following question on its web site: “How does the prosecutor 
prove that I am guilty of a Penal Code 273.5 [domestic violence] 
violation?”110
In defining the term bodily injury for its clients, the law 
firm writes on its web site that “a ‘bodily’ injury is just that . . . 
a physical injury to the body. . . . [C]ommon examples . . . in-
clude: hitting, punching, kicking, slapping, biting, and push-
ing.”
 The firm tells its clients that amongst the ele-
ments the State must prove are that the defendant “inflicted 
corporal (bodily) injury upon (a) your current or former spouse, 
(b) your current or former cohabitant (that is, someone with 
whom you share or shared a residence), or (c) the mother or fa-
ther of your child.” 
111 The firm specifically notes that “[s]ince a corporal injury 
is a bodily injury, causing emotional and/or mental abuse alone 
will not subject one to liability.”112
3. The Future of Brain-Based Bodily Injury Claims 
 This example illustrates 
nicely the way in which the definition of bodily injury is com-
municated by attorneys to their potential clients. In this con-
text, it is made clear that physical injury to the victim is re-
quired in order to trigger criminal liability for domestic 
violence; you can mentally abuse your spouse and you won’t be 
held criminally liable. 
The rise of neuroscience and law generally, and the in-
creasing willingness of society and different bodies of law to 
recognize mental injury as brain-based, suggests that future 
litigation over bodily injury will increasingly involve 
neuroscientific evidence. To gain some additional purchase on 
this prediction, I conducted a search in Westlaw for cases that 
included both the word “brain” and the phrase “bodily injury.” 
This is, at best, a rough proxy for the actual number of such 
cases. But the results, presented in Figure 1, are nonetheless 
suggestive. 
 
 109. See California Penal Code 273.5 PC: Corporal Injury on a Spouse, Co-
habitant, or Fellow Parent, SHOUSE L. GROUP, http://www.shouselaw.com/ 
domestic_violence273-5.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. The firm does also note, however, that “instances of emotional 
and/or mental abuse may sometimes be prosecuted under Penal Code 422, Cal-
ifornia's criminal threats law or under Penal Code 646.9, California's stalking 
law.” Id. 
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Since the 1980s, and especially since the late 1990s, the 
number of these cases seems to be rising dramatically.113 Such 
growth, if indeed the chart is accurate in measuring it, would 
be similar to the growth being seen in neurolaw cases more 
generally.114
 
 At a minimum, it suggests that preparing for 
brain-based bodily injury claims is a wise strategy for courts 
and legislatures to adopt. 
Figure 1 
Results of “Brain” & “Bodily Injury” Search in 
Westlaw’s ALLCASES Database:115

















B. THE CASE OF ALLEN V. BLOOMFIELD HILLS 
We do not know what a brain-based bodily injury case 
would look like in criminal law, but there is at least one non-
criminal case in which an analogous argument persuaded a 
 
 113. See infra Figure 1.  
 114. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 115. This database “contains documents from the U.S. Supreme Court, 
courts of appeals, former circuit courts, district courts, bankruptcy courts, 
former Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims, Tax Court, related federal 
and territorial courts, military courts, the state courts of all 50 states and the 
local courts of the District of Columbia.” Scope ALLCASES, WESTLAW CLASSIC, 
rootURL (follow “Scope” hyperlink next to the ALLCASES hyperlink in “Cases” 
source box on main page) (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). Analysis of randomly 
selected hits suggests that the volume of these results is largely due to crimi-
nal cases centering on violence to the brain (either to victim or defendant). 
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court. In 2010, a case before the Michigan Supreme Court 
would have dealt with precisely the question of whether PTSD 
constitutes a “bodily” harm had the parties not settled out of 
court.116 The case was brought by plaintiff Charles Allen, who 
was conducting a train when he hit a school bus (with only a 
driver inside) that had moved around the railroad barriers and 
onto the train tracks.117 Allen hit the bus at a speed at sixty-five 
miles per hour, and the bus driver was seriously injured.118 Al-
len brought his suit against the owner of the school bus, the 
Bloomfield Hills School District.119
By making the school district the target of the suit, Allen 
was aiming to take advantage of Michigan’s motor vehicle ex-
ception to government immunity.
 
120 Michigan law states that 
“[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and 
property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any 
officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a mo-
tor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner.”121 The 
operative words—and the reason this case is of great interest 
for this Article—are “liable for bodily injury.” Since Allen’s 
damages were primarily those from PTSD, and not more tradi-
tional “bodily” injury, his recovery would be barred by statute 
unless he could convince the court that the Michigan legisla-
ture intended to include PTSD as a “bodily” injury for purposes 
of the statute.122
Dr. Joseph C. Wu presented an affidavit on Allen’s behalf, 
stating that a PET scan of Allen “depicted ‘decreases in frontal 
and subcortical activity consistent with depression and post 
traumatic stress disorder.’” He further opined “that ‘the ab-
normalities in Mr. Allen’s brain as depicted on the September 
8, 2006, PET scan are quite pronounced and are clearly differ-
ent in brain pattern from any of the normal controls. They are 




 116. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 815–16 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing expert testimony on the relationship be-
tween PTSD and the brain), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 779 N.W.2d 793 
(Mich. 2010). 
 Allen al-
so submitted a report by Dr. Gerald A. Shiener noting that 
 117. Id. at 812. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  
 121. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1405 (2000). 
 122. See Allen, 760 N.W.2d at 814–15.  
 123. Id. at 815. 
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PTSD “causes significant changes in brain chemistry, brain 
function, and brain structure.”124
The trial court sided with the defense, which argued that 




  The brain is a part of the human body, so “harm or damage done 
or sustained” is injury to the brain and within the common meaning 
of “bodily injury” in MCL 691.1405, as elucidated in Wesche. The 
question on appeal then becomes, for purposes of reviewing the trial 
court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant, whether plaintiff 
produced sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact that 
he suffered a “bodily injury” as so defined. In doing so, we must still 
adhere to the court rules and follow the law. We must review any evi-
dence of a claimed “bodily injury” in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Also, we must conduct our review with common 
sense, and with cognizance of modern medical science and the human 
body. Here, plaintiff presented objective medical evidence that a men-
tal or emotional trauma can indeed result in physical changes to the 
brain. 
 but an appeal was made and the appellate court ruled in 
favor of Allen, reasoning that: 
  Although the brain is the organ responsible for our thoughts and 
emotions, it is also the organ that controls all our physical functions. 
The fact that it serves more than one function hardly detracts from 
the fact that it is one of our major organs. It can be injured. It can be 
injured directly and indirectly. It can be injured by direct and indirect 
trauma. What matters for a legal analysis is the existence of a mani-
fest, objectively measured injury to the brain. Consequently, to sur-
vive a motion for summary disposition, we must determine whether 
plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that Allen suffered from an ob-
jectively manifested physical injury to his brain.126
This ruling led to a further appeal, this time by the school 
district, to the Michigan Supreme Court, where again both 
sides made their case through briefs. The briefs submitted to 
the Michigan Supreme Court sparred over statutory interpreta-




 124. Id. 
 Allen’s legal team cited 
multiple scientific sources, including the U.S. Surgeon Gen-
eral’s 1999 report on mental health, which argued that 
“[p]eople continue to see mental and physical as separate func-
 125. See id. at 812.  
 126. Id. at 815. 
 127. See, e.g., Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Opposing Brief to Defendant-Appellant’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal at 14–20, Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 
779 N.W.2d 793 (Mich. 2010) (No. 137607), 2008 WL 7165010, at *14–20; De-
fendant-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal at 10–19, Allen, 779 
N.W.2d 793 (No. 137607), 2008 WL 7165008, at *10–19. 
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tions when, in fact, mental functions (e.g., memory) are physical 
as well.”128
The defense pointed to legislative intent and past case 
law.
 
129 Regarding legislative intent, the Michigan Attorney 
General filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the defense 
arguing that “[n]othing in the statutory language of the motor 
vehicle exception reflects intent by the Legislature to apply the 
motor vehicle exception to mental, emotional, or psychiatric 
disorders, even if the secondary effect of such disorders is a 
change in the brain or any other part of the body.”130 Relying on 
an earlier case, the Attorney’s General’s brief argued in several 
ways that “damages of a spiritual or mental nature are not en-
compassed within the plain language of the motor vehicle ex-
ception.”131
Recognizing the potential magnitude of the decision for tort 
recovery, the Court allowed supplemental briefs to be filed, as 
well as amicus briefs from the Michigan Association for Justice, 
the Michigan Attorney General, the Insurance Institute of 
Michigan,
 The defense also made a slippery-slope policy argu-
ment, warning that swinging open the doors in this case would 
ultimately force the school district to allocate less money to 
students. 
132 and the Brain Injury Association of Michigan.133
 
 128. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Supplemental Brief at 5, Allen, 779 N.W.2d 793 
(No. 137607), 2009 WL 4227403, at *5 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HU-
MAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6 (1999) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/ 
access/NNBBHS.pdf). It was also noted in the Surgeon General’s Report that 
“[t]he brain is the organ of mental function; psychological phenomena have 
their origin in that complex organ. Psychological and sociocultural phenomena 
are represented in the brain through memories and learning, which involve 
structural changes in the neurons and neuronal circuits.” U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra, at 50. 
 
That so many third parties took a large interest in the case 
speaks to the significant implications of (re)defining bodily in-
jury to include PTSD without additional “physical” manifesta-
tions. 
 129. See e.g., Defendant-Appellant’s Reply to Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposing 
Brief to Defendant-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal at 2–3, Allen, 
779 N.W.2d 793 (No. 137607), 2008 WL 7165009, at *2–3. 
 130. Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General in Support of Defendant-
Appellee Bloomfield Hills School District’s Application for Leave to Appeal at 
3, Allen, 779 N.W.2d 793 (No. 137607), 2009 WL 4227401, at *3. 
 131. Id. at 3 (citing Wesche v. Mecosta Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 746 N.W.2d 847, 
853–54 (Mich. 2008)). 
 132. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 764 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. 2009). 
 133. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 772 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 2009).  
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Because the case settled, we do not know how the Michigan 
Supreme Court would have ruled. Nor do we know how such an 
argument would have fared in a criminal context. But we can 
begin to explore the possibility of such an argument appearing 
in criminal courts through experimental research. I turn now to 
those experiments. 
III.  BODILY INJURY EXPERIMENTS   
This Part discusses original experiments that test lay un-
derstanding of bodily injury in criminal contexts. Because this 
is the first empirical assessment of lay understandings of the 
term “bodily injury,” the following strategy was employed as 
proof of concept. First, data was collected in the Common Un-
derstanding Experiment (Experiment One) to see if lay people 
share similar intuitions about what constitutes bodily injury. 
Second, the Jury Instructions Experiment (Experiment Two) 
was designed to test whether there are any conditions (even if 
stylized) under which mental trauma is considered by experi-
mental subjects as bodily injury.134
A. CONTEXT AND RELATED EMPIRICAL WORK 
 This Part is organized into 
five sub-Parts: (A) Context and Related Empirical Work; (B) 
Design of Common Understanding Experiment; (C) Results of 
Common Understanding Experiment; (D) Design Of Jury In-
structions Experiment; and (E) Results of Jury Instructions 
Experiment. 
Over the past two decades, scholars have increasingly em-
ployed quantitative empirical methods to assess the efficacy, 
fairness, and operation of law.135
 
 134. Given the cost of running experiments with nationally representative 
samples (costs which can rise over $10 per subject), establishing the most (or 
least) promising avenues for future research is especially important. See Adam 
J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Re-
search: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 353–54 (2012) 
(presenting evidence comparing traditional and online methods of conducting 
survey experiments). Additional inquiry, now warranted given the proof of 
concept, can help to determine with much more specificity under what condi-
tions lay people are more/less likely to label a crime victim’s injury as bodily 
injury. 
 In the criminal law, social sci-
 135. See Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741, 1742 (2004) (citing evidence of growth of empirical 
legal scholarship); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 144–47 (2006) (providing 
an intellectual history of the rise of empirical legal scholarship); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 904–10 (2011) (dis-
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ence tools have been used to inform criminal law theory (and 
vice versa).136 Empirically assessing the effects of criminal jus-
tice reform in the real world is hard because it is difficult to ad-
equately control for a number of confounding variables.137 In 
real-world legal settings (as in most real-world policy settings), 
true random assignment is not feasible or ethical.138 One way 
that scholars have addressed this issue of causation is to devel-
op experimental studies, where the causal effect of manipula-
tions can be more readily ascertained.139
There are also empirical literatures examining the effects 
of many types of jury instructions on juror outcomes,
  
140 examin-
ing the effects of victim impact statements,141
 
cussing the trend toward more empirical legal scholars on law school facul-
ties). 
 and exploring ju-
 136. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist Versus Sub-
jectivist Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal 
Law Theory, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 416–18 (1998). 
 137. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the 
MPCS, 61 FLA. L. REV. 797, 811–13 (2009) (discussing how statistical evalua-
tions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing (MPCS) are difficult due in large 
part to an inability to show causation). 
 138. David S. Goldman, Legal Construct Validation: Expanding Empirical 
Legal Scholarship to Unobservable Concepts, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 116–17 
(2007) (discussing the use of quasi-experimental methods in legal scholarship 
to avoid practical and ethical concerns associated with traditional randomized 
experiments). 
 139. For a general discussion of the rise of the empirical, including experi-
mental, approach in law, see Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Intro-
duction to the Symposium on Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791 (2002). As legal theorist Paul Robinson and psycholo-
gist John Darley (pioneers in this research tradition) wrote fifteen years ago: 
“[W]e seek to demonstrate to criminal law theorists and code drafters 
. . . [that] experimentation[] can be brought to bear on their issues of debate.” 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 136, at 417. With the exception of randomized 
field trials, laboratory experiments are thought to trade better internal validi-
ty for worse external validity. See Gregory Mitchell, Revisiting Truth or Trivi-
ality: The External Validity of Research in the Psychological Laboratory, 7 
PERSP. ON PSYCH. SCI. 109, 109 (2012) (reviewing research on the conventional 
wisdom that “highly controlled experiments produce internally valid findings 
with suspect external validity”). In the experiments reported in this Article, 
caution is warranted in making generalizations to other subject populations 
and to real-world conditions. 
 140. See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Lan-
guage Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges' Cautionary In-
structions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 31 (1996). 
 141. Findings in the literature are mixed, but there is evidence that the 
severity of emotional harm described in victim impact statements affects pun-
ishment levels. For a review, see Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Im-
pact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 
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ry decision making generally.142 Related, though not directly on 
point, is empirical research on subject response to non-bodily 
(or “emotional”) harms. Empirical research has shown, for in-
stance, that punitive damage awards vary significantly be-
tween bodily and non-bodily injuries (with punitive damages 
being awarded by judges less frequently than juries for non-
bodily injuries).143 At the same time, however, subjects respond 
with harsher punishments when they are told in victim impact 
statements about greater emotional harm experienced by the 
victim.144
In the realm of neurolaw, a small number of behavioral ex-
periments have been conducted to test the effect of 
neuroscientific evidence on juror and judge decision making.
  
145 
While some early empirical work suggested that the “seductive 
allure” of brain images would unduly persuade jurors,146
 
(2003). See also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting and Capital Sen-
tencing: Reducing the Effect of Victim Impact Statements, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
107 (2009) (reporting the results of two experiments suggesting that victim 
impact statements increase the imposition of capital sentences because of a 
perception of prolonged emotional harm); Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim 
Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 634–36 (2009) (presenting em-
pirical evidence that victim impact statements do not affect sentence severity 
in either capital or non-capital cases); Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the 
Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & 
JUST. 347, 373–75 (2009) (concluding that there is no aggregate effect on sen-
tencing from victim impact statements). 
 a more 
recent and much more robust set of studies suggests just the 
opposite: relative to other scientific evidence that would be ad-
mitted in its place, there is no significant relationship between 
 142. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making: 
Implications for and from Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 
63 (2011); Jessica M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Promise of a 
Cognitive Perspective on Jury Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 
174 (2010).  
 143. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: 
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, 
and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 285–87 (2006). 
 144. See Blumenthal, supra note 141, at 114. 
 145. Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does 
Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges' Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337 
SCIENCE 846 (2012); David P. McCabe et al., The Influence of fMRI Lie Detec-
tion Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 566 (2011); N.J. 
Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, 
17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357 (2011); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The 
Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI-
ENCE 470 (2008). 
 146. Weisberg et al., supra note 145, at 475–76. 
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the introduction of brain imaging evidence, per se, and pun-
ishment or blame outcomes.147
While these and other related studies are of interest, they 
are not instructive on the central questions of this Article: 
whether there is consensus on what constitutes “bodily injury,” 
whether the definition of the term provided in jury instructions 
matters, and whether appeals to brain-based arguments and 
evidence affect bodily injury determination. 
 
Two previous experiments that I have conducted on bodily 
injury in the context of tort provide some preliminary expecta-
tions about what we might find in the criminal context.148
After reading the vignette, subjects were then asked: “Im-
agine for a moment that you were deciding this case, and you 
had to rule one way or the other. How would you rule?” Sub-
jects were offered two choices: (a) John’s experience of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder IS a “bodily” injury, and he should 
be able to collect on his insurance policy; (b) John’s experience 
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is NOT a “bodily” injury, and 
he should NOT be able to collect on his insurance policy.
 In 
Tort Experiment One, I randomly assigned subjects to read one 
of three case summaries. Each summary was based on the Al-
len case described in Part II.B. Group One, the “Baseline” 
group, was exposed to only the summary, which made no men-
tion of neuroscience. Group Two, the “Plaintiff” group, was ex-
posed to only the plaintiff’s expert providing neuroscience in-
formation to support the plaintiff’s case that PTSD is a bodily 
injury. Group Three, the “Both” group, was exposed to both the 
plaintiff and the defendant experts’ testimony. 
149
Subjects in Tort Experiment Two were also randomly as-
signed to a Baseline, Plaintiff, or Both group. Subjects were 
asked to read a short case summary. The case summary in Ex-
periment Two was based on an actual reported PTSD civil liti-




 147. Schweitzer et al., supra note 
 The case 
was chosen because it was a relatively straightforward case of 
premises liability and because the actual settlement amount 
145, at 387–88. 
 148. See Shen, supra note 4. 
 149. The experiment did not, nor did it intend to, present subjects with a 
realistic trial experience. It does, however, provide us with a first step in that 
direction and with insights into the dynamics of public support for legislative 
policymaking in this arena. 
 150. No. 07-44531 32D, 2009 WL 4731140 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2009). 
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was known: $207,500.151 The facts reported were that the plain-
tiff was attacked in a Walmart parking lot one night in 2006, 
and he then sued Walmart to seek damages both for a shoulder 
injury and for PTSD.152 The plaintiff reported that he “sought 
counseling and report[ed] a heightened level of anxiousness in 
busy areas and in parking lots.”153 He sought only $6000 in 
medical costs, leaving the rest—roughly $200,000—for pain 
and suffering from PTSD and loss of consortium to the victim’s 
wife, who was also a plaintiff in the case.154 The defense argued 
that the plaintiff was “not suffering from PTSD, noting that he 
was able to gain a promotion at work and had a child with his 
wife.”155
In the experiment (not in the real case), the plaintiff’s ex-
pert claimed he could confirm the plaintiff’s PTSD via a brain 
scan. The “Both” group, however, learned that upon cross-
examination of the plaintiff’s expert, the case for biomarking 
PTSD was not as strong.
 
156
After reading the vignette, all three groups in Experiment 
Two were asked: “Imagine for a moment that you were deciding 
this case, and you had to award some damage amount to [the 
victim]. How much would you award for the bad memories from 
PTSD?” Subjects then used a slider bar to choose an amount 
from $0 to $1,000,000. 
 In this way, the vignette provided a 
glimpse into how individuals might respond both to the un-
checked promise and the more realistic complexity of 
neuroscientific research on PTSD biomarkers. 
The results from these two tort experiments suggested (a) 
that at baseline, a strong majority of subjects (72%) believe that 
PTSD constitutes a bodily injury; (b) that if subjects are ex-
posed only to neuroscientific information that is favorable to 
the plaintiff, they are more likely (88%) to feel this way; but (c) 
if exposed both to the plaintiff’s scientific expert and a critique 
 
 151. As reported, the amount was reached via mediation with mediator 
Cindy Hanna. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. A biological marker, or “biomarker” for short, is a physiological indica-
tor of a disease. Christoph W. Turck et al., Proteomic Strategies for Biomarker 
Discovery: From Differential Expression to Isofroms to Pathways, in BI-
OMARKERS FOR PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 57, 60 fig.3.1 (2009). 
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from a defense expert, support for the bodily claim drops (to 
62%).157
B. DESIGN OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING EXPERIMENT  
  
Against this backdrop of experimental findings in the tort 
context, Experiment One was designed to offer more general 
findings on how lay people assess bodily injury. The primary 
goal was to establish—as a baseline—how subjects apply the 
bodily injury label to a range of different injuries. The experi-
ment also set out to identify the possible effect (on bodily injury 
determination) of exposure to mental health parity arguments.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The 
control group was simply told: “Sometimes courts have to de-
termine what injuries constitute ‘bodily’ injury. For each of the 
following injuries, please determine whether the injury consti-
tutes a bodily injury.” Ten injuries, which vary in their severi-
ty, were presented for rating: Broken Leg, Broken Ribs, Con-
cussion, Sprained Wrist, Scratch on Forearm, Torn Lung 
Tissue, Memory Loss, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Recur-
ring Headaches, and Depression. Subjects were asked to rate 
each injury on a 1–5 scale as follows: 1 = This injury is definite-
ly not bodily injury; 2 = This injury is probably not bodily inju-
ry; 3 = This injury might be bodily injury; 4 = This injury is 
probably bodily injury; and 5 = This injury is definitely bodily 
injury. 
Before rating the ten injuries, the treatment group was 
presented with the following paragraph: “Since the 1990s, 
many have argued for ‘mental health parity’—treating mental 
illness in the same way that we treat physical illness. For in-
stance, in 1996 the director of the National Institute of Mental 
Health testified to Congress that: ‘I can state without reserva-
tion that research shows no biomedical justification for differ-
entiating serious mental illness from other serious and poten-
tially chronic disorders of the nervous system such as stroke, 
brain tumor, or paralysis. There is absolutely no biomedical 
justification for policies that judge mental disorders as being in 
any way less real or less deserving of treatment . . . .’”158
To gain additional purchase on how subjects conceptualize 
bodily injury, all subjects were asked after the rating exercise 
to provide their own definition of bodily injury: “Now, in your 
 
 
 157. Shen, supra note 4, at 345. 
 158. Hearings, supra note 107.  
  
2074 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2036 
 
own words, how would you describe or define the term ‘bodily 
injury’?” Subjects were required to provide an answer of at 
least fifty characters. 
1. Experimental Subjects 
To carry out both Experiment One and Experiment Two, I 
utilized a web-based experimental platform, Qualtrics, to host 
the experiment.159 Research using Qualtrics-based experiments 
has been published and presented in a number of academic 
fields, suggesting that it meets scholarly expectations for quali-
ty online web-based experiments.160
All subjects were recruited via modest payments made 
available through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk payment service. 
No personally identifying information was collected. Studies 
assessing the quality of Turk subjects have found them to be 
engaged in the online experimental stimuli and to be signifi-
cantly more representative than the convenience samples that 
would otherwise be used.
  
161 While certainly not the gold stand-
ard of a truly nationally representative (but prohibitively cost-
ly) sample, Mechanical Turk nonetheless provides high-quality, 
low-cost subjects.162
The total number of subjects was 180 for Experiment One 
and 425 for Experiment Two. This number provided enough 
 As discussed in more detail in Appendix C, 
filtering questions were used to ensure that subjects were care-
fully reading through the experiment. 
 
 159. Researchers in psychology have increasingly turned to web-based ex-
periments because they offer a “large number of participants” and “high statis-
tical power.” Ulf-Dietrich Reips, Standards for Internet-Based Experimenting, 
49 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (2002) (quoting Jochen Musch & Ulf-
Dietrich Reips, A Brief History of Web Experimenting, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EX-
PERIMENTS ON THE INTERNET 61, 70 (Michael H. Birnbaum ed., 2000)). 
 160. Studies relying on Qualtrics experiments include Jonathan S. 
Abramowitz et al., Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms: The Contribution of Ob-
sessional Beliefs and Experiential Avoidance, 23 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 160 
(2009); Yany Grégoire et al., When Customer Love Turns into Lasting Hate: 
The Effects of Relationship Strength and Time on Customer Revenge and 
Avoidance, 73 J. MARKETING (2009); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of 
Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010).  
 161. Berinsky et al., supra note 134, at 366; Michael Buhrmester et al., 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, yet High-Quality, 
Data?, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 4 (2011); John J. Horton et al., The Online 
Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERI-
MENTAL ECON. 399, 402 (2011). 
 162. In order to better approximate a jury-eligible subject pool, I took the 
additional step of filtering out, via an initial screening question, subjects who 
indicated that they had been convicted of a felony. 
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statistical power in each experiment to test the Article’s central 
hypotheses. At the end of each experiment, I collected demo-
graphic information from each of the subjects (summarized in 
Table 1). While not a truly nationally representative sample, 
the 605 subjects who participated in the experiments came 
from forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.163 My 
sample was skewed in terms of gender, with 64% subjects fe-
male and only 36% male. My sample was 81% white, higher 
than the national average. In terms of education, my subjects 
are skewed toward having more education, but in terms of in-
come, my subjects reported less income than the population 
distribution as a whole.164 Taken as a whole, it can be said that 
while not nationally representative, the sample is surely more 
demographically diverse than traditional psychology experi-







 163. Only Alaska and Idaho, which collectively make up less than 1% of the 
nation’s population, were not represented in the pool of subjects. 
 164. It should be noted that the Census estimates do not take into account 
the most recent economic downturns, which may account for some of the dis-
crepancy. 
 165. The issue is discussed in Francis X. Shen, et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1324–26 (2011). Over-reliance on undergraduates has 
generated the term “science of the sophomore” and led to long-standing de-
bates over the validity of studies relying solely on students. See, e.g., Michael 
E. Gordon et al., The “Science of the Sophomore” Revisited: From Conjecture to 
Empiricism, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 191 (1986). For one critique of the repre-
sentativeness of experimental samples in the social sciences, see Steven Levitt 
& John A. List, What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Prefer-
ences Reveal About the Real World?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 154 (2007) (sug-
gesting that “great caution is required when attempting to generalize lab re-
sults out of sample”). For reviews of the literature, see generally Jerald 
Greenberg, The College Sophomore as Guinea Pig: Setting the Record Straight, 
12 ACAD. MGMT REV. 157 (1987) (recognizing value in the role of college stu-
dents in experimental research); Marc Hooghe et al., Why Can’t a Student Be 
More Like an Average Person?: Sampling and Attrition Effects in Social Sci-
ence Field and Laboratory Experiments, 628 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 85 (2010) (discussing the limitations of experimental samples that only 
include students); Robert A. Peterson, On the Use of College Students in Social 
Science Research: Insights from a Second-Order Meta-Analysis, 28 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 450 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of including non-student 
samples before attempting to generalize experimental results). The discussion 
stretches back over half a century. See, e.g., Maurice L. Farber, The College 
Student as Laboratory Animal, 7 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102 (1952). 
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Table 1 
Demographics of Experimental Subjects (N = 605) 
Education Subjects U.S. Census 
Less than HS 2% 18% 
High school / GED 11% 30% 
Some college 29% 20% 
Assoc. degree 10% 7% 
Bachelor’s 34% 17% 
Graduate Degree 14% 10% 
   
Income Subjects U.S. Census 
< $20,000 30% $1–$24,999: 22% 
$20,000–$40,000 31% $25,000–$34,999: 19% 
$40,000–$60,000 21% $35,000–$49,999: 21% 
$60,000–$80,000 10% $50,000–$64,999: 14% 
$80,000–$100,000 2% $65,000–$74,999: 6% 
> $100,000 6% $75,000–$99,999: 8% 
   
Gender Subjects U.S. Census 
Male 38% 49% 
Female 62% 51% 
   
Race Subjects U.S. Census 
White 81% 74% 
Non-White 19% 26% 
C. RESULTS OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING EXPERIMENT  
The results of Experiment One—both subjects’ rating of 
bodily injury and the definitions they provided in their own 
words—suggest that there is tremendous variation in whether 
mental injuries are considered by lay people as “bodily.” The 
results are presented graphically in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, and 
summarized in Table 2. 
1. Baseline Variation in Bodily Injury Rating 
We can begin with the most straightforward data point: 
how do subjects determine bodily injury when you ask them 
(absent any other information) to do so? The answer to this 
question, presented in Figure 2.1, is revealing. If all subjects 
held a common, clear understanding of bodily injury, then we 
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would expect to see solid black bars (definitely bodily injury) 
and solid light gray bars (definitely not bodily injury). If, how-
ever, there is more uncertainty in bodily injury determinations, 
then we should see more of the middle gray colors for the in-
termediate categories. 
Even a quick glance at Figure 2.1 reveals that—with the 
notable and important exceptions of injuries such as a broken 
leg, broken rib, and concussion—we see much more uncertainty 
about bodily injury than would be expected in a world of com-
plete common understanding. For instance, the number of sub-
jects who chose the “Maybe” option was as follows: one out of 
five for torn lung tissue and depression; one out of four for 
PTSD; one out of three for memory loss; and nearly one out of 
two for recurring headaches.  
That said, there is also a clear clustering pattern, most ev-
ident in Figure 2.2. Four injuries—depression, PTSD, memory 
loss, and recurring headaches—are bunched to the left and re-
ceive the lowest bodily injury ratings. Two injuries—torn lung 
tissue and scratch on the forearm—are in the middle. Four in-
juries—sprained wrist, concussion, broken ribs, and broken 
leg—are clustered to the right, and receive the highest bodily 
injury ratings. In this sense, then, one might infer some com-
mon understanding of relative “bodily-ness.” But two points are 
warranted. First, the variation around these averages is signif-
icant, suggesting that there is sizeable disagreement masked 
by the group averages. Second, and more important, even the 
group clustered toward the left is not clustered near the defi-
nitely not bodily injury pole. 
In other words, there seems to be an inclusion-consensus: 
some injuries (e.g., broken bones) are definitely bodily injury. 
But there is no clear exclusion-consensus: subjects cannot read-
ily determine what injuries are definitely not bodily injury. 
2. Introduction of Mental Health Parity Arguments 
Experiment One also examined the effect of exposure to a 
mental health parity argument (as made by Dr. Steven Hyman 
in congressional testimony in 1996).166
 
 166. See Hearings, supra note 107.  
 The results—presented 
graphically in Figure 2.2, summarized in Table 2, and explored 
more in depth in Appendix C—suggest that reading about men-
tal health parity had only a small effect on bodily injury deter-
minations. After controlling for subject demographic character-
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istics,167
3. Bodily Injury in Subjects’ Own Words 
 the introduction of the brain information only had a 
significant effect on the sprained-wrist, lung-tissue, and recur-
ring-headaches injuries.  
Each of the 180 subjects in Experiment One provided, in 
their own words, a definition of “bodily injury.” Here I examine 
only those responses from the control group—subjects who 
were given no information about mental health parity or brain-
based explanations of mental disease. Analysis of these re-
sponses reveals that—even at baseline—subjects vary in the 
degree to which they include mental injuries. 
Many respondents supplied definitions of bodily injury that 
excluded mental injuries. For example: 
• “[I]njury to the physical self whether it be the muscles, bones or 
joints.” 
• “Any sort of bone, muscle, or tissue damage would normally be 
counted as a bodily injury.” 
• “An injury to one’s physical body, not one’s mental faculties.” 
• “Any physical injury that is a result from some kind of accident or 
collision.” 
• “Bodily injury would be any physical damage done to a person or 
any injury resulting from a physical assault.” 
But many other subjects explicitly mentioned psychological or 
mental harms. For example: 
• “Any injury that leaves either physical or psychological trauma and 
can be observed by a medical professional.” 
• “I believe bodily injury to be defined as a physical or mental injury 
to a person which causes impairment.” 
• “Bodily injury is harm caused by some event or series of events. 
The harm is typically physical, but could also include psychological 
damage or microscopic damage to bodily organs such as lungs, 
heart, or brain. Injury means damage, breakage, or impairment 
which causes the recipient to function in a more negative way.” 
• “Bodily injury to me is any kind of trauma or injury that affects a 
person’s life functions of any organ or body part including the brain 
and causes pain, distress or impaired ability to live and function in 
the same way that was possible before the trauma occurred.” 
• “Injury which impairs day-to-day functioning, primarily in a physi-
cal sense, but also may include injuries to the brain or to mental 
capacities and/or functioning. PTSD is as great (if not greater) a 
disruption to a person’s normal functioning abilities as broken 
bones or other, more strictly ‘physical’ injuries might be.” 
In addition to confusion over the inclusion of mental 
 
 167. See supra Table 1.  
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harms, subjects were at odds about whether there was an im-
plicit requirement of severity. One subject raised the implicit 
issue of injury severity: 
Bodily injury to me is something more major than a scratch on the 
[]arm or recurring headaches. . . . Bodily injury in my opinions are 
broken bones, fractures, sprains in the neck, brain damage, slipped 
discs, . . . Bodily injury is more than a sprained wrist or ankle, to me 
that is just not severe enough to be called bodily injury. 
Another subject honed in on severity in a different way: 
“Harm to one’s physical body that is measurable by a doctor, 
requires medication or therapy to heal and does not heal com-
pletely within 30 days.” The 30-days requirement reads into the 
term bodily injury an implicit requirement of substantial or 
long-lasting injury. 
For other subjects, however, bodily injury implied no a pri-
ori requirement of magnitude. As one subject wrote, “Bodily in-
jury can cover a very wide variety of magnitudes from a sprain 
or bruise or some other relatively temporary injury up to paral-
ysis or death; therefore there is a definite need to consider the 
magnitude of the bodily injury when using the term.” And an-
other wrote that “even minor issues like scratches or cuts could 
count too.” In short, there were many different opinions about 
whether bodily injury should be taken at face value, or whether 
it really should be understood as implying a sufficiently bad 
bodily injury.168
Also telling was subjects’ emphasis on documentation and 
measurement. One subject wrote that bodily injury is “an inju-
ry to your physical body that can be diagnosed with a clinical 
test (x-ray, blood test). I wouldn’t count any mental health is-
sues because I don’t think there is an accurate clinical test [for] 
diagnosis.” Another emphasized visibility: “You must be able to 
see the visible mark or sign of injury for it to be considered to 
be bodily. A headache would not be considered a bodily injury 
 
 
 168. Judges too have argued about this issue. In an Indiana case, where 
the issue was whether the victim experienced a bodily injury, one judge equat-
ed physical pain with bodily injury. Lewis v. State, 898 N.E.2d 429, 434–35 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, 915 N.E.2d 986 (2009). But another judge 
wrote a concurring opinion to “respectfully disagree . . . to the extent [the ma-
jority opinion] suggests that any degree of pain, no matter how slight, is suffi-
cient to constitute an ‘impairment of physical condition’ and therefore consti-
tute ‘bodily injury’ for purposes of Indiana Code Section 35–41–1–4. I believe 
that something more than the mere sensation of pain is required; to hold oth-
erwise is to read ‘impairment’ out of the statute.” Id. at 436 (Crone, J., concur-
ring); see also Bailey v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), for discus-
sion of the severity issue. 
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because it is not able to [be seen].” Another subject went even 
further and said that bodily injury is “something that can phys-
ically be seen by the human eye.”169
Finally, one subject actually speculated in his/her answer 
that his/her conception of bodily injury might be at odds with 
the law: “Harm to a person that causes injury, be it physical, 
mental, or emotional. This does not agree with current law, I 
think.” It is not possible to know from the data presently col-
lected how widespread this disconnect is, but it is ripe for fur-
ther investigation. 
  
This brief review of the definitions provided by subjects 
suggests that confusion arises from at least three questions: (1) 
does bodily injury include mental injury? (2) is there an implicit 
severity requirement for bodily injury? and (3) must the injury 
be “visible”?170
I have suggested that the confusion is driven in large part 
by the “bodily” part of bodily injury, but it’s also plausible that 
the confusion is being generated in part by the word “injury.” 
For instance, is depression an injury, disorder, disease, condi-
tion, some combination of these, or something else altogether? 
And is a scratch a minor injury, a harm, just a de minimus 
change, or something else? My experiments, which did not ran-
domly assign subjects to these different variants (e.g., bodily 
disorder, bodily condition, and the like) cannot speak directly to 
the question. But surely the language matters, and future re-
search would do well to consider its effects. 
 Subjects answer these questions in different 









 169. Because so many subjects emphasized visibility and measurement, it 
raises the interesting possibility of how they would react to new technology 
(e.g. fMRI) that—at least theoretically—might measure and make “visible” the 
brain’s functioning. 
 170. In many ways, subjects are echoing the concerns that William Prosser 
raised in his classic article on mental suffering in tort law: “There are in reali-
ty two problems: to distinguish true claims from false ones, and to distinguish 
the trifling insult or annoyance from the serious wrong.” William L. Prosser, 
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 
877 (1939). 
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Figure 2.1 
At Baseline: Number of Subjects Determining 
Whether a Selected Injury Is: Definitely Not; Probably 

























What to Notice in Figure 2.1: If subjects fully shared a clear and 
common understanding of the term, we should expect to see a 
series of nearly all black, or all very light gray bars (because all 
subjects are definitely sure whether each injury is bodily or 
not). But this is not what the data show. With the exception of 
broken legs, broken ribs, concussions, and sprained wrists, 
there is considerable uncertainty in the bodily injury determi-
nation. This is seen in: (1) the size of the medium gray line 
(representing the “Maybe” bodily injury choice), (2) subjects’ 
hesitance to label the mental injuries as definitely not bodily 
injury, and (3) the extent to which many subjects—even with-
out any prompting about brain-based understanding of mental 
illness—identified PTSD as probably or definitely bodily injury. 
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Figure 2.2 
Subject Determination of Bodily Injury, Average Re-
sponse by Injury and by Presentation of Brain-Based 
















What to Notice in Figure 2.2: In Experiment One, half of the 
subjects were randomly assigned to read a short paragraph ex-
plaining mental illness as a brain-based disease. This Figure 
illustrates the differences in bodily injury rating between the 
“Baseline” group (who received no additional information) and 
the “Brain” group (who read about mental health parity). It 
should be noticed that the injuries group into roughly three 
categories: (1) injuries that are clearly bodily injury: broken leg, 
broken rib, concussion, and sprained wrist; (2) injuries that are 
probably bodily injury: torn lung tissue and scratch on forearm; 
and (3) injuries that may be bodily injury: recurring headaches, 
PTSD, memory loss, and depression (to a lesser degree). Intro-
duction of the brain information in this context has only limited 
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Table 2 
Percentage of Subjects in Experiment One Deter-
mining Whether a Selected Injury Is: Definitely Not, 
Probably Not, Maybe, Probably, or Definitely Bodily In-
jury 
 













Broken Leg 0% 1% 0% 5% 93% 
Broken Ribs 0% 1% 9% 16% 74% 
Concussion 1% 1% 10% 19% 69% 
Sprained Wrist 1% 4% 7% 25% 63% 
Scratch On Fore-
arm 9% 9% 15% 23% 44% 
Torn Lung Tissue 1% 15% 22% 20% 42% 
Memory Loss 12% 23% 36% 15% 13% 
PTSD 22% 25% 25% 15% 12% 
Recurring Head-
aches 10% 20% 44% 21% 5% 
Depression 35% 25% 22% 10% 8% 
Before Determining Bodily Injury, Subjects Presented with Short Paragraph 













Broken Leg 0% 0% 0% 4% 93% 
Broken Ribs 0% 0% 2% 14% 81% 
Concussion 0% 1% 5% 15% 76% 
Sprained Wrist 0% 1% 4% 12% 80% 
Scratch On Fore-
arm 7% 8% 10% 15% 58% 
Torn Lung Tissue 1% 5% 19% 18% 55% 
Memory Loss 15% 13% 42% 20% 8% 
PTSD 20% 20% 24% 18% 16% 
Recurring Head-
aches 9% 12% 40% 23% 14% 
Depression 27% 27% 23% 10% 10% 
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Notes: Confirming the visual presentation in Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.2, this table shows that subjects—even in the baseline 
condition—are ambivalent about determining bodily injury for 
injuries such as memory loss, PTSD, recurring headaches, and 
depression. While there is clear consensus that injuries such as 
broken legs, broken ribs, concussions, and sprained wrists are 
bodily injury, the consensus does not extend to all of the other 
injuries. 
D. DESIGN OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS EXPERIMENT 
Having established the baseline finding that there is varia-
tion in subject understanding of the bodily injury concept, the 
Jury Instructions Experiment (Experiment Two) begins to un-
cover how subjects make bodily injury determinations in crimi-
nal contexts. As discussed in Part I, there are many crimes for 
which bodily injury matters. I chose, for the initial proof of con-
cept, two frequently occurring crimes: assault and burglary. 
For each crime, I created fact patterns that (save for the de-
scription of the victim’s injuries) would not likely constitute 
bodily injury in most traditional views of the term.171
Both aggravated burglary and assault are often defined, in 
part, by a requirement that the defendant intend to and/or ac-
tually inflict bodily (or great bodily) harm.
 
172 Aggravated bur-
glary requires that the “actor purposely, knowingly, or reckless-
ly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.”173 In 
assault and battery, the result of conduct must typically in-
clude bodily injury.174
 
 171. These crimes also differ significantly in the ease of justification for 
criminalization of the act. As described by criminal theorist Joel Feinberg, 
“typical hard cases for the legislator involve conflicts between the active inter-
ests . . . of some persons . . . to say what they wish . . . and the passive interests 
of other persons in being unassailed . . . .” The hard case selected was verbal 
assault, and the easy case was burglary of a house. 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 203–04 (1984). 
 The traditional view is that this bodily in-
jury includes hitting, even when there is no permanent wound 
 172. The definition of both crimes varies, of course, by jurisdiction. See in-
fra Table A2.  
 173. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (1981). Second degree burglary can al-
so be found if it is “perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night” or with a 
deadly weapon. Id. 
 174. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof, in 2 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 550, 553–54 (2d ed. 2003). At common law, as-
sault was defined as attempted battery. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 
114 (2d ed. 1969). I use the term “assault and battery” since in some states as-
sault is defined to include what other states classify as battery. See LAFAVE, 
supra, at 551 n.2. 
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or bruise, as well as offensive touching (such as fondling or 
spitting in another’s face).175 The Model Penal Code’s ap-
proach—and the approach used in most states—limits battery 
to “physical” or “bodily” injury.176 State criminal code defini-
tions of simple assault provided in the Appendix make clear 
how prevalent the element of bodily (or physical) injury is.177
Having identified the crimes of interest, I next constructed 
two short fact patterns (reprinted in full in Appendix C), one for 
burglary and one for assault. In the burglary fact pattern, the 
protagonist John breaks into a private home to steal a televi-
sion. Subjects were told that John knows someone is at home, 
and that John yells at the homeowner. Subjects were told that 
the homeowner has recurring nightmares about the break-in, 
and that she has been diagnosed with PTSD due to the event.
 
178
In the assault fact pattern, the protagonist John begins 
yelling at a fellow subway passenger, humiliating him in front 
of the others riding on the train. Subjects were told that since 
 
Subjects were also told that an expert medical witness testified 
during the trial that the homeowner suffered from PTSD relat-
ed to the break-in. The defendant John does not contest the 
facts of the case, and does not challenge the intent or causation 
issues, but argues that he is guilty only of the lesser charge of 
burglary because the homeowner’s injuries do not constitute 
“bodily injury.”  
 
 175. LAFAVE, supra note 174, at 553. 
 176. Id. LaFave notes that “this is the prevailing view in those jurisdictions 
with new criminal codes, as reflected in the use of such statutory terms as 
‘physical injury,’ ‘bodily injury,’ ‘bodily harm,’ ‘physical harm,’ ‘force or violence 
upon the person,’ or, occasionally, ‘serious bodily injury.’” Id. A minority of 
these codes follow a much broader view, sometimes extending the crime to any 
touching or physical contact, but more often requiring that the contact be ‘of-
fensive,’ ‘insulting or provoking,’ or done ‘in a rude, insolent, or angry man-
ner.’” Id. at 553–54. 
 177. It is worth noting that historically even the least touching, as well as 
actions that do not involve body-to-body touching, often qualify as simple as-
sault and battery. For instance, a finding of battery may result from spitting 
in another’s face. See R v. Cotesworth, (1705) 87 Eng.Rep. 928 (K.B.). A find-
ing of battery may also result from throwing a cup of urine in another’s face. 
See People v. Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 961 (1992). 
 178. I am not aware of research specifically on the development of PTSD 
after such home burglaries. Stress disorder has been found to be produced by 
bank robberies and armed robberies. See Maj Hansen & Ask Elklit, Predictors 
of Acute Stress Disorder in Response to Bank Robbery, 2 EUR. J. 
PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 5864 (2011); André Marchand et al., A Randomized 
Controlled Trial of an Adapted Form of Individual Critical Incident Stress De-
briefing for Victims of an Armed Robbery, 6 BRIEF TREATMENT & CRISIS IN-
TERVENTION 122 (2006). 
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the incident, the victim has had recurring nightmares and 
traumatic memories about the experience. The victim now finds 
it difficult to ride the subway because of these bad memories. 
Once again, John does not contest the facts, and does not raise 
intent or causation issues, but argues solely that he cannot be 
found guilty of assault because the victim experienced no “bodi-
ly injury.” 
Both scenarios were highly stylized, and facts stipulated, 
so as to remove the intent element, eliminate the causation is-
sue, and focus squarely on whether the victim’s harm consti-
tutes bodily injury. Future research can, of course, address the-
se additional issues. But in the first instance, it is important to 
establish a baseline with these basic fact patterns.179
Table 3 lists the three different prosecution arguments, 
and five types of jury instructions, that I employ in this exper-
iment. The 3 x 5 design gives me fifteen unique variations of 
each crime scenario. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
the fifteen versions of each scenario. After reading through the 
crime scenario, subjects were prompted to determine whether 
the crime victim experienced bodily injury or not. Presentation 
of the burglary and assault cases was counter-balanced to ac-
count for ordering effects. 
 
Because courts have routinely asserted (without empirical 
validation) that common understanding of the term “bodily in-
jury” is clear,180
For a given subject, the prosecution argument and jury in-
structions in the assault scenario were identical to the burglary 
scenario. For example, a subject who was in the baseline condi-
tion for burglary (i.e., no prosecution mention of the brain, and 
no bodily injury definition provided in the jury instructions) 
was also in the baseline condition for the assault scenario. 
 I explicitly asked subjects, “On a scale from 0–
9—with 0 being not well understood and very confusing, and 9 
being very well understood and not at all confusing—how well 
did you understand the term ‘bodily injury’?” 
 
 179. As discussed in Part IV, future experiments can begin to unpack the 
intent element as it relates to different conceptions of bodily injury. In Cali-
fornia’s penal code, for instance, the introduction of the infliction of the great 
bodily harm aggravator brought with it a debate over what type of intent—
general or specific—was required. See Michael M. Blazina, “With the Intent to 
Inflict Such Injury”: The Courts and the Legislature Create Confusion in Cali-
fornia Penal Code Section 12022.7, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 963 (1991). 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246 (9th Cir. 
1980) (claiming that “bodily injury” is amenable to a “common sense” under-
standing). 
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Table 3 
Illustration: Constructing Fifteen Unique Burglary 
Scenarios from a Common Fact Pattern 
 
All Subjects Were Pro-
vided with the Basic 
Fact Pattern for Bur-
glary Scenario: 
Subjects Were Random-
ly Assigned to One of 
Three Types of Prosecu-
tion Argument: 
Subjects Were Also 
Randomly Assigned to 
One of Five Definitions 
of Bodily Injury Provid-
ed in Jury Instruction: 
   
[All Subjects] Defend-
ant (John) is charged 
with aggravated bur-
glary. John admits to 
breaking into a private 
home and stealing the 
TV, knowing that some-
one was in the home 
when he broke in. John 
yells at the homeowner. 
The homeowner later 
experiences recurring 
nightmares about the 
break-in and is diag-
nosed with Post-
Traumatic Stress Dis-
order (PTSD) due to the 
event. An expert medi-
cal witness testifies 
during the trial that the 
homeowner suffered 
from PTSD related to 
the break-in. 
[A] (Baseline: Subjects 
given no information 
about the prosecution’s 
argument.) 
A1. (Baseline) No defi-
nition provided 
A2. Black’s (1990) defi-
nition 
A3. Black’s (Current) 
definition 






[B] The prosecution ar-
gues that the brain is a 
part of the body, that 
the homeowner’s PTSD 
and nightmares are the 
result of biochemical 
changes in her brain 
cells, and therefore that 
she has experienced bod-
ily injury. 
B1. (Baseline) No defi-
nition provided 
B2. Black’s (1990) defi-
nition 
B3. Black’s (Current) 
definition 






[C] To support the ar-
gument (B) above, an 
expert witness, in sup-
port of the diagnosis of 
PTSD, testifies that the 
homeowner’s brain ac-
tivity was abnormal. A 
brain scan showing ab-
normal activity was ad-
mitted into evidence. 
C1. (Baseline) No defi-
nition provided 
C2. Black’s (1990) defi-
nition 
C3. Black’s (Current) 
definition 
C4. Federal definition 
C5. Brain-inclusive fed-
eral definition 
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Note: For both the burglary and the assault crimes, I construct-
ed fifteen (3 prosecution arguments x 5 jury instructions) 
unique scenarios. Full text of the scenarios is presented in Ap-
pendix C.3. Notice that each scenario uses an identical fact pat-
tern. The only difference between treatments is the type of ar-
gument made (and evidence used) by the prosecution, and the 
definition of bodily injury provided to subjects in the jury in-
structions. 
E. RESULTS OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS EXPERIMENT 
In this sub-Part, I summarize the results of Experiment 
Two. Appendix C.4 provides additional discussion of the details 
of the statistical analysis. 
1. Do Jury Instructions Matter for Assessment of Bodily 
Injury in Burglary and Assault Contexts? 
If jurors hold a robust common understanding of bodily in-
jury, then different definitions should have only minimal im-
pact compared to the baseline (because the instructions would 
simply be confirming what subjects already know). Experiment 
Two allows us to test the validity of such logic. 
The results in the top panes of Figure 3 (burglary) and 
Figure 4 (assault) strongly suggest that—even without intro-
duction of brain evidence—subject assessment of bodily injury 
is contingent on the way in which it is defined. To begin with, 
in the baseline burglary case, with no definition of bodily injury 
provided, fully one in five subjects still found that the victim’s 
PTSD constituted bodily injury. 
In both the burglary and the assault scenarios, subjects re-
ceiving the federal definition of bodily injury (with its more in-
clusive listing) were significantly more likely to find that John 
inflicted bodily injury. In the assault case, the numbers are 
striking: 28% of subjects receiving the federal definition found 
bodily injury, compared to only 7% of those receiving no defini-
tion. In both scenarios, Black’s 1990 definition (which included 
the phrase “not mental, but corporeal”) produced the lowest 
percentage of subjects finding bodily injury (only 4% in the as-
sault case, and 11% in the burglary case). 
2. Do Brain-Based Definitions and Evidence Affect Juror 
Assessment of Bodily Injury? 
In both the burglary and assault cases, the prosecution’s 
introduction of brain-based arguments and evidence has a sig-
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nificant, positive effect on the likelihood of subjects finding that 
John inflicted bodily injury on the victim. Notably, even with-
out the prosecution making mention of a brain argument, simp-
ly modifying the federal-rules definition to be brain inclusive—
by adding to the itemized list “impairment of the brain’s nor-
mal functioning”—leads to a significant increase in finding of 
bodily injury. This is true even in the condition where no extra 
brain information is provided by the prosecution. Thus, even 
when PTSD was not described as a brain-based disease, sub-
jects understood it as such, and placed it within the bodily inju-
ry category, when applying the modified federal definition. 
When the prosecution’s brain-based arguments are added 
to the mix, we see the expected increase in bodily injury deter-
minations (rising up to 71% in the burglary case, when brain 
evidence is presented and a brain argument is made). Im-
portantly, though, the restrictive Black’s 1990 dictionary defi-
nition significantly constrains bodily injury findings even when 
brain scan evidence is presented. This suggests that subjects 
are quite sensitive to the instructions received, and moreover 
that the effect of the brain evidence cannot be divorced from the 
jury instructions. Of note, and deserving of further study, is the 
finding that when given no definition of bodily injury, but pre-
sented with brain scan evidence, fully 50% of subjects find that 
the verbal assault victim has experienced bodily injury. When 
the Black’s dictionary definitions are introduced, this plummets 
to 6–7%. 
There are, however, some findings that are not as readily 
explained. For instance, in the Burglary scenario, the prosecu-
tion’s introduction of a brain scan (compared to just making the 
brain argument with the scan) actually reduces the percentage 
of subjects finding PTSD to be a bodily injury. By contrast, in 
the assault scenario, introducing the brain scan (again com-
pared to the condition where the prosecution makes the brain-
based argument, but without the scan) raises the percentage 
finding bodily injury from 3% to 50%. These and other anoma-
lies suggest that, although there are discernible patterns in the 
data, there is also tremendous variance in subject response. 
Additional research is needed to better understand in what 
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Figure 3 
Burglary: Percentage of Subjects Finding that the 




























What to notice in Figure 3: The figure presents the percentage 
of subjects, in each of the 15 conditions, finding that the crime 
victim experienced bodily injury. The bars are shaded according 
to the type of bodily injury definition provided, and results are 
grouped according to the type of prosecution argument. The re-
sults shown in this figure suggest that: (1) even without brain-
based arguments, differing definitions of bodily injury in jury 
instructions affect juror decisions; (2) when brain-based argu-
ments are introduced by the prosecution, jurors are more per-
suaded that PTSD is a bodily injury; and (3) the combination of 
a brain-based argument and a (purportedly) confirming brain 
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Assault: Percentage of Subjects Finding That the Victim 



























What to notice in Figure 4: The figure presents the percentage 
of subjects, in each of the 15 conditions, finding that the crime 
victim experienced bodily injury. The bars are shaded according 
to the type of bodily injury definition provided, and results are 
grouped according to the type of prosecution argument. The re-
sults shown in this figure show that: (1) even without brain-
based arguments, the federal definition of bodily injury oper-
ates quite differently than the Black’s Law definition; (2) in the 
assault context, brain-based arguments and brain scan evi-
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dence affect juror outcomes, but are not as persuasive as in the 
burglary context. 
IV.  DISCUSSION   
In first-year criminal law, law students learn that “[t]he 
harm is the body—the linchpin—of the crime.”181
A. CAUTIONS 
 On closer ex-
amination, for many crimes against the person, it may be fur-
ther said that harm in the form of bodily injury is the linchpin. 
Thus, how legislatures define, and how courts and jurors un-
derstand and apply, definitions of bodily injury affects the op-
eration of the criminal law. The previous Part presented results 
about how subjects understand bodily injury. In this Part, I 
discuss the implications of the results for the conceptualization 
of crime victim harms in the criminal law.  
In a separate empirical assessment of key provisions in the 
Model Penal Code, my co-authors and I wrote that “we must 
suggest caution” for the MPC study was “but one set of experi-
ments in a young—indeed almost non-existent—empirical lit-
erature. Future studies may point in different and unanticipat-
ed directions.”182
As discussed in Part III, the scenarios utilized in Experi-
ment Two are intended to serve as a proof of concept. To this 
end, the results clearly suggest that additional experiments are 
worthwhile to pursue.
 The same caution must be made at the outset 
here. The results just presented are from only two experiments, 
with highly stylized fact patterns, and additional work is cer-
tainly required to better understand what actual juror assess-
ments would look like in different contexts. 
183
Future work should include scenarios with a more robust 
defense. Prosecutors must prove every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus the burden of persuasion 
is high. It remains to be seen whether the prosecution, even 
when using a brain-based argument, can successfully persuade 
 These additional experiments can 
more carefully address the complicated issues of intent of the 
accused, and causation between the actions of the accused and 
the mental/brain harm caused to the alleged victim. 
 
 181. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 112 (6th ed. 
2012). 
 182. Shen, supra note 165, at 1344. 
 183. See supra Part III.E.2. 
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subjects in the face of defense challenges on the grounds of in-
tent, causation, or scientific validity (e.g., through the testimo-
ny of a competing expert or cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion expert). Perhaps with these procedural safeguards in 
place, subjects will not be so moved by the brain evidence. 
Additional crime scenarios should also be considered. Vary-
ing the criminal charges, the extent of trauma experienced by 
the victim, and the extent of the defendant’s violence toward 
the victim may all affect juror outcomes. One set of scenarios 
will explore the lower bounds of “bodily” injury for subjects. For 
instance, would a mere scratch constitute “bodily injury”? 
There are also a host of related conceptual questions to work 
out. For instance, is the definition of bodily injury embedded in 
the criminal code an objective standard (requiring us to ask 
whether the reasonable person views PTSD as a bodily injury), 
or a subjective standard (requiring us instead to ask whether 
the defendant viewed PTSD as a bodily injury)? Additional 
studies are required to answer such questions. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The caveats just discussed notwithstanding, the results of 
this study suggest that rather than sharing a common under-
standing of bodily injury, ordinary people display much variety 
in how they understand the concept. Experiment One showed 
that the bodily injury classification is not straightforward for 
injuries such as PTSD, memory loss, and depression.184 In addi-
tion, Experiment One found that lay subjects define and de-
scribe bodily injury in many different ways.185
Experiment Two showed how this variation in understand-
ing bodily injury can play out in criminal contexts. Subjects as-
sess bodily injury in context, based on the evidence presented 




1. PTSD at the OK Boys Ranch 
 
I stated earlier that there are no cases of the type I con-
structed in my experiments. There is, however, at least one 
case in which it would have made a material difference to learn 
 
 184. See supra Table 2. 
 185. See supra Figure 2.1. 
 186. See supra Part III.E. 
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that common understanding may include PTSD as a bodily in-
jury. The case is State v. Van Woerden, and I review it here.187
The OK Boys Ranch was a group home for boys that closed 
in the late 1990s after allegations of sexual and physical 
abuse.
 
188 Three defendants were charged with criminal mis-
treatment in the second degree, and the State’s “theory was 
that, as a result of the defendants’ failure to protect them from 
abuse, 10 boys developed Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD).”189 In order to convict, the State had to prove “that 
PTSD constitutes either ‘great bodily harm’ or ‘substantial bod-
ily harm.’”190 Both the trial court and the appellate court reject-
ed this argument, and the courts’ reasoning is telling.191
The State made exactly the argument that I have explored 
here, that “PTSD meets either definition because it is either a 
bodily injury, i.e., an illness, or a physical condition that causes 
an impairment of the function of an organ, i.e., the brain.”
 
192 
Specifically, the State argued that PTSD affects “way the brain 
tells the body to react physically to various stimuli[.]”193
Although generally understood as a psychological disorder, PTSD also 
may be viewed from a biologic perspective. There is now accumulating 
evidence to suggest that severe psychological trauma can cause alter-
ations in the organism’s neurobiologic response to stress even years 
after the original insult.” PTSD alters brain chemistry leading to 
“hypervigilance, increased startle, affective lability, anxiety, 
dysphoria, and increased autonomic nervous system 
hyperreactivity.
 The 
State, much like the scenario presented in the experiment, had 
an expert testify to the following: 
194
In assessing this argument, the Court went through many 
of steps discussed thus far. It recognized that “[u]ndefined 
statutory terms are given their usual and ordinary meaning” 
and looked to both Webster’s and Black’s Law Dictionary.
 
195 
The Court was ultimately guided by rules of statutory construc-
tion and the rule of lenity to rule that bodily injury includes on-
ly physical illnesses.196
 
 187. State v. Van Woerden, 967 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 
 188. Id. at 16. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 17. 
 193. Id. at 18. 
 194. Id. at 18–19. 
 195. Id. at 17–18. 
 196. Id. at 18. 
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Addressing the question of whether PTSD was an impair-
ment of physical condition, the Court in my view strained to 
distinguish it in the following way: 
[U]nder the statute, the State must prove that PTSD is an impair-
ment of physical condition that causes an impairment of the function-
ing of the brain, not merely that PTSD impairs the functioning of the 
brain. Based on the evidence submitted by the State, PTSD is a psy-
chological disorder that alters the functioning of the brain. Therefore, 
even though PTSD has measurable and perhaps “deleterious physio-
logical impacts on the brain’s functioning,” it does not meet the defini-
tion of bodily injury because it is foremost the impairment of a men-
tal, as opposed to a physical, condition.
197
The logic of the Court’s reasoning here is, as best I can tell, as 
follows: 
 
(1) PTSD is a “psychological disorder.” 
(2) PTSD alters the function of the brain (in fact it may 
have deleterious physiological impacts) 
(3) BUT (and this is the crucial point), because it is a “psy-
chological disorder” it is “foremost the impairment of a men-
tal . . . condition.198
If this is an accurate reading of the case, then it suggests 
that psychology (or “mind”) is somehow antecedent to the 
brain.
  
199 And this logic is antithetical to the standard cognitive 
neuroscience understanding that “the brain is what the mind 
does.”200
The Court, of course, is well within its rights to reject that 
neuroscientific view. And as I suggest later, drawing this dual-
ist line in the legal sand might well be good policy. But the 
Court had to strain to hold that PTSD is not an impairment of 
physical condition, and I think it likely that such strain will on-
ly increase in the years to come as we increasingly see PTSD as 
a biologically-based disorder. 
  
2. Much Ado About Nothing? 
Two of the possible negative outcomes from an ill-defined 
concept of bodily injury are: (1) over-criminalization because 
 
 197. Id. at 19. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Even if the Court meant that the behavioral manifestations of PTSD 
affect the brain (which certainly they do, as the brain is always interacting 
with its environment), it would still be odd to claim that those behavioral man-
ifestations were originating from someplace other than the mind-brain. 
 200. See, e.g., Weisberg et al., supra note 145, at 476 (“For instance, neuro-
science may illustrate a connection between the mind and the brain that peo-
ple implicitly believe not to exist, or not to exist in such a strong way . . . .”). 
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defendants are made liable for inflicting, or attempting to in-
flict, injuries that are “bodily” but not sufficiently bad; and (2) 
under-criminalization because individuals who commit acts 
that inflict substantial, but purely mental, harm are not held 
liable. 
But is there really need for such concern? Several counter-
arguments present themselves. First, one might argue that the 
subset of non de minimus purely mental harms is negligible. 
This would be the case if substantial emotional or mental harm 
is always (or almost always) accompanied by physical harm (at-
tempted or actual). But it is not hard to think of many typical 
situations in which mental harm is experienced, but not physi-
cal harm (as traditionally defined). A good example is the 
spousal verbal abuse example mentioned earlier. We can imag-
ine that the spouse being repeatedly verbally abused (even if 
there was no touching) might experience a range of negative 
emotions, and depending on the facts, that the behavioral ef-
fects could be quite substantial (perhaps even substantial 
enough for someone to leave the relationship).201
Moreover, the well-established tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress highlights many instances where an indi-
vidual causes (and intends to cause) only mental anguish. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts lists a number of examples, that 
would invite civil liability, including:  
 Again, this is 
not to say that such conduct should be criminalized; it is simply 
to make the point that such conduct—which causes mental but 
not physical injury—is not hard to imagine. 
As a practical joke, A falsely tells B that her husband has been badly 
injured in an accident, and is in the hospital with both legs broken. B 
suffers severe emotional distress. A is subject to liability to B for her 
emotional distress. If it causes nervous shock and resulting illness, A 
is subject to liability to B for her illness.202
 
 201. Of course, even if there were touching, it might fall into a category of 
not sufficient to produce bodily injury, but sufficient to produce mental injury. 
Consider the domestic case of a daughter and father in California, who accord-
ing to the police report, “each touched the other in an angry manner, but with-
out sufficient force to cause bodily injury.” Deborah Demander, Six Face Mis-
demeanor Arraignments in Circuit Court, UINTA COUNTY HERALD (Nov. 25, 
2011), http://www.uintacountyherald.com/v2_news_articles.php?heading=0& 
page=72&story_id=5085. While in that case, the facts were such that both pled 
guilty to a battery charge, one can imagine a case in where there are regular 
angry exchanges, and even though the victim knows he/she is not in physical 
danger, nevertheless it takes a mental toll. 
 
 202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977). 
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Should such a defendant in this situation face criminal lia-
bility as well? Again, there are reasonable arguments for and 
against. On one hand, if we wish to impose criminal liability 
(whether to deter or to express moral disapproval) on those in-
dividuals who intentionally inflict great, demonstrable harm, 
then we might wish to impose liability just as we would if the 
defendant had hit the victim on the arm.203 Expanding liability 
in this context would be more consistent with the American 
Psychological Association’s observation that “millions of Ameri-
cans know that suffering from a mental health disorder can be 
as frightening and debilitating as any major physical health 
disorder.”204
On the other hand, there are many good reasons to distin-
guish the two, and to avoid such expansion of the concept of 
bodily injury. Perhaps most importantly, such expansion of lia-
bility might lead to a slippery slope of liability for mental inju-
ries. This has been a longstanding concern in tort law, and 
Prosser addressed it eloquently in his classic statement on the 
new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: 
  
The most valid objection to the protection of “mental” interests lies in 
the “wide door” which might be opened, not only to fictitious and 
fraudulent claims, but to litigation in the field of trivialities and mere 
bad manners.” It is easy to lie about what goes on inside the plaintiff’s 
own head. It would be an absurd thing for the law to seek to secure 
universal peace of mind, and there are many interferences with it 
 
 203. For those advocates of empirical desert, there might also be value in 
better aligning criminal statutes with citizen preferences (preferences that 
might demand more liability for purely mental harms). To be sure, there is 
currently an ongoing debate within criminal law scholarship about whether 
the principles of “justice” for the criminal defendant should be grounded in 
moral philosophy or (an empirical assessment of) a community’s norms. See, 
e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO 
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 10 (2008) (arguing that “one could adopt a 
distributive principle of ‘desert’ based upon the community’s shared intuitions 
of justice rather than based upon philosophical notions of desert.”); Paul H. 
Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, 
and Empirical, 67 CAMB. L.J. 145, 154 (2008) (arguing that [t]he networks of 
interpersonal relationships in which people find themselves, the social norms 
and prohibitions shared among those relationships and transmitted through 
those social networks, and the internalised representations of those norms and 
moral precepts control people’s conduct.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Dar-
ley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care 
What the Lay Person Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus. Normative Crime Con-
trol, 86 VA. L. REV. 1838 (2000); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Util-
ity of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). 
 204. Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/parity-law.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).  
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which must of necessity be left to other agencies of social control. If 
the plaintiff is to recover every time that her feelings are hurt, we 
should all be in court twice a week. . . . But this is a poor reason for 
denying recovery for any genuine, serious mental injury. It is the 
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the ex-
pense of a “flood of litigation . . . .”205
While one way to address the slippery slope concern is to 
set the bar quite high for the severity of emotional harm re-
quired to trigger criminal liability, still concerns remain about 
proof and the causal connection between the defendant’s ac-
tions and the crime victim. The criminal law might do well to 
avoid such thorny issues.
 
206
So too can the rationale behind the existing mind-body di-
chotomy be clarified. Although the legal outcome (no liability) is 
the same, it is normatively quite different to say of a person 
who inflicts mental injury on another: “We’re not holding this 
person liable because of seemingly intractable evidentiary con-
cerns” versus “We’re not holding this person liable because we 
don’t think such mental injuries are as bad as physical inju-
ries.”
 
207 Neuroscience, as I have argued elsewhere,208 can pro-
vide lawmakers with additional information but it cannot dic-
tate policymaking. Even if the neuroscience and medical 
communities come to view all mental phenomena as instantiat-
ed in the brain, it does not mean that the law must follow. Law 
might also be flexible and choose to adopt the neuroscience 
view in some, but not all, contexts. For instance, the goals of 
tort law may demand a different definition of bodily injury than 
does the criminal justice system. Yet at present state statutes 
typically provide just one, general definition of bodily injury.209
However legislatures wish to weigh the competing policy 
considerations, the emerging neuroscience research and the re-
quirements of justice, my view is that the law should, clearly 
and carefully, state its reasons for the bodily injury concept(s) 
  
 
 205. Prosser, supra note 170, at 877. 
 206. Indeed, tort law has wrestled with this issue mightily and developed 
what has been called a patchwork of liability rules to handle emotional dis-
tress. Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197 (2009). 
 207. A discussion of rationales necessarily raises a question about which 
behaviors we wish to deter, and how deterrence would work in the near and 
long term. For instance, how would we judge whether temporary mental harm 
would generate long term gain? 
 208. Francis X. Shen, Neurolegislation and Juvenile Justice, 59 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 209. See infra Table A2. 
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it adopts. I turn now the options legislatures can pursue to 
achieve this end. 
C. OPTIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM 
Legislatures have six primary options: (1) do nothing 
(which would then require potentially difficult statutory inter-
pretation by courts); (2) explicitly include mental injuries with-
in the bodily injury category (as they often already do in the 
case of child and elder abuse); (3) explicitly exclude mental in-
juries from the bodily injury category (as many insurance poli-
cies now do); (4) eliminate the category of “bodily” altogether 
and focus solely on severity of injury (as the Iowa code does); (5) 
develop crime-specific criteria for bodily injury (as the federal 
sentencing guidelines do in the case of forcible rape); or (6) 
eliminate the bodily injury element from particular crimes 
against the person to focus solely on offender behavior (as in 
stalking or harassment). 
Option 1. Do Nothing (i.e., Judicial Interpretation of Current 
Statutes) 
 
If legislatures choose not to address definitions of bodily in-
jury, then the onus falls to courts’ statutory interpretation. If 
ordinary people label (at least certain types of) diagnosed men-
tal trauma as bodily injury, will it and should it affect courts’ 
statutory interpretation of the term “bodily injury”? Such rein-
terpretation in the criminal context could, even without legisla-
tive action, change the scope of offenses against the person. 
For the reasons I now lay out, however, such statutory in-
terpretation is unlikely to be persuasive at least in the short 
run, and may even be unconstitutional in the criminal context. 
Judicial pronouncements on bodily injury in the criminal law 
frequently rely on the (asserted) common understanding that 
lay people have about the term. Common understanding (or 
“plain meaning”) requires an analysis of the author and audi-
ence of the statute in question.210 The experiments just dis-
cussed provide evidence that the audience does not hold a con-
sistent understanding of bodily injury, but rather is quite 
malleable in its views.211
 
 210. POPKIN, supra note 48, at 38. 
 
 211. See infra Table 2. A full-blown analysis of each state’s legislative his-
tory is beyond the scope of this Article, but there is at least circumstantial evi-
dence that in other contexts (e.g., mental health law) legislators have shown a 
  
2100 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2036 
 
But this malleability emerged under experimental condi-
tions in which subjects were forced to think about the issue, 
and it doesn’t mean that the public is regularly thinking about 
PTSD or anxiety as bodily injury. It certainly doesn’t mean—
and this is the legally relevant point—that would-be criminals 
(i.e., those who cause the mental injury) are on notice that such 
behavior is criminal. Clearly due process concerns would be 
implicated.212
Whether the term should be interpreted in a light most fa-
vorable to the accused (the common-law rule), or primarily in 
furtherance of the general purposes of the code, depends on the 
state. While many states have jettisoned the favorable to the 
accused rule,
 
213 others such as Florida still state that “[t]he pro-
visions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall 
be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differ-
ing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the 
accused.”214
In those states where the general purpose of the criminal 
code is relevant to statutory interpretation of bodily injury, one 
can see at least a small possibility for justifying a broader bodi-
ly injury interpretation because states refer generally to harm 
(not specifically to bodily harm).
 Applying the rule of lenity would almost certainly 
lead courts to exclude from the bodily injury category harms 
such as PSTD, which have been traditionally “mental” injuries. 
215
 
clear willingness to view the brain as a part of the body. See, e.g., State Alco-
hol, Drug Abuse, Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health Act, WIS. 
STAT. §§ 51.01–51.95 (2012). Thus, it might be argued that legislators do in-
deed intend for bodily injury to cover more expansive behavior than it present-
ly does. 
 For instance, in Colorado, 
the criminal code “shall be construed in such manner as to 
promote maximum fulfillment of its general purposes, namely: 
. . . (c) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious 
 212. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (“Due process requires 
that all ‘be informed as to what the State Commands or forbids . . . and that 
‘men of common intelligence’ not be forced to guess at the meaning of the crim-
inal law.” (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)); Connally 
v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
 213. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 265–66 (1982). See, e.g., 11 DEL. CODE § 203 (2012) (“The 
general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to 
this Criminal Code . . . .”). 
 214. FLA. STAT. § 775.021 (2012). 
 215. For instance, in Arizona the criminal statutes are intended “[t]o pro-
scribe conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substan-
tial harm to individual or public interests.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-101(1) 
(2012). 
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and minor offenses, and prescribe penalties which are propor-
tionate to the seriousness of offenses . . . .”216
Thus, in the short term the path of statutory 
(re)interpretation is one that likely leads to exclusion of purely 
mental injuries. Most striking are concerns about legality, the 
basic principle that one cannot be criminally liable for conduct 
unless that conduct was defined as criminal before the act.
 The language of 
the statute requires us to ask: is it reasonable to distinguish 
between degrees of culpability based on categorization of “bodi-
ly” and “mental” injury? Perhaps. But it’s also possible, even if 
not overly compelling, to argue that the distinctions should rest 
on severity of injury alone and not type of injury. 
217 In 
this context, defendants are not likely to know that judges had 
reinterpreted statutes so that assault includes injuries to the 
brain, i.e., purely “mental” injuries of some sufficient degree. 
Even absent issues of notice, another important limitation aris-
es if it remains unclear whether—for the specialized purpose of 
the criminal code—the term “bodily injury” has a specialized 
meaning. The classic case of Nix v. Hedden, in which the Su-
preme Court had to determine whether a “tomato” was a fruit 
or a vegetable, is instructive.218 In Nix the court reasoned that 
because “tomato” had not received special meaning in trade or 
commerce, its ordinary meaning should apply.219
If this view is correct—that statutory interpretation of ex-
isting law to include mental harms within the definition of bod-
ily injury will not be persuasive—then we are left with a situa-
tion in which courts will continue to assert a definition of bodily 
injury that doesn’t comport with lay understanding.
 But in the 
criminal context, where “bodily injury” has been used for many 
years in a certain way, there seems a very strong case that it 
has acquired a special meaning—a special meaning that need 
not change even if (with the advent of neuroscientific evidence) 
popular uses of the term change. 
220
 
 216. COL. REV. STAT. § 18-1-102(1)(c) (2012). 
 And, to 
the extent that the mind-body dichotomy continues to dissolve 
in other legal and policy contexts, the criminal law’s traditional 
definition will become increasingly archaic. Perhaps this is a 
tenable situation. But if we desire the lines of criminal liability 
to be more clearly demarcated, and if other areas of law contin-
 217. See DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 39. 
 218. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893). 
 219. Id. at 306. 
 220. See supra Part III. 
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ue to close the mind-body gap, then it is both timely and im-
portant for legislatures to revisit this question in one of the fol-
lowing five ways. 
Moreover, while the analysis above may hold for the short 
term, in the long term it’s not clear that the public will contin-
ue to view mental illness and mental injuries in the same way 
as they do today. For instance, a non-profit organization in 
Maine called Fearless Nation PTSD Support ran an event in 
March 2012 to raise awareness of PTSD as a real, physical in-
jury.221 The founder of the nonprofit, Colleen Crary, commented 
that “[n]ew medical imaging makes it very clear now that 
PTSD severely alters the shape and function of the human 
brain, making it a brain injury. This presentation is created for 
the layperson to understand, with examples of brain changes 
that occur after trauma.”222 In a similar vein, former Congress-
man Patrick Kennedy told a group of students at Syracuse 
University in 2012 that, “[t]he brain is part of the body last 
time I checked. It is not OK to marginalize people just because 
their illness is a part of the brain and not in any other part of 
the body.”223 Efforts such as these—aimed at changing public 
attitudes about PTSD and mental illnesses—could one day take 
hold and lead to societal changes (and thus notice) in ordinary 
usage of the terms mental illness and mental injury.224




Legislatures that seek to include purely mental and emo-
tional harms in the category of bodily injury can write this di-
rectly into the code. To see how this can be done, legislatures 
need only look at their child abuse and elder abuse statutes. 
 
 221. John Platt, Presentations on the Neurobiology of PTSD This Week, 
PTSD NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://ptsd-news.blogspot.com/2012/03/ 
presentations-on-neurobiology-of-ptsd.html. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Alexandra Hitzler, Kennedy Speaks on Research, Mental Health, DAI-
LY ORANGE, Oct. 11, 2012, http://dailyorange.com/2012/10/kennedy-speaks-on-
research-mental-health/.  
 224. Of course, finding “ordinary meaning” is difficult for courts to do. See 
Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 
2053 (2005) (arguing that courts have no principled way to “actually decide 
just what makes ordinary meaning ordinary. The argument more resembles a 
food fight in a school for children with disciplinary problems than a serious 
argument among distinguished jurists.”). 
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For instance, in Florida, child abuse is defined as 
“[i]ntentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a 
child.”225 where mental injury is defined as “injury to the intel-
lectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a 
discernible and substantial impairment in the ability of the 
child to function within the normal range of performance and 
behavior as supported by expert testimony.”226
As a bookend to these protections given to our youngest cit-
izens, elder abuse laws typically include liability for neglect, 
which is said to occur when a caregiver’s fails “to endeavor to 
secure or maintain adequate care, services, or supervision for 
an individual, including food, clothing, shelter, or physical or 
mental health care, and creating significant risk or danger to 
the invidual’s physical or mental health.”
  
227
For society’s most vulnerable, then, the modern criminal 
code provides additional protections by explicitly criminalizing 
acts which lead to mental, as well as physical, injury. These 
statutes provide useful guidance for the ways in which mental 
injury or mental health language might be added to an expand-
ed definition of bodily injury. So too might aspects of tort and 
insurance law provide useful guidance for interpreting the 
bodily injury concept. For instance, as discussed in the Appen-
dix, one option is to adopt a “physical manifestation” require-
ment for mental injury liability.
 
228
There are, however, good reasons not to go down these 
paths. Chief amongst the concerns are the evidentiary concerns 
and the issue of causation. The evidentiary concern is: how 
could a court verify, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim 
experienced a mental injury? And, relatedly, what types of in-
juries or harms would count for purposes of criminal liability? 
At present, there are no reliable biomarkers for mental disor-
  
 
 225. FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Abuse also in-
cludes: “An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in phys-
ical or mental injury to a child; or active encouragement of any person to 
commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physi-
cal or mental injury to a child.” FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(b)(2)–(3). Definitions in 
other states similarly include mental abuse. See Definitions of Child Abuse 
and Neglect, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2011), http://www 
.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.cfm/.  
 226. FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(d) (2012). 
 227. This is language from Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. § 46.90 (2012) (emphasis 
added). Other states typically have similar language. 
 228. See infra Appendix A. A related requirement might be “visibility,” 
though with scientific tools that increasingly allow one to “see” the microscop-
ic, visibility and physicality might be very similar to one another. 
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ders, and none will be included in the forthcoming Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of the American Psychological Associa-
tion.229 Thus, the court would have to evaluate the testimony of 
competing expert witnesses; not an easy task, especially when 
it’s difficult and costly to identify malingering.230
Even if it could be established that there was an actual 
mental injury (however defined), the causation issue would still 
be difficult to resolve. In a typical physical battery, there is a 
fairly non-controversial causal connection between the actus 
reus of the perpetrator and the harm experienced by the victim. 
If John hits David with a baseball bat, and David’s arm breaks, 
John’s actions are not only necessary but sufficient for the on-
set of the injury. The picture is likely not as clear in many in-
stances of mental injury.  
 In addition, 
it’s not hard to see the potential moral hazard this creates, as a 
non-victim could fake a mental injury much easier than faking 
a broken wrist. 
Option 3. Explicitly Exclude Purely Mental and Emotional 
Injury 
 
For legislatures that seek to ensure that the concept of bod-
ily injury does not expand, the results in this Article suggest 
that a simple and effective solution is to add a negating clause 
in the definition of bodily injury. The language used in the 1990 
Black’s Law Dictionary—“not mental, but corporeal”231—could 
be even further strengthened. My results suggest that such a 
definition might generate the common understanding that re-
mains elusive at present. Legislatures seeking guidance for 
limiting language can look to private insurance contracts.232
In addition, the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act 




 229. Steven E. Hyman, Can Neuroscience Be Integrated into the DSM-V? 8 
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 725, 725 (2007). 
 The PLRA requires that in order 
to recover damages, a plaintiff must suffer physical injury. The 
statute clearly states: “No Federal civil action may be brought 
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional fa-
cility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody 
 230. See generally Mary A. Conroy & Phylissa P. Kwartner, Malingering, 2 
APPLIED PSYCH. CRIM. JUST. 29 (2006). 
 231. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 52. 
 232. See infra Appendix A. 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006). 
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without a prior showing of physical injury.”234
Option 4. Focus Only on Severity, Not Type of Injury 
 Legislatures 
could be equally clear about excluding purely mental and emo-
tional injuries. Legislatures would also have the option, follow-
ing case law in the civil context, to require some sort of physical 
“manifestation” or require a combination of mental and (tradi-
tional) physical injury in order for the element to be satisfied. 
Of course, such line drawing would be difficult and would still 
require legislatures to think carefully about the relationship 
between mind and brain. 
 
Slicing injury into the two categories of bodily and non-
bodily, and criminalizing only the former, leads to a regime in 
which there is no criminal sanction even for extremely bad non-
bodily harms. This possibility can be avoided if the criminal 
code focuses solely on the severity of injury, and drops its in-
quiry into the type of injury. 
One way to operationalize this approach is to adopt a modi-
fied version of the current Iowa statutory definition of serious 
injury.235
1. “Serious injury” means any of the following: 
 The relevant Iowa statute reads: 
a. Disabling mental illness. 
b. Bodily injury which does any of the following: 
(1) Creates a substantial risk of death. 
(2) Causes serious permanent disfigurement. 
(3) Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ. 
c. Any injury to a child that requires surgical repair and necessitates 
the administration of general anesthesia. 
2. “Serious injury” includes but is not limited to skull fractures, rib 
fractures, and metaphyseal fractures of the long bones of children un-
der the age of four years.236
Notable in this statutory construction is the legislature’s 
use of “serious injury” as an umbrella term, without the word 
bodily. This allows for inclusion of both “disabling mental ill-
 
 
 234. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 
(5th Cir.1997). 
 235. IOWA CODE § 702.18 (2012). A review of Iowa case law, however, sug-
gests that prosecutors have not used this statute to impose criminal liability 
purely for infliction of a disabling mental illness. It is unclear why this is the 
case, and legislative history provides little guidance on the origins of the stat-
ute’s phrasing. 
 236. Id.  
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ness” and bodily injury items. This approach allows for parity 
in crime victim injury: criminal liability attaches when a de-
fendant causes either sufficiently bad mental injury or suffi-
ciently bad physical injury. Determination of sufficiently bad 
injuries is accomplished through the adjectives in the statute, 
e.g., disabling mental illness, serious permanent disfigurement, 
and so forth.237
The issue of severity in the context of mental injury has 
been the subject of debate in the context of torture. The United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines torture as 
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a con-
fession.”
 
238 The operative word is “severe”—how should it be de-
fined? In 2002, the Department of Justice defined severe pain 
as that which reaches “to the level of death, organ failure, or 
the permanent impairment of a significant body function.”239 
They went on to define mental pain or suffering as “significant 
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for 
months or even years,” and also required it to be the interroga-
tor’s “precise objective.”240 This definition has been criticized as 
under-inclusive.241
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to enter the de-
bate about how to define torture, and in particular how to draw 
the line distinguishing really bad (but not “severe”) mental 
harm from that mental harm that is truly “severe.” But the tor-
ture discussion becomes more relevant when we look at state 
statutes defining torture.
 
242 Connecticut, for instance, finds 
cruelty to persons when someone “intentionally tortures, tor-
ments or cruelly or unlawfully punishes another person . . . .”243
 
 237. Id. 
 
 238. Ronald L. Nelson, Torture in the Law of the Fifty American States: 
Searching for Definition, 4 WAR CRIMES, GENOCIDE & CRIMES AGAINST HU-
MANITY 1, 5 (2010). 
 239. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp 
-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Vincent Iacopino, Scott A. Allen & Allen S. Keller, Bad Science Used to 
Support Torture and Human Experimentation, 331 SCI. 34 (2011).  
 242. See Nelson, supra note 238, at 25 (finding five states that have a stat-
utory definition of torture). 
 243. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-20(a)(1) (2012).  
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There is no distinction here between mental and physical—
ought we to read one into the definition? And if we do (or do 
not) do so here, would we do the same in the criminal context? 
Such questions are ripe for further investigation.  
Option 5. Develop Crime-Specific Criteria for Bodily Injury 
 
A fifth option is to develop crime-specific criteria for bodily 
injury. This is the path that the states and the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines have taken with regard to sexual assault crimes. 
Courts have been faced with this question: has a rape victim, 
whose body is functioning normally, experienced serious bodily 
(or physical) injury?  
In an Arizona case in which a female college student was 
raped, the court found that the convicted assailant could not be 
charged with aggravated assault because an element of aggra-
vated assault is “serious physical injury” and “the plain mean-
ing of the statute does not include injuries which are solely 
mental or emotional.”244
Similarly, in United States v. Rivera, a case that ultimately 
led to congressional action, a twenty-four-year-old mother was 
carjacked and raped at gunpoint.
  
245 A question on appeal, after 
a sentencing enhancement, was whether the victim had experi-
enced serious bodily injury.246 A three-judge panel—reasoning 
that there was only evidence of “protracted . . . impairment 
of . . . mental faculty” and—citing the rule of lenity—found that 
the answer was no.247 The dissent argued forcefully that this 
outcome could not have been intended by Congress, as it would 
create a sentencing enhancement for the loss of a finger, but 
not a rape at gunpoint.248
 
 244. State v. Garcia, 673 P.2d 955, 958 (1983). Other state courts also ar-
rived at the same conclusion in similar cases in this earlier era. See, e.g., State 
v. Rossier, 397 A.2d 110 (1978). 
 
 245. United States v. Rivera, 83 F.3d 542, 544 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 246. Id. The carjacking statute defines “serious bodily injury” as bodily in-
jury that involves either: “(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical 
pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or im-
pairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty . . . .” Id. 
at 547 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(3)). 
 247. Id. at 548 (emphasis added). 
 248. See Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 511, 576–77 (2001) (detailing the unpublished dissent in U.S. v. Rivera). 
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In response to this case, Congress amended the carjacking 
statute to include sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse 
under the definition of bodily injury.249
This approach—in which the legislature explicitly deems a 
particular criminal act to cause a type of injury—could be used 
in other places throughout the criminal code, should a legisla-
ture wish to be more precise in determining where infliction of 
mental injury will be criminalized.
 
250
In Wisconsin in 2011, State Senator Joe Leibham proposed 
SB 109, the Law Enforcement Injury Bill.
 Indeed, there are exam-
ples of legislators doing precisely this in the context of bodily 
injury. 
251 The Bill would “al-
low suspects who, while knowingly resisting or obstructing ar-
rest, cause an officer to suffer a soft tissue injury to be charged 
with a Class H felony.”252 The State Senator introduced the Bill 
to directly amend the bodily injury definition by adding a new 
category in order to expand liability.253
Option 6. Focus Solely on Offender Conduct 
 
 
Finally, legislatures can address the bodily injury defini-
tional challenge by avoiding it altogether through construction 
of crimes without a bodily injury element. Although I have em-
phasized in this Article that many crimes against the person 
 
 249. See Carjacking Correction Act of 1996, H.R. 3676 (1996) (amending 18 
U.S.C. § 2119 (2006)).  
 250. If legislatures sought to attempt such precision for more than a hand-
ful of crimes, such an enumeration might lead, as has been observed in the 
context of judicial use of dictionaries, to infinite regress: “Requiring terms to 
be defined, like requiring all premises to be proven, leads to infinite regres-
sion. It replaces a short story with an infinitely long one.” A. Raymond Ran-
dolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 78 (1994). 
 251. WIS. LEGISLATURE, http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/proposals/ 
SB109 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
 252. Constituent Ideas Turn into New Laws, WEBSITE OF JOE LEIBHAM, 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/leibham/PressReleases/Pages/pa-show.aspx? 
id=Constituent+Ideas+Turn+Into+New+Laws (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
 253. The Senator’s websites explains: 
SB 109 adds soft tissue injuries as defined as “an injury that requires 
medical attention to a tissue that connects, supports, or surrounds 
other structures and organs of the body and includes tendons, liga-
ments, fascia, skin, fibrous tissues, fat, synovial membranes, muscles, 
nerves and blood vessels” to the list of injuries that would result in 
the commission of a felony.  
Id.  
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include an injury element, this is not always (and of course 
need not be) the case. 
A useful example of a crime against the person that does 
include an injury element—bodily or otherwise—is the so called 
“Peeping Tom” law. The Nevada peeping law, to illustrate, 
states that “A person shall not knowingly enter upon the prop-
erty or premises of another . . . with the intent to surreptitious-
ly conceal himself . . . and peer, peep or spy through a window, 
door or other opening of a building or structure that is used as 
a dwelling on the property or premises.”254
D. ACCORDANCE WITH HARM THEORY 
 Written in this way, 
the legal inquiry focuses entirely on the offender’s actions and 
the law does not need to reach the question of the actual effects 
on the victim. Other crimes could similarly be defined without 
requiring evidence of infliction of an actual harm or injury. 
The options just enumerated include several paths by 
which infliction of mental injury could serve as a potential trig-
ger for criminal liability and punishment. Given that this trig-
ger would fundamentally expand liability, it is important to 
ask: is such an expansion consistent with leading criminal law 
theory on harm? In this sub-Part, I argue that it is. 
Although criminal law theorists disagree about whether 
the harm must be realized in order to justify punishment, both 
retributivists and utilitarians agree that the criminal law is 
centrally concerned about harms that are intended and/or in-
flicted by defendants.255 The basic harm principle, first laid out 
by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, states “that the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.”256
 
 254. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.603 (2011). 
 While Mill’s claim has been modified much over the 
years in the enactment of criminal statutes, the spirit of the 
 255. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPA-
BILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 171–96 (2009) (discussing the debate in 
criminal law theory over the salience of resulting harm). This Article takes no 
side in the debate over moral luck and resulting harm, as the present inquiry 
is concerned only with those acts that clearly result in a (possibly “bodily inju-
ry”) harm.  
 256. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb 
eds., 2003) (1859). The harm principle has of course been analyzed and re-
analyzed over the centuries, for instance in how to best regulate speech. See, 
e.g., Freedom of Speech, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/freedom-speech/#JohStuMilHarPri (last updated July 1, 2012). 
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harm principle still lives on.257 The philosopher Joel Feinberg 
put forth, in a four-volume treatise, the most systematic treat-
ment of harm in the modern criminal context.258
Feinberg takes as his starting point the harm principle, 
and recognizes that “the harm principle must be made suffi-
ciently precise to permit the formulation of a criterion of ‘seri-
ousness,’ and also, if possible, some way of grading types of 
harms in terms of their seriousness.”
 It is thus in-
structive to review Feinberg’s work in order to answer the 
question: does a mental/physical divide necessarily emerge 
from the harm principle? 
259
Feinberg’s technical discussion of harms, hurts, and of-
fenses recognizes that “[n]ot everything that we dislike or re-
sent, and wish to avoid, is harmful to us.”
  
260 In listing examples 
of such unpleasant, but not “harmful” experiences, Feinberg in-
cludes “unhappy mental states” such as “disappointment[] . . . 
hurt feelings . . . and shame.”261 But he also includes physical 
pain “at a readily tolerable level” and “bodily discomfort,” 
amongst others.262 Thus, Feinberg’s principle for line drawing is 
in one sense not coterminous with a physical/mental divide.263
That said, Feinberg writes at times with a mental/physical 
distinction in mind. He recognizes that “mental pains” are 
 
 
 257. For instance, in laying out their proposed culpability-based criminal 
code, Alexander and Ferzan note that the starting point is to determine which 
harmful impositions should be made criminal. The authors follow Mill and 
Feinberg in identifying “preventing harm to others” as the “clearest justifica-
tion for state interference,” and then specifically flag “fear and other emotional 
injuries” as a difficult harm category to assess. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra 
note 255, at 269–70. 
 258. 1 FEINBERG, supra note 171; 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MOR-
AL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, 
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988). 
Feinberg’s treatment of Mill’s harm principle has been described as the “most 
extensive and influential analysis.” Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Be-
tween Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 571, 574 n.15 (2011). For a critique of Feinberg’s harm principle, see R.A. 
Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 13 (2001). 
 259. 1 Feinberg, supra note 171, at 12. 
 260. Id. at 45. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Feinberg goes on to distinguish between harms and offense, noting 
that some mental states can be “lumped together with physical pains as forms 
of physical discomfort,” while others are best thought of as “forms of 
offendedness.” Id. at 46. 
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“hurts” but “only by courtesy of metaphor.”264 Feinberg later 
addresses the question head on: whether, “in applying the 
harm principle, we should permit coercion designed to prevent 
mental stress merely, when the distress is not likely to be fol-
lowed by hurt or harm of any other kind?”265 Feinberg’s answer 
is that “the hurt is serious enough if and only if it is either a 
symptom of a prior or concurrent harm of another order (as a 
pain in the arm may be the result and sign of a broken bone) or 
else it is in itself the cause of a consequential harm (e.g., men-
tal breakdown) of another order.”266
Feinberg later emphasizes that there are legally protected 
interests, and that we can think of criminal law as prohibiting 
certain types of impairments of interest. He gives, as an illus-
trative example, the case of a child who was kidnapped but 
soon rescued. Feinberg notes that we might say at that time, 
“‘X was found unharmed,’ the implication being that he suf-
fered no bodily harm.”
 Notably, Feinberg’s answer 
emphasizes the order (i.e., severity) of the harm, not necessari-
ly the type of harm. The legislative challenge is where to draw 
the line of seriousness, not the (non-coterminous) lines between 
bodily and non-bodily injury. 
267 We might also later say that “‘X was 
not harmed by the experience,’ by which it is at least implied 
that X has suffered no psychological harm.”268 Feinberg goes on 
to note how—even in this case where no “harm” may have oc-
curred (at least as defined a certain way)—there has been an 
impairment of the child’s ability to pursue his welfare inter-
ests.269
 
 264. Id. 
 For our purposes here, the important point is that the 
notion of “interest” is even less constrained than the categories 
“bodily” and “psychological.” It would seem that one could con-
sistently adhere to Feinberg’s rule that criminal law prohibit 
only impairments of interest, while modifying the construction 
of bodily injury. Whether we in fact make this modification de-
pends on whether and when we view purely mental injuries as 
significant impairments to interest. And answering that ques-
tion in future years may be increasingly informed by our grow-
ing understanding of how the mind works. 
 265. Id. at 48. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 52 (quoting John Kleinig, Crime and the Concept of Harm, 15 
AM. PHIL. Q. 27, 32 (1978)). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 53. 
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V.  CONCLUSION   
How “bodily injury” is defined and interpreted has im-
portant implications in a variety of criminal law contexts. Alt-
hough courts routinely write that bodily injury is a concept 
commonly understood, this Article has been the first to empiri-
cally test that assertion. The results of the studies reported in 
this Article suggest three empirical conclusions.  
First individuals do not hold a common understanding of 
whether mental injuries such as PTSD should be considered 
bodily. Rather than uniform responses, subjects demonstrated 
rich and varied understandings of the concept of bodily injury. 
The variation in the data does not allow it to be neatly pack-
aged as a robust “common understanding” of the concept of bod-
ily injury. 
Second, and even without an explicit brain-based argument 
made by the prosecution, jury instructions (communicating dif-
ferent definitions of bodily injury) are effective at channeling 
the fluid bodily injury concept. Subjects given a definition of 
bodily injury that enumerates a series of injuries were signifi-
cantly more likely to find PTSD as bodily injury. Exposure to 
the definitions found in Black’s Law Dictionary, by contrast, 
dampened the likelihood of subjects finding PTSD to be bodily. 
Third, brain-based definitions and evidence of bodily injury 
was persuasive to subjects—but not when a restrictive defini-
tion was also provided. On one hand, when the brain-inclusive 
instructions were combined with the prosecution’s argument 
and a brain scan to support it, over 70% of subjects found that 
PTSD in the burglary scenario constituted bodily injury. But 
this percentage dropped precipitously when subjects were in-
structed with the restrictive Black’s Law Dictionary definition. 
Taken together, these three findings cast new light on the 
current and possible future interpretation of bodily injury in 
criminal law. Conventional wisdom is that the bodily injury re-
sult element does not include pure “mental” injury. But society 
may, spurred in part by exposure to neuroscience research, in-
creasingly recognize that “bodily” injury is not a priori more se-
rious or more devastating than “non-bodily” injury. And if this 
shift occurs, the fundamental separation of mind and body in 
the criminal law might similarly change. 
As emphasized throughout the Article, the initial proof-of-
concept experiments presented here are a beginning, not an 
end. Additional empirical study is required to validate the find-
ings to date, and the implications that flow from them. In par-
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ticular, it is important to see whether the results hold when 
subjects are presented with different fact patterns, and when 
they receive more information about the case and the relevant 
science. It also remains to be seen how the issue of intent will 
play out in a legal world in which bodily injury increasingly is 
determined by employing the technology and expertise of neu-
roscience. It is not too early, however, for legislatures to care-
fully revisit and debate the role of bodily injury in determining 
criminal culpability and punishment. 
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APPENDIX A.  BODILY INJURY IN NON-CRIMINAL 
CONTEXTS   
This Appendix provides additional discussion of bodily in-
jury in non-criminal legal contexts. Litigation over the defini-
tion of bodily injury arises occasionally in the context of injuries 
resulting from car accidents, either through claims against a 
driver’s insurance policy or claims for uninsured motorist bene-
fits.270 The plaintiffs in these cases typically assert that they 
have suffered mental harm as a result of being involved in or 
witnessing a car accident. Another context where this issue 
arises is real estate; for example, in Alabama the buyers of 
apartment complexes asserted claims of bodily injury, alleging 
that they suffered mental harm as a result of misrepresenta-
tions by the seller.271
Other cases involve claims on an individual’s homeowners’ 
insurance that provides coverage for bodily injury inflicted by 
the insured. In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Cowan, the 
Texas Supreme Court heard a claim for mental distress against 
a photo lab clerk’s insurer after the clerk publicly distributed 
provocative pictures of the plaintiff.
 
272 A New Jersey case in-
volved a teacher’s claim against a parent for the parent’s alleg-
edly false and misleading public statements about the teacher’s 
competency.273
A related issue arises with regard to the 2010 BP oil spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico. The Louisiana health commissioner re-
ports that there is an increase in anxiety, depression, stress, 
grief, substance abuse, and suicide ideation in the affected are-
  
 
 270. E.g., Haralson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 616, 
619 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Angel v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2007-CA-
001521-MR, 2008 WL 2468873, at *2–3 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Garvis v. Emp’rs 
Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 256–57 (Minn. 1993); Derousse v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); Tucker v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 215 P.3d 1, 5–6 (Mont. 2009); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wagner-
Ellsworth, 188 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Mont. 2008); see Bell, supra note 6 (illustrat-
ing the massive recent increase in insurance claims for bodily injury in the 
United Kingdom); M. Jane Goode, Bodily Injury and Personal Injury, in 1 LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 6:11 (2011) (explaining 
the evolution of the definition of the term “bodily injury” in the insurance law 
context). 
 271. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 518 So. 2d 708, 708–09 (Ala. 1987). In 
another case, residents asserted bodily injury claims for their mental distress 
from their landlord’s negligence in the demolition and renovation of the 
brownstones in which they lived. Lavanant v. General Accident Ins. Co. of 
Am., 561 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 272. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. 1997).  
 273. Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1261 (N.J. 1992). 
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as since the disaster.274 The American Psychiatric Association 
has stated that BP should compensate those affected people for 
their mental health claims, explaining in a news release that 
“an entire way of life has been destroyed,” and this is causing 
the increase in mental health issues, including PTSD.275 None-
theless, the BP claims administrator, Kenneth Feinberg, testi-
fied to a House Judiciary Committee that mental health claims 
without accompanying physical injury probably will not be in-
cluded in the claims that BP will pay.276
Much litigation has arisen under the Warsaw Convention, 
an international instrument that provides liability for the in-
ternational carriage of persons, luggage, and goods.
  
277 The Su-
preme Court has ruled that purely emotional harm does not 
meet the bodily injury requirement of Article 17 of the Conven-
tion,278 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that physical manifestations of emotional harm are 
not sufficient to prove the bodily injury requirement under the 
Convention.279 Although a district court found that a passen-
ger’s PTSD should be covered, the decision was later vacated.280
Tort determinations of what counts as bodily injury often 
turn on whether the court first finds that the term “bodily inju-
ry” is ambiguous. The majority of courts find that the term is 
not ambiguous, and follow the rule of contractual interpretation 
that undefined terms should be interpreted according to their 
plain and ordinary meaning, if one is available. Ultimately, 
these courts conclude that mental harm does not fall within the 
plain and ordinary meaning of “bodily.” The courts primarily 
use two lines of reasoning to reach this conclusion: looking to 
dictionary definitions of the word “bodily,” and versions of a 
reasonable lay person test. For example, the Texas Supreme 
 
 
 274. Sasha Chavkin, Mental Health Claims from Oil Spill Probably Won’t 
Be Paid, PROPUBLICA (July 27, 2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/mental-health-claims-from-oil-spill-probably-wont-be-paid. 
 275. Rosemary Black, Oil Spill Related Mental Health Claims: Should BP 
Have to Pay Up?, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://articles 
.nydailynews.com/2010-08-18/news/27072910_1_oil-spill-health-claims-gulf-of-
mexico-oil. 
 276. Chavkin, supra note 274. 
 277. 49 U.S.C. § 40105 hist. n. (2006); Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 
49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934). 
 278. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991). 
 279. Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 280. Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1192 (D. Mont. 
1999), vacated, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002) (mem.).  
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Court utilized both lines of reasoning in Trinity Universal In-
surance Co. v. Cowan.281 First, the court concluded that exclud-
ing purely mental harm “comports with the commonly under-
stood meaning of ‘bodily,’ which implies a physical, and not 
purely mental, emotional, or spiritual harm.”282 The court fur-
ther supported its conclusion with the definitions of “bodily” 
from both Webster’s (“having a body or a material form: physi-
cal, corporeal”) and Black’s Law Dictionary (“pertaining to or 
concerning the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical 
constitution; not mental, but corporeal”).283
A few courts, however, have held that “bodily injury” is 
ambiguous, and that the term can encompass mental and emo-
tional harm. Sometimes additional language in a policy or stat-
ute allows the court to make such a finding. The Missouri Su-
preme Court interpreted a statute that allowed the recovery of 
damages from uninsured motorists for “bodily injury, sickness 
or disease.”
  
284 The court found this language to be ambiguous as 
to whether “bodily” modified only “injury” or also “sickness or 
disease.”285 The court relied on the comma following “bodily in-
jury” to determine that the “bodily” modified only “injury” and 
that the statute created three distinct categories of harm: (1) 
bodily injury, (2) sickness, and (3) disease.286 The court looked 
to the dictionary definitions of “sickness” and “disease” and ul-
timately concluded that emotional harm alone, even without 
physical manifestations, was compensable under the “sickness 
or disease” prong.287
 
 281. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 823–24 (Tex. 
1997).  
 
 282. Id. at 823. 
 283. Id. at 824; see also Aim Ins. Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal. App. 3d 209, 219 
(1991) (concluding from seven dictionary definitions that “bodily” does not rea-
sonably encompass mental harm).  
 284. Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 285. Id. at 895. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. Other courts have made the same finding to allow coverage for 
mental harm. In Morrison Assurance Co. v. North American Reinsurance 
Corp., the court analyzed a policy definition of “bodily injury” that included 
“sickness” and “disease.” 588 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff’d, 760 
F.2d 279 (11th Cir. 1985). The court held that bodily injury, sickness, and dis-
ease were distinct categories and that mental anguish is necessarily included 
in the terms “sickness” and “disease.” Id. Citing Morrison, the Alabama Su-
preme Court later also held that the language “sickness or disease” includes 
mental anguish. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 518 So. 2d 708, 710 (Ala. 1987). 
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Other courts have introduced a reasonable person test into 
this analysis as well, finding that it is reasonable to conclude 
that “bodily injury” or “sickness” includes mental anguish.288
While few courts have found that mental harm alone is a 
“bodily injury,” most seem to agree that mental harm accompa-
nied by physical manifestations can be sufficient to trigger in-
surance coverage.
 
That courts can use the same mode of analysis, some version of 
a reasonable/ordinary person standard, and arrive at different 
outcomes is further indication that the standard itself is in 
need of re-examination.  
289 Courts arrive at this conclusion in various 
ways. In some cases, courts have found that the issue of physi-
cal manifestations of mental harm creates an ambiguity in con-
tract or statutory language regarding bodily injuries. According 
to these courts, while the definitions of bodily injury clearly ex-
clude purely mental harm, it is unclear from the plain meaning 
of the term whether physical manifestations of mental harm 
should be included. For instance, physical manifestations of 
PTSD may include weight loss, hair loss, stomach pains, and 
muscle aches.290 The courts then rely on a well-established rule 
that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured party, 
in other words, in favor of extending coverage, to conclude that 
mental harm accompanied by physical manifestations can con-
stitute “bodily injury.”291
Other courts include mental harm with physical manifes-
tations on policy grounds, making a comparison to tort law. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that it is appropriate to 
include mental harm with physical manifestations because in-
surance policies are “designed to protect the insured against 
tortious conduct” and “there is tort law recognizing infliction of 





 288. Hill v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 935 So. 2d 691, 694 (La. 2006); Lavanant 
v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 561 N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 Some courts have used a reasonable 
 289. E.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. Hosler, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1114 (D. Colo. 
2009); Haralson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622–
25 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 
(Minn. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d 1042, 1051 
(Mont. 2008); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1261 (N.J. 
1992); Trinh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 1259, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 290. Trinh, 37 P.3d at 1264. 
 291. Haralson, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 625; Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d at 
1051; Voorhees, 607 A.2d at 1261. 
 292. Garvis, 497 N.W.2d at 257. On the other hand, the Texas Supreme 
Court declined to make such a comparison to tort law when it would have af-
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lay person test, finding that such a reasonable person would 
expect insurance coverage for bodily injury to include physical-
ly-manifested emotional harm.293
A final, useful illustration comes from asbestos litigation in 
the context of the comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy. 
Insurers first developed the CGL in the 1960s, and in it they 
defined bodily injury as “bodily injury, sickness or disease sus-
tained by any person.”
  
294 In cases such as asbestos-induced 
abestosis, insurance coverage under CGL policies is triggered 
when an occurrence of the disease causes bodily injury.295 The 
problem, which has been identified by commentators and liti-
gated in courts, is that “the CGL policy does not define ‘bodily 
injury’ in a way to make clear exactly (1) what counts as such 
injury, i.e., what is the proper definition of the term ‘bodily in-
jury,’ and (2) when it occurs.”296
How do courts resolve this issue? There are competing ra-
tionales to be found in the opinions. Based on public policy con-
siderations, for example, “finding an administratively manage-
able interpretation, honoring the reasonable expectations of the 
parties, and construing the policies to promote coverage,”
 
297 
some courts have ruled that the microscopic tissue damage 
caused by asbestos exposure constitutes bodily injury.298 Simi-
larly, although coming to a different conclusion on the facts in 
front of it, another court found that because the scientific evi-
dence and contractual language were not definitive, public poli-
cy considerations should rule.299
 
forded coverage for purely emotional harm. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cow-
an, 945 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. 1997) (citation omitted) (“That Texas tort law 
allows for recovery of mental anguish damages unaccompanied by physical 
manifestations in some circumstances does not mean that insurance coverage 
for bodily injury necessarily encompasses purely emotional injuries.”); see also 
Hosler, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 (“[T]ort cases are of limited value in guiding 
consideration of the insurance law issues in the instant case. ‘Tort law and in-
surance law are not coextensive’” (quoting SL Indus. Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. 
Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1275 (1992)). 
 
 293. Voorhees, 607 A.2d at 1261; Trinh, 37 P.3d at 1264.  
 294. James E. Scheuermann, The Injury in Fact Theory as a Solution to the 
Trigger of Coverage Issue, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 763, 767–68 (1989). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 768. 
 297. Id. at 774 n.53.  
 298. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212, 1217–18 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 299. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
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An alternative approach is that this type of microscopic tis-
sue damage is not bodily injury because it does not fall under 
“the common ordinary meaning” of the term, where such com-
mon ordinary meaning is defined as “an injury, sickness, or 
disease when her sense of well-being is adversely affected or 
impaired.”300
In practice, courts in the asbestos context have tried to ar-
ticulate a principle of severity, rather than type. In a leading 
case in this area, American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co., the trial court ruled that to be covered by 




Analyzing this body of case law on injury in fact in tort 
suits, attorney and philosopher James Scheuermann has ar-
gued “[t]here is no principle—metaphysical, linguistic, herme-
neutical, or other—by which physical facts alone determine 
meanings.”
 
302 Thus, Scheuermann recognizes that there is a 
reasonable person standard being applied to identify those in-
juries that a reasonable person would find non-trivial.303 The 
problem is that “the definition of bodily injury in terms of the 
counterfactual beliefs of a reasonable person . . . [is] an idea 
which itself is little more than an ad hoc empirical generaliza-
tion.”304
 
 This Article has attempted to move beyond ad hoc gen-




 300. Scheuermann, supra note 294, at 774 n.56; see, e.g., Eagle-Picher In-
dus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1982).  
 301. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 
1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984). The ap-
pellate court affirmed the decision in general but rejected its interpretation of 
“injury in fact” to mean that an injury was diagnosable and compensable. Id. 
at 764. 
 302. Scheuermann, supra note 294, at 776. Scheuermann goes on to argue 
that the bodily injury definitional question “is always to be solved by an ap-
peal to criteria of meaning such as the intentions of the parties, their reasona-
ble expectations, course of performance, or the like.” Id. 
 303. Scheuermann argues that “the law is not concerned with trivialities 
and no one insures against them (i.e., trivialities such as the initial microscop-
ic injuries to lungs that follow upon exposure to and inhalation of asbestos, but 
which very often do not result in asbestosis), and no one seriously believes that 
substantial injury in progressive disease cases occurs only upon manifesta-
tion.” Id. at 780. 
 304. Id. at 782. 
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Table A1 
Selected Definitions of Bodily Injury Used in Tort 
and Insurance Law 
 
 
 305. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, supra note 277. 
 306. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. 1997). 
 307. Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 298 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 308. Morrison Assurance Co. v. N. Am. Reinsurance Corp., 588 F. Supp. 
1324, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 1984). 
 309. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 518 So. 2d 708, 710 (Ala. 1987). 
 310. Hill v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 935 So. 2d 691, 694 (La. 2006). 
 311. Lavanant v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 561 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 312. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hugh, 501 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Iowa 1993). 




tion for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air)305
Not defined (has led to much litigation, in-
cluding the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 520 
(1991).  
Trinity Universal Insurance 
Company standard homeown-
er’s insurance policy306
Bodily harm, sickness or disease. This in-
cludes required care, loss of services and 
death that results.  
State Farm uninsured motorist 
policy307
Bodily injury to a person and sickness, dis-
ease or death which results from it.  
Morrison Assurance Company 
basic liability insurance poli-
cy308
Bodily injury, sickness or disease . . . in-
cluding death at anytime resulting there-
from.  
American States Insurance 
Company Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability Coverage309
Bodily injury, sickness or disease.  
 
 
Shelter Mutual Insurance 
Company Policy310
Bodily injury to a person and sickness, dis-
ease or death which results from it.  
General Accident Insurance 
Company multi-peril policy311
Bodily injury, sickness or disease. 
 
Pekin Insurance Company un-
derinsured motorist policy312
Bodily harm, sickness or disease including 
death that results.  
Allstate auto insurance policy313 Physical harm to the body, sickness, dis-
ease, or death. 
 
Employers Mutual Casualty 
Company comprehensive gen-
Bodily injury, sickness, or Disease sus-
tained by a person. 
  




Definitions of Bodily Injury, Serious Bodily Injury, 
and Assault, by State 
 
State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




Alabama  Physical Injury. Im-
pairment of physical 
condition or substan-
tial pain. ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-1-2(12) (2012). 
Serious Physical Inju-
ry. Physical injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death, 
or which causes serious 
and protracted disfig-
urement, protracted 
impairment of health, 
or protracted loss or 
impairment of the 
function of any bodily 
organ. ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-1-2(14) (2012). 
(a) A person 
commits the 
crime of as-
sault in the 
third degree 
if: (1) With 
intent to 
cause physi-




injury to any 
person; or (2) 
He recklessly 
causes phys-




6-22 (2012).  
 
 314. Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1993). 
 315. Vorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1258 (N.J. 1992). 
 316. Trinh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 1259, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 317. Tucker v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 215 P.3d 1, 5 (Mont. 2009). 
eral liability policy314





Bodily harm, sickness or disease to a person 
including required care, loss of services and 
death resulting therefrom.  
Allstate uninsured motorist 
policy316
Bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
   
Farmers Insurance Exchange317 Bodily injury to or sickness, disease or 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




Alaska   “[P]hysical injury” 
means a physical pain 
or an impairment of 
physical condition. 
ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.81.900(46) (2012).  
“[S]erious physical in-
jury” means (A) physi-
cal injury caused by an 
act performed under 
circumstances that 
create a substantial 
risk of death; or (B) 
physical injury that 
causes serious and pro-
tracted disfigurement, 
protracted impairment 
of health, protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of a body 
member or organ, or 
that unlawfully termi-
nates a pregnancy. 
ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.81.900(56) (2012). 
Assault in 
the Fourth 




sault in the 
fourth de-




ical injury to 
another per-







by means of 
a dangerous 
instrument; 











sault in the 
fourth de-
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 







Arizona  “Physical injury” 
means the impairment 
of physical condition. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
105(33) (2012).  
“Serious physical inju-
ry” includes physical 
injury that creates a 
reasonable risk of 
death, or that causes 
serious and permanent 
disfigurement, serious 
impairment of health 
or loss or protracted 
impairment of the 
function of any bodily 
organ or limb. ARIZ. 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 






Arkansas  “Physical injury” 
means the: (A) Im-
pairment of physical 
condition; (B) Infliction 
of substantial pain; or 
(C) Infliction of bruis-
ing, swelling, or a visi-
ble mark associated 
with physical trauma. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
102 (14) (2010).  
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury that creates a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or that causes pro-
tracted disfigurement, 
protracted impairment 
of health, or loss or 
protracted impairment 
of the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan. ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-1-102 (21) (2010). 
(a) A person 
commits as-
sault in the 
third degree 














The term “bodily inju-
ry” shall include sick-
ness or disease, includ-
ing death resulting 
therefrom. CAL. INS. 
CODE § 11580.06(c) 
(2012). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means a serious im-
pairment of physical 
condition, including, 
but not limited to, the 
following: loss of con-
sciousness; concussion; 
bone fracture; pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan; a wound requiring 
extensive suturing; and 












§ 240 (2012).  
 
 318. ARK. CODE § 5-13-203 (2010) (“A person commits battery in the third 
degree if: (1) With the purpose of causing physical injury to another person, 
the person causes physical injury to any person; (2) The person recklessly 
causes physical injury to another person.”). 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 





CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 243(f)(4) (2012).  
 
Colorado  “Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness, 
or any impairment of 
physical or mental 
condition. COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1-901(3)(c) 
(2012).  
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
which, either at the 
time of the actual inju-
ry or at a later time, 
involves a substantial 
risk of death, a sub-
stantial risk of serious 
permanent disfigure-
ment, a substantial 
risk of protracted loss 
or impairment of the 
function of any part or 
organ of the body, or 
breaks, fractures, or 
burns of the second or 
third degree. COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-1-
901(3)(p) (2012). 
(1) A person 
commits the 
crime of as-
sault in the 
third degree 























means impairment of 
physical condition or 
pain. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53a-3(3) (2012). 
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury which creates a 
substantial risk of 
death, or which causes 
serious disfigurement, 
serious impairment of 
health or serious loss 
or impairment of the 
function of any bodily 
organ. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53a-3(4) (2012). 
(a) A person 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 





son or to a 
third person; 










ical injury to 
another per-
son by 












Delaware  “Physical injury” 
means impairment of 
physical condition or 
substantial pain. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 222(24) (2012). 
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury which creates a 
substantial risk of 
death, or which causes 
serious and prolonged 
disfigurement, pro-
longed impairment of 
health or prolonged 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily organ, or which 
causes the unlawful 
A person is 
guilty of as-







ical injury to 
another per-
son; or (2) 
With crimi-
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




termination of a preg-
nancy without the con-
sent of the pregnant 
female. DEL. CODE 








by means of 
a deadly 




ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 611 (2012). 
Florida  (1) “Bodily injury” 
means: (a) A cut, abra-
sion, bruise, burn, or 
disfigurement; (b) 
Physical pain; (c) Ill-
ness; (d) Impairment of 
the function of a bodily 
member, organ, or 
mental faculty; or (e) 
Any other injury to the 
body, no matter how 
temporary. FLA. STAT. 
§ 914.21 (2012). 
 
“Serious bodily injury’’ 
means a physical con-
dition that creates a 
substantial risk of 
death, serious personal 
disfigurement, or pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
any bodily member or 
organ. FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.155 (2012).  
(1) An “as-




word or act 
to do vio-
lence to the 
person of an-
other, cou-
pled with an 
apparent 
ability to do 













 319. See also FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (2012) (“A person commits aggravated 
battery who, in committing battery: 1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 
















other. (b) As 



























bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or 2. Uses a 
deadly weapon.”). 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 







Hawaii  “Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness, 
or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-
700 (2012).  
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or which causes seri-
ous, permanent disfig-
urement, or protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan. HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 707-700 (2012).  























712 (2012).  
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




Idaho  “Bodily injury” means 
any bodily injury, sick-
ness, disease or death 
sustained by any per-
son and caused by an 
occurrence. IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 6-902 
(2012). 
 
 (2) As used in this sec-
tion, “great bodily inju-
ry” means a significant 
or substantial physical 
injury. IDAHO CODE 


















word or act 
to do vio-
lence to the 
person of an-
other, cou-
pled with an 
apparent 
ability to do 











901 (2012).  
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




Illinois  Not defined. § 2.19a. “Serious physi-
cal injury” means a 
physical injury that 
creates a substantial 
risk of death or that 
causes death, serious 
disfigurement, pro-
tracted impairment of 
health, impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily organ, or plastic 
surgery. 510 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5 / 2.19a 
(2012).  





















“Bodily injury” means 
any impairment of 
physical condition, in-
cluding physical pain. 
IND. CODE § 35-31.5-2-
29 (2012).  
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
that creates a substan-
tial risk of death or 
that causes: (1) serious 
permanent disfigure-
ment; (2) unconscious-
ness; (3) extreme pain; 
(4) permanent or pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
a bodily member or or-
gan; or (5) loss of a fe-
tus. IND. CODE § 35-
31.5-2-292 (2012).  














offense is: (1) 
a Class A 
misdemean-
or if: (A) it 
 
 320. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 12-3 (2012) (“(a) A person commits battery if 
he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily 
harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provok-
ing nature with an individual.”). 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 











Iowa  Not defined. “Serious injury” means 
any of the following: a. 
Disabling mental ill-
ness. b. Bodily injury 
which does any of the 
following: (1) Creates a 
substantial risk of 
death. (2) Causes seri-
ous permanent disfig-
urement. (3) Causes 
protracted loss or im-
pairment of the func-
tion of any bodily 
member or organ. c. 
Any injury to a child 
that requires surgical 
repair and necessitates 
the administration of 
general anesthesia. 2. 
“Serious injury” in-
cludes but is not lim-
ited to skull fractures, 
rib fractures, and 
metaphyseal fractures 
of the long bones of 
children under the age 
of four years. IOWA 
CODE § 702.18 (2012).  
An assault 
as defined in 
this section 








son does any 
of the follow-
ing: 1. Any 
act which is 
intended to 
cause pain or 













ecute the act. 
2. Any act 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 























Kansas  Not defined.  (4) “[S]erious bodily 
injury” means an inju-
ry as described in sub-
section (h)(3) of section 
1365 of title 18 of the 
United States Code. 













5412 (2012).  
 
 
 321. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3) (2006) (“The term ‘serious bodily injury’ 
means bodily injury which involves: (A) a substantial risk of death; (B) ex-
treme physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protract-
ed loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental 
faculty.”). 
  
2134 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2036 
 
State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




Kentucky  “Physical injury” 
means substantial 
physical pain or any 
impairment of physical 
condition. KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§ 500.080(13) (West 
2012).  
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury which creates a 
substantial risk of 
death, or which causes 
serious and prolonged 
disfigurement, pro-
longed impairment of 
health, or prolonged 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily organ. KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§ 500.080(15) (West 
2012). 
A person is 
guilty of as-







ical injury to 
another per-




ical injury to 
another per-
son by 
means of a 
deadly 






(West 2012).  
Louisiana  Not defined. B. For purposes of this 
Section [Second Degree 
Battery] . . . “Serious 
bodily injury” means 
bodily injury, which 
involves unconscious-
ness, extreme physical 
pain or protracted and 
obvious disfigurement, 
or protracted loss or 
impairment of the 
function of a bodily 
member, organ, or 
mental faculty, or a 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




substantial risk of 
death. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:34.1 (2012). 
 




“Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, physical 
illness or any impair-
ment of physical condi-
tion. ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 17-A, § 2 (2012).  
“Serious bodily injury” 
means a bodily injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or which causes seri-
ous, permanent disfig-
urement or loss or sub-
stantial impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan, or extended con-
valescence necessary 
for recovery of physical 
health. ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 17-A, § 2 (2012).  
A person is 
guilty of as-













graph is a 
Class D 
crime; or B. 
The person 
has attained 
at least 18 









 322. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:33 (2012) (“Battery is the intentional use of force 
or violence upon the person of another; or the intentional administration of a 
poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another.”). 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




who is less 
than 6 years 
of age. Viola-
tion of this 
paragraph is 




§ 207 (2012).  
Maryland  “[P]hysical injury” 
means any impairment 
of physical condition, 
excluding minor inju-
ries.  
MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW 
§ 3-203(c)(1) (2012). 
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury that: (1) creates a 
substantial risk of 
death; or (2) causes 
permanent or protract-
ed serious: (i) disfig-
urement; (ii) loss of the 
function of any bodily 
member or organ; or 
(iii) impairment of the 
function of any bodily 
member or organ.  
MD. CODE., CRIM. LAW 



















Not defined. “Serious bodily injury” 
shall mean bodily inju-
ry that results in a 
permanent disfigure-
ment, loss or impair-
ment of a bodily func-
tion, limb or organ, or 
a substantial risk of 
death. MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 265, § 13A(c) 
(2012). 
“[D]efinition 
of assault is 
an attempt 






 323. Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 733 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Mass. 2000) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 885 (Mass. 1975)). 
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State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




Michigan  Not defined. (8) For purposes of 
subsection (3), “serious 
bodily injury” means 
each of the following: 
(a) Bodily injury that 
involves a substantial 
risk of death. (b) Un-
consciousness. (c) Ex-
treme physical pain. 
(d) Protracted and ob-
vious disfigurement. (e) 
Protracted loss or im-
pairment of the func-
tion of a bodily mem-
ber, organ, or mental 
faculty. MICH. COMP. 























“Bodily harm” means 
physical pain or injury, 
illness, or any impair-
ment of physical condi-
tion. MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.02(7) (2012). 
“Great bodily harm” 
means bodily injury 
which creates a high 
probability of death, or 
which causes serious 
permanent disfigure-
ment, or which causes 
a permanent or pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
any bodily member or 
organ or other serious 
bodily harm. MINN. 
STAT. § 609.02(8) 
(2012). 
Whoever 




is guilty of a 
misdemean-
or: (1) com-
mits an act 
with intent 
to cause fear 
in another of 
immediate 
bodily harm 








 324. People v. Johnson, 284 N.W.2d 718, 718 (Mich. 1979) (quoting People 
v. Sanford, 265 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1978)). 
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Not defined. “Serious bodily harm,” 
within the meaning of 
the felony child abuse 
statute, means bodily 
injury which creates a 
substantial risk of 
death, or permanent or 
temporary disfigure-
ment, or impairment of 
any function of any 
bodily organ or func-
tion. MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-5-39 (2012).325
(1)(a) A per-
son is guilty 
of simple as-






























 325. From Child Neglect Section. 
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Missouri  “Physical injury” 
means physical pain, 
illness, or any impair-
ment of physical condi-
tion; MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 556.061(20) (2012).  
 
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury that creates a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or that causes serious 
disfigurement or pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
any part of the body. 
MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 565.002(6) (2012). 
1. A person 
commits the 
crime of as-
sault in the 
third degree 






ical injury to 
another per-
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ates a grave 
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Montana  “Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness, 
or an impairment of 
physical condition and 
includes mental illness 
or impairment. MON. 
CODE ANN. § 45-2-
101(5) (2011). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
that: (i) creates a sub-
stantial risk of death; 
(ii) causes serious per-
manent disfigurement 
or protracted loss or 
impairment of the 
function or process of a 
bodily member or or-
gan; or (iii) at the time 
of injury, can reasona-
bly be expected to re-
sult in serious perma-
nent disfigurement or 
protracted loss or im-
pairment of the func-
tion or process of a bod-
ily member or organ. 
(b) The term includes 
serious mental illness 
or impairment. MON. 
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Nebraska  Bodily injury shall 
mean physical pain, 
illness, or any impair-
ment of physical condi-
tion; NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-109(4) (2012). 
Serious bodily injury 
shall mean bodily inju-
ry which involves a 
substantial risk of 
death, or which in-
volves substantial risk 
of serious permanent 
disfigurement, or pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
any part or organ of 
the body; NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 28-109(20) 
(2012). 












person; or (b) 
Threatens 






Nevada  “Physical injury” in-
cludes, without limita-
tion: 1. A sprain or dis-
location; 2. Damage to 
cartilage; 3. A fracture 
of a bone or the skull; 
4. An intracranial 
hemorrhage or injury 
to another internal or-
gan; 5. A burn or scald-
ing; 6. A cut, lacera-
tion, puncture or bite; 
7. Permanent or tem-
porary disfigurement; 
or 8. Permanent or 
temporary loss or im-
pairment of a part or 
organ of the body. NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 432B.090 
(2011). 
 
Unless the context oth-
erwise requires, “sub-
stantial bodily harm” 
means: 1. Bodily injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or which causes seri-
ous, permanent disfig-
urement or protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan; or 2. Prolonged 
physical pain. 
NEV. REV. STAT. 
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“Serious bodily injury” 
means any harm to the 
body which causes se-
vere, permanent or 
protracted loss of or 
impairment to the 
health or of the func-
tion of any part of the 
body. N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 625:11 (2012). 
I. A person is 
guilty of 
simple as-


























“Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness 
or any impairment of 
physical condition; N.J. 
REV. STAT. § 2C:11-1(a) 
(2012). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or which causes seri-
ous, permanent disfig-
urement, or protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan. N.J. REV. STAT. 
§ 2C:11-1(b) (2012). 
A person is 
guilty of as-
sault if he: 
(1) Attempts 
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A. “[B]odily injury” 
means an injury to a 
person that is not like-
ly to cause death or 
great bodily harm to 
the person, but does 
cause painful tempo-
rary disfigurement or 
temporary loss or im-
pairment of the func-
tions of any member or 
organ of the person’s 
body; 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-
13-2 (2012).  
 
“[G]reat bodily harm” 
means an injury to the 
person which creates a 
high probability of 
death; or which causes 
serious disfigurement; 
or which results in 
permanent or protract-
ed loss or impairment 
of the function of any 
member or organ of the 
body. N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30-1-12(A) (2012). 
Assault con-
sists of ei-




the person of 
another; B. 
any unlawful 







lieve that he 
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New York  “Physical injury” 
means impairment of 
physical condition or 
substantial pain. N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 10.00(9) 
(McKinney 2012). 
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury which creates a 
substantial risk of 
death, or which causes 
death or serious and 
protracted disfigure-
ment, protracted im-
pairment of health or 
protracted loss or im-
pairment of the func-
tion of any bodily or-
gan. N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 10.00(10) (McKinney 
2012). 
A person is 
guilty of as-











son or to a 
third person; 
or 2. He 
recklessly 
causes phys-
ical injury to 
another per-





ical injury to 
another per-
son by 
means of a 
deadly 
weapon or a 
dangerous 
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Not defined. “Serious bodily injury” 
is defined as bodily in-
jury that creates a sub-
stantial risk of death, 
or that causes serious 
permanent disfigure-
ment, coma, a perma-
nent or protracted con-
dition that causes 
extreme pain, or per-
manent or protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan, or that results in 
prolonged hospitaliza-
tion. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-32.4 (2012). 





do injury to 






“Bodily injury” means 
any impairment of 
physical condition, in-
cluding physical pain. 
N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-01-04 (2011). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
that creates a substan-
tial risk of death or 




nent loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
any bodily member or 
A person is 











 326. State v. Britt, 154 S.E.2d 519, 521 (N.C. 1967) (citing State v. Davis, 
23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 125, 127 (N.C. 1840)). 
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organ, a bone fracture, 
or impediment of air 
flow or blood flow to 
the brain or lungs. 
N.D. CENT. CODE 




means of a 
firearm, de-
structive de-
vice, or other 
weapon, the 
use of which 
against a 
human being 







Ohio  “Physical harm to per-
sons” means any inju-
ry, illness, or other 
physiological impair-
ment, regardless of its 
gravity or duration. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2901.01(3) (West 
2012).  
“Serious physical harm 
to persons” means any 
of the following: (a) 
Any mental illness or 
condition of such gravi-
ty as would normally 
require hospitalization 
or prolonged psychiat-
ric treatment; (b) Any 
physical harm that 
carries a substantial 
risk of death; (c) Any 
physical harm that in-
volves some permanent 
incapacity, whether 
partial or total, or that 
involves some tempo-
rary, substantial inca-
pacity; (d) Any physical 
harm that involves 
some permanent dis-
figurement or that in-







cal harm to 







ical harm to 
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(e) Any physical harm 
that involves acute 
pain of such duration 
as to result in substan-
tial suffering or that 
involves any degree of 
prolonged or intracta-
ble pain. OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. 




Not defined. “[G]reat bodily injury” 
means bone fracture, 
protracted and obvious 
disfigurement, pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
a body part, organ or 
mental faculty, or sub-
stantial risk of death. 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 646(B) (2012). 














Oregon  “Physical injury” 
means impairment of 
physical condition or 
substantial pain. OR. 
REV. STAT. § 161.015(7) 
(2012). 
“Serious physical inju-
ry” means physical in-
jury which creates a 
substantial risk of 
death or which causes 
serious and protracted 
disfigurement, pro-




sault in the 
fourth de-




 327. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 642 (2012) (“A battery is any willful and unlaw-
ful use of force or violence upon the person of another.”). 
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health or protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily organ. OR. REV. 























pairment of physical 
condition or substan-
tial pain. 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 2301 (2012). 
“Serious bodily injury.” 
Bodily injury which 
creates a substantial 
risk of death or which 
causes serious, perma-
nent disfigurement, or 
protracted loss or im-
pairment of the func-
tion of any bodily 
member or organ. 18 






sault if he: 
(1) attempts 
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in fear of 
imminent 
serious bodi-
ly injury. 18 
PA. CONS. 




Not defined. “Serious bodily injury” 
means physical injury 
that: (1) Creates a sub-
stantial risk of death; 
(2) Causes protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily part, member or 
organ; or (3) Causes 
serious permanent dis-
figurement or circum-
cises, excises or infibu-
lates the whole or any 
part of the labia 
majora or labia minora 
or clitoris of a person. 


























means death or per-
manent or temporary 
disfigurement or im-
pairment of any bodily 
organ or function. S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 63-7-
20(18) (2012). 
 
“Great bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
which causes a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or which causes seri-
ous, permanent disfig-
urement or protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of a bodily 
member or organ. S.C. 











 328. State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 186 (R.I. 1988) (citing State v. Baker, 
38 A. 653, 654 (R.I. 1897)). 
  
2013] MIND, BODY, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 2151 
 
State Bodily (or Physical) 
Injury 




CODE ANN. § 16-3-
600(A)(1) (2012). 














Not defined. “Serious bodily injury,” 
such injury as is grave 
and not trivial, and 
gives rise to apprehen-
sion of danger to life, 
health, or limb. S.D. 
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cludes a cut, abrasion, 
bruise, burn or disfig-
urement, and physical 
pain or temporary ill-
ness or impairment of 
the function of a bodily 
member, organ, or 
mental faculty; TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-11-
106(2) (2012). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
that involves: (A) A 
substantial risk of 
death; (B) Protracted 
unconsciousness; (C) 
Extreme physical pain; 
(D) Protracted or obvi-
ous disfigurement; (E) 
Protracted loss or sub-
stantial impairment of 
a function of a bodily 
member, organ or men-
tal faculty; or (F) A 
broken bone of a child 
who is eight (8) years 
of age or less. TENN. 
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Texas  “Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness, 
or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
TEX. PENAL CODE 
§ 1.07(8) (2011). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
that creates a substan-
tial risk of death or 
that causes death, se-
rious permanent dis-
figurement, or pro-
tracted loss or 
impairment of the 
function of any bodily 
member or organ. TEX. 
PENAL CODE § 1.07(46) 
(2011). 
(a) A person 
commits an 
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CODE § 22.01 
(2011). 
Utah  “Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness, 
or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
1-601(3) (West 2012). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
that creates or causes 
serious permanent dis-
figurement, protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan, or creates a sub-
stantial risk of death. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-













Vermont  “Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness 
or any impairment of 
physical condition.  
VT. STAT. tit. 13, 
§ 3251(5) (2012). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means: (A) bodily inju-
ry which creates any of 
the following: (i) a sub-
stantial risk of death; 
(ii) a substantial loss or 
impairment of the 
function of any bodily 
member or organ; (iii) 
a substantial impair-
ment of health; or (iv) 
substantial disfigure-
ment; or (B) strangula-
tion by intentionally 
impeding normal 
breathing or circula-
(a) A person 
is guilty of 
simple as-
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tion of the blood by ap-
plying pressure on the 
throat or neck or by 
blocking the nose or 
mouth of another per-
son. VT. STAT. tit. 13, 
§ 1021(2) (2012). 







in fear of 
imminent 
serious bodi-
ly injury. VT. 





Virginia  Not defined. 
 
Not defined. “An assault 
requires an 









cal injury to 
the person of 
another. 
There is no 
requirement 
that a victim 
be physically 
touched to be 
assaulted.”329
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cal injury,” or “bodily 
harm” means physical 
pain or injury, illness, 
or an impairment of 
physical condition. 
WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.04.110(4a) (2012). 
“Great bodily harm” 
means bodily injury 
which creates a proba-
bility of death, or 
which causes signifi-
cant serious perma-
nent disfigurement, or 
which causes a signifi-
cant permanent loss or 
impairment of the 
function of any bodily 
part or organ. WASH. 
REV. CODE 













to give effect 
to the at-







“Bodily injury” means 
substantial physical 
pain, illness or any im-
pairment of physical 




“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death, 
which causes serious or 
prolonged disfigure-
ment, prolonged im-
pairment of health or 
prolonged loss or im-
pairment of the func-
tion of any bodily or-








to the person 














 330. State v. Sample, 757 P.2d 539, 540 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). 
 331. Within the stalking statute; see also W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(9) (2012) 
(within the Sexual Offenses section). 
 332. Within the Sexual Offenses section. 
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guilty of a 
misdemean-
or and, upon 
conviction, 
shall be con-
fined in jail 















“Bodily harm” means 
physical pain or injury, 
illness, or any impair-
ment of physical condi-
tion. WIS. STAT. 
§ 939.22(4) (2012). 
“Great bodily harm” 
means bodily injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death, 
or which causes serious 
permanent disfigure-
ment, or which causes 
a permanent or pro-
tracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of 
any bodily member or 
organ or other serious 
bodily injury. WIS. 















the person so 
harmed is 
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Wyoming  “Bodily injury” means 
physical pain, illness 
or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-
104(a)(i) (2012). 
“Serious bodily injury” 
means bodily injury 
which creates a sub-
stantial risk of death 
or which causes mis-
carriage, severe disfig-
urement or protracted 
loss or impairment of 
the function of any 
bodily member or or-
gan. WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6-1-104(x) (2012). 
















APPENDIX B.  POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AS A 
BRAIN INJURY   
In this Appendix, I present one way to understand PTSD 
as a brain-based disorder.333 Since its official recognition in 
1980 by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in the Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, PTSD has 
become central to many types of personal injury litigation and 
has spawned a cottage industry of lawyers and scientists work-
ing at this intersection.334
The growth of PTSD civil litigation raised a number of 
challenges, including whether PTSD exists to begin with, what 
a valid PTSD diagnosis is, the causal link to the traumatic 
event, and how to tell if an individual is “malingering” (i.e., de-




 333. There is ongoing research on the relationship between brain function 
and PTSD, thus the discussion in this Appendix should not be viewed as a de-
finitive statement on the relationship between brain function and PTSD. Ra-
ther, this is a non-technical summary of one view of that relationship. See 
Landy F. Sparr & Roger K. Pitman, PTSD and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF 
PTSD: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 449 (Matthew J. Friedman et al. eds., 2007) for 
additional discussion. 
 These are just a few of the 
 334. Id. at 449.  
 335. Erin D. Bigler, Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: Causality Considera-
tions from a Neuroimaging and Neuropathology Perspective, in PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL KNOWLEDGE IN COURT: PTSD, PAIN, AND TBI 308, 324 (Gerald Young et 
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many concerns that skeptics raise about PTSD.336 Indeed, some 
argue that PTSD is actually prolonged by the litigation process, 
stating that “ongoing litigation acts as an artificial reinforcing 
factor for unpleasant memories and their accompanying af-
fect.”337
Yet, despite the scientific concerns voiced since its incep-
tion, PTSD has only grown in terms of its practical legal im-
portance. In 1993 Dr. Alan Stone, professor of law and psychia-
try at Harvard Law School, observed “no diagnosis in the 
history of American psychiatry has had a more dramatic and 
pervasive impact on law and social justice than . . . PTSD.”
 
338
Stress-related mental injuries, especially those accrued due 
to exposure to military combat, have long been scrutinized, 
though PTSD was officially recognized by the APA for the first 
time in 1980 in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III).
 
339 Due in large part 
to concerns about veterans upon their return from the battle-
field, since the 1980s PTSD has been and continues to be well 
studied.340 The National Center for PTSD, established in 1989 
within the Department of Veterans Affairs, has invested tens of 
millions of dollars to improve PTSD research, clinical practice, 
and awareness.341
 
al. eds., 2006); Melissa A. Polusny & Paul A. Arbisi, Assessment of Psychologi-
cal Distress and Disability After Sexual Assault in Adults, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
KNOWLEDGE IN COURT, supra, at 97, 111.  
  
 336. See generally C. R. BREWIN, POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: MAL-
ADY OR MYTH? 11–15 (2003) (discussing the challenges to the PTSD diagnosis 
since its formal recognition in 1980).  
 337. L.H. Field, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Reappraisal, 92 J. ROY-
AL SOC’Y MED. 35, 36 (1999). But see Review of Veterans’ Disability Compensa-
tion: Expert Reports on PTSD and Other Issues: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) (statement of Dean G. Kilpatrick, Dis-
tinguished Univ. Professor & Director of Nat’l Crime Victims Research Ctr., 
Med. Univ. S.C.) (concluding that “compensation does not in general serve as a 
disincentive to seeking treatment”).  
 338. Alan A. Stone, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law: Critical 
Review of the New Frontier, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 23, 23 
(1993). 
 339. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS-III 236 (3d ed. 1980). 
 340. Matthew J. Friedman et al., PTSD: Twenty-Five Years of Progress and 
Challenges, in HANDBOOK OF PTSD, supra note 333, at 3. 
 341. See NAT’L CTR. PTSD, About Us, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS (2013), 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/about/index.asp. As the research base on PTSD has 
grown, so too have criticisms. The controversies include debates about wheth-
er PTSD is a legitimate diagnosis, PTSD’s failure to account for cross-cultural 
variation, and concerns about the reliability of verbal reports and traumatic 
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PTSD is “a favored diagnosis in tort law because it is inci-
dent-specific, easy to understand, and tends to rule out other 
factors potentially involved in causation.”342 PTSD is also de-
fined and diagnosed exclusively through behavioral 
measures.343 The diagnostic criteria for PTSD make no explicit 
mention of the brain.344 Compensation is tied to deficits in be-
havioral outcomes, caused by the specific event at issue, both 
for personal injury cases and for veterans’ PTSD claims.345
If behavior is front-and-center in PTSD litigation, what 
does neuroscience research add to the legal landscape? 
Neuroscientific evidence may play a critical role in determining 
whether PTSD is a “mental” or a “bodily” injury. To see how, 
we can start by thinking of PTSD as an inability to properly 
regulate fear response and memory formation.
 It is 
not enough for a client’s brain to change from a traumatic 
event; if those brain changes do not lead to the behavioral out-
comes specified in the diagnostic criteria, then there is no 
PTSD diagnosed and no successful claim to file. 
346 The three 
brain regions of most interest for understanding PTSD are the 
amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus.347
 
memories. See generally POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: ISSUES AND CON-
TROVERSIES (Gerald M. Rosen ed., 2004) (providing a compilation of debates 
about PTSD as a diagnosis). 
 Setting aside 
for the moment a myriad of complexities and individual differ-
ences, one story emerging from neuroimaging research on 
PTSD is one of “exaggerated responsivity in the amygdala, di-
minished responsivity in medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), and 
an inverse relationship between these two brain regions” along 
 342. Sparr & Pitman, supra note 333, at 449.  
 343. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS-IV 463, 463–68 (4th ed. 2000) (providing the diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD).  
 344. Id.  
 345. See, e.g., Shen, Monetizing Memory Science, supra note 4, at 333–40 
(discussing PTSD, neuroscience, and the conceptualization of injury in tort 
law, noting the difficulties with putting a price on mental and emotional 
harms); Sparr & Pitman, supra note 333, at 460–61 (noting the legal system’s 
traditional “hostility toward claims for mental distress damages”). 
 346. See, e.g., Steven M. Southwick et al., Neurobiological Alterations Asso-
ciated with PTSD, in HANDBOOK OF PTSD, supra note 333, at 166, 180–81 
(noting that “stress sensitization” that often occurs with PTSD can cause an 
individual to “overreact to even minor stresses”). 
 347. Lisa M. Shin et al., Structural and Functional Anatomy of PTSD: 
Findings from Neuroimaging Research, in NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF PTSD: BIO-
LOGICAL, COGNITIVE, AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 59 (Jennifer J. Vasterling 
& Chris R. Brewin eds., 2005). 
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with “diminished volumes, neuronal integrity, and functional 
integrity of the hippocampus.”348
Crime victims with PTSD will typically exhibit either hy-
peractive or disassociative fear reactions, correlating with dis-
tinct neural activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex, anteri-
or cingulated cortex (ACC), and amygdala.
  
349 The amygdala has 
an important role in fear responses, letting us know “when we 
should genuinely be frightened and behave accordingly, and 
when the coast is clear.”350 Activity in the amygdala, as in all 
brain structures, is “mediated by neurotransmitters that carry 
signals from one neuron to the next.”351
Understood in this neurobiological way, we can see why, 
from a neuroscience perspective, the processes would be readily 
labeled “bodily” or “physical,” just as the biological processes 
underlying the functioning of other organs in the body would be 

















 348. Id. at 74. 
 349. R.A. Lanius et al., A Review of Neuroimaging Studies in PTSD: Heter-
ogeneity of Response to Symptom Provocation, 40 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 709, 
711–14 (2006). For those individuals experiencing hyperarousal, one interpre-
tation is that reduced activity in the prefrontal cortex—a part of the brain re-
sponsible for much executive function—can be interpreted as a failure “to in-
hibit subcortical limbic, especially amygdala, reactivity.” James W. Hopper et 
al., Neural Correlates of Reexperiencing, Avoidance, and Dissociation in PTSD: 
Symptom Dimensions and Emotion Dysregulation in Responses to Script-
Driven Trauma Imagery, 20 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 713, 714 (2007). Lanius and 
others note that activation patterns differ for those whose PTSD manifests it-
self in disassociation rather than hyperarousal. Lanius et al., supra at 714. 
 350. Shen, Monetizing Memory Science, supra note 4, at 331. 
 351. Id.  
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Figure B.1 































The CNSforum provides the following caption to this im-
age: “Sensory input, memory formation and stress response 
mechanisms are affected in patients with post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). The regions of the brain involved in memory 
processing that are implicated in PTSD include the hippocam-
pus, amygdala and frontal cortex. While the heightened stress 
 
 352. Image Bank: The Areas of the Brain Affected in Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, LUNDBECK INST., http://www.cnsforum.com/imagebank/item/Neuro_ 
biol_PTSD/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).  
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response is likely to involve the thalamus, hypothalamus and 
locus coeruleus.” 
At this cellular level, all mental states, for healthy and dis-
tressed individuals alike, are produced by “neurotransmit-
ter/neuroendocrine systems . . . . characterized by complex in-
teractions with one another and with multiple brain regions, 
including the amygdala, [locus coeruleus], dorsal raphe nucle-
us, hippocampus and [prefrontal cortex].”353 In the case of a 
crime victim with PTSD, these complex systems function ab-
normally, and the abnormal functioning of the brain’s biochem-
istry results in the victim’s inability to live life as they normally 
would, e.g., experiencing fear at moments when (but for the 
traumatic event) they normally would not.354
Because of a victim’s preexisting vulnerabilities, the nature 
of the traumatic event, and subsequent events, the victim’s 
brain has been re-wired (through altered neuronal connections 
and firing patterns). PTSD involves dysregulation of several 
neurotransmitter/neurohormone systems: the noradrenergic 
system, serotonergic system, and hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) axis.
 
355 Increased levels of catecholamine and 
cortisol “enhance the functioning of the amygdala, promoting 
fear conditioning and the consolidation of emotionally relevant 
memories.”356 At the same time, the release of these hormones 
“impair[s] the cognitive functioning of the PFC.”357
The relationship between memory and trauma plays an 
important role in PTSD as well.
 In short, the 
neurochemical environment during a stressful moment sets the 
stage for the encoding that may eventually lead to observed 
PTSD behavioral outcomes. 
358
 
 353. Steven M. Southwick et al., Neurobiological Alterations Associated 
with PTSD, in HANDBOOK OF PTSD, supra note 346, at 166, 180. 
 Experimental research on 
memory for trauma-relevant and -irrelevant words, as well as 
tests of autobiographical memory, have found that PTSD may 
 354. Id. at 180–81. 
 355. Steven M. Southwick et al., Neurobiological and Neurocognitive Alte-
rations in PTSD : A Focus on Norepinephrine, Serotonin, and the Hypothala-
mic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis, in NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF PTSD, supra note 347, 
at 27.  
 356. Id. at 30. 
 357. Id. at 31. 
 358. As discussed elsewhere, moderate and extreme stressors may have 
different effects on memory systems affecting PTSD. The relationship between 
arousal and performance takes on an inverted-U shape that psychologists 
have long recognized in a number of performance areas. See, e.g., id. at 29.  
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involve both “unwanted recall of the traumatic event” and 
“mild impairments in recall of newly acquired information.”359
To understand why some memories evoke this fear re-
sponse, while others do not, we must review the critical role of 
the hippocampus. The hippocampus is a part of the brain in-
volved in multiple memory systems.
  
360 Relevant to this discus-
sion of PTSD, “the hippocampus is essential for the acquisition 
of episode memories with spatiotemporal content.”361
When memories are formed under intense stress, a critical component 
of normal memory formation—the hippocampus—is disabled, and 
memories without spatiotemporal content are created. At the same 
time, another component of normal memory function—the amygda-
la—can be potentiated, leading to stronger-than-usual memory for 
highly charged emotional events. When a person retrieves a traumat-
ic event memory, the retrieved information is bereft of spatiotemporal 
context. Instead of being bound firmly to the past, this “disembodied” 
event memory is conflated with the ongoing spatio/temporal 
frame. . . . The memory takes on a quality of the here and now so 
strongly that the individual may literally re-experience the event.
 When a 
memory is formed in the midst of a traumatic event, the brain’s 
memory systems are not functioning normally because of the 
stress. More specifically: 
362
Those who experience PTSD are less able to successfully 
engage in “context discrimination”—discriminating between a 
new context that is not threatening versus the old context that 
was.
 
363 This, in turn, may lead to an inability to resume the 
normal course of life.364 By uncovering the neural mechanisms 
that cause these behavioral outcomes, memory scientists allow 
lawyers to speak of mental injuries in the brain-based termi-
nology of the hippocampus, the amygdala, and the biochemical 
processes by which the hippocampus and amygdala function 
with each other and with the rest of the brain.365
 
 359. Joseph I. Constans, Information-Processing Biases in PTSD, in NEU-
ROPSYCHOLOGY OF PTSD, supra note 347, at 105, 116. 
  
 360. Lynn Nadel, Multiple Memory Systems: A New View, in 1 LEARNING 
AND MEMORY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE 41, 43–44 (Randolf Menzel & 
John H. Byrne eds., 2008). 
 361. Lynn Nadel & W.J. Jacobs, The Role of the Hippocampus in PTSD, 
Panic and Phobia, in THE HIPPOCAMPUS FUNCTIONS AND CLINICAL RELE-
VANCE 455, 457 (Nobumasa Kato ed., 1996). 
 362. Id. at 459. 
 363. See Shen, Monetizing Memory Science, supra note 4, at 331 (discussing 
how individuals diagnosed with PTSD experience fear when they otherwise 
would not). 
 364. See id.  
 365. See id. at 339–40 (suggesting neuroscientific possibilities for monetiz-
ing PTSD and how brain data may be used by lawyers to influence jurors’ de-
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APPENDIX C.  TECHNICAL DETAILS   
This Appendix provides additional detail on the research 
design employed in the two Experiments, the statistical proce-
dures used to analyze the data, and the results of the statistical 
analyses.366
A. SUBJECT COMPLIANCE 
 
Concern about subjects’ compliance with task instructions 
are of special interest with online experiments because subjects 
cannot be monitored while engaged in the experimental 
tasks.367 To address this issue, experimental psychologists have 
developed “attention filters” designed to ascertain whether sub-
jects are in fact following instructions and paying attention to 
the material being presented to them online.368 In my experi-
ments, I employed a modified version of the filter developed by 
psychologist Daniel Oppenheimer and his colleagues.369 The de-
sign of the attention filter question was such that users who did 
not read carefully would see, in large font, a headline reading 
“Background Questions on Sources for News” as well as anoth-
er large, bold question: “From which of these sources have you 
received information in the past month?” A series of check-box 
options were provided (e.g., local newspaper, local TV news). 
Subjects reading carefully, however, were instructed not to 
check any of the boxes, but instead to type “123” into the text 
box provided. The results presented in this Article are based 





 366. Replication data is available by request from the author and online at 
Harvard Dataverse Network, Harvard Univ., http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/ 
bodilyinjury (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).  
 367. Id. at 343. In addition, concerns may arise about individuals taking 
the survey multiple times. To address this concern, a filter employed after da-
ta collection allowed for the experiment to exclude from the dataset subjects 
with duplicate IP addresses. Seventeen observations were dropped to avoid 
duplicate IP addresses in Experiment Two. Twenty observations were dropped 
to avoid duplicate IP addresses in Experiment Two. 
 368. Id. at 343–44; see also Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional 
Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 867, 867–68 (2009). 
 369. See Oppenheimer et al., supra note 368, at 868 (describing a filter in 
which subjects must carefully read instructions which, counter to the boldface 
headline above the instructions, tell subjects not to actually click on an answer 
to the question). 
 370. In the sample of subjects for Experiment One, 19 out of 200 (10%) did 
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After filtering out the subjects who did not meet these cri-
teria, I had an N of 180 subjects in Experiment One. In the 
sample of subjects for Experiment Two, 68 out of 513 (13%) did 
not complete the attention filter properly, and are excluded 
from the analysis. This gave me a total N of 425 subjects in Ex-
periment Two.  
B. EXPERIMENT ONE: SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS AND THE 
DETERMINATION OF BODILY INJURY 
In the body of the Article, the figures presenting data from 
Experiment One illustrated the variance in subject rating of 
bodily injury.371 What explains that variance? To examine the 
question in more depth, here I present additional statistical 
analysis of the factors related to bodily injury rating. Because 
the outcome variable is ordinal, ordered logic regression analy-
sis was employed. In addition to exposure to the mental health 
parity information, these expanded models also include the fol-
lowing measures: the education level of the respondent;372 
whether the respondent previously knew about mental health 
parity;373
The results of the regression analysis, reported in Table 
C1, suggest that when these additional covariates are account-
ed for, the exposure to Dr. Hyman’s testimony significantly af-
fected bodily injury rating only for the sprained wrist, lung tis-
sue, and recurring headaches injuries. The regression results 
also find that there is a relationship between education levels 
and bodily injury rating. There is a positive, significant rela-
tionship between a respondent’s education level and their bodi-
ly injury rating for memory loss, recurring headaches, PTSD, 
and depression. In addition, self-reported previous knowledge 
of mental health parity was also significantly and positively re-
lated to bodily injury rating. The results suggest at least the 
 an index of the subject’s political ideology (with 1 be-
ing very liberal and 7 being very conservative); a dichotomous 
variable measuring whether the respondent is female; and a di-
chotomous variable measuring whether the respondent is non-
white.  
 
not complete the attention filter properly, and are excluded from the analysis. 
 371. See supra Figures 2.1–.2, Tables 1–2. 
 372. All subjects provided their education level: Less than High School; 
High School/GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College De-
gree; Master's Degree; or Doctoral Degree/Professional Degree. 
 373. All subjects were asked to respond, on a seven-point scale to the fol-
lowing question: Before taking this survey, how knowledgeable—if at all—
were you with the concept of mental health parity? 
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possibility that if there is a “common” understanding of the 
term, it is to be found within certain population sub-groups. 
 
Table C1 
Explaining Subject Likelihood to Identify Injuries as 








































* 0.34 0.30 
 
(0.67) (0.38) (0.345) (0.35) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) 
Educa-




** 0.24** 0.24** 
 
(0.22) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Previous 
Knowled








(0.22) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Con-
servative -0.28 -0.14 -0.16 -0.05 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06 -0.18** -0.13 
 
(0.22) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Non-







0.63* -0.66* -0.61* 
 
(0.84) (0.45) (0.44) (0.41) (0.36) (0.36) (0.6) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) 
Female -0.49 0.68* 0.08 0.61* 0.57* 0.06 0.22 -0.28 -0.14 0.15 
 
(0.72) (0.37) (0.35) (0.34) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) 
         
 
 
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
 
Notes: Significance is denoted as: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .0 
C. EXPERIMENT TWO: FULL TEXT OF DEFINITIONS AND 
SCENARIOS 
The five definitions used in this Experiment were: 
(1) No definition 
(2) Black’s Law’s Dictionary: Physical damage to a person’s 
body374
 
 374. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009). 
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(3) Black’s Law Dictionary: “Bodily: pertaining to or concerning 
the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical constitu-
tion; not mental, but corporeal”;375
(4) Federal: “(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; 
(B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of the function of 
a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other in-
jury to the body, no matter how temporary.”
 
376
(5) Brain-Inclusive: (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfig-
urement; (B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; (E) im-
pairment of the brain’s normal functioning; or (F) any other in-
jury to the body, no matter how temporary. 
 
The text of the scenarios utilized was: 
 
Text of Burglary Scenario 
Facts: The facts of the case are as follows. The Defendant (John) is charged 
with aggravated burglary. John admitted on the stand that he had broken into 
a private home to steal an expensive TV. He had seen the TV through the 
home's living room window. He knew that someone was in the home when he 
broke in. Security cameras on the house confirmed that, at approximately 
12:00 noon on a weekday, John broke the lock on the private residence and en-
tered the house. He was not armed. The homeowner was startled by John's 
entrance into the home, and John yelled “I'm taking the TV!” He quickly took 
the TV, left the home, and drove off. John was later arrested and now faces 
this charge at trial. The homeowner testified during the trial that she has re-
curring nightmares about the break-in, and that she has been diagnosed with 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) due to the event. An expert medical 
witness testified during the trial that the homeowner suffered from PTSD re-
lated to the break-in. 
Defense Argument: John does not contest the facts of the case just present-
ed, nor does he challenge the issue of intent. But John argues that he is only 
guilty of a reduced charge of burglary because the homeowner’s injuries do not 
constitute “bodily injury” as required by the statute. 
[ Variation 1 of 3] No additional information on prosecution argument provid-
ed. 
[Variation 2 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the 
brain is a part of the body, that the homeowner’s PTSD and nightmares are 
the result of physical, biochemical changes in her brain, and therefore that she 
has experienced bodily injury as a result of the break-in. 
[Variation 3 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the 
brain is a part of the body, that the homeowner’s PTSD and nightmares are 
the result of physical, biochemical changes in her brain, and therefore that she 
has experienced bodily injury as a result of the break-in. During the trial, an 
expert witness, in support of the diagnosis of PTSD, testified that the home-
 
 375. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (6th ed. 1990). 
 376. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(4) (2006). 
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owner’s brain activity was abnormal. A brain scan showing abnormal activity 
was admitted into evidence. 
 
Text of Assault Scenario 
Facts: The facts of the case are as follows. The Defendant (John) is charged 
with assault. John was riding a subway train to work in the morning, sitting 
down because he had recently broken his leg and was not able to stand with-
out crutches. Another passenger (Peter) entered the train car, and stood across 
from John. Peter was wearing a sports jersey of a rival team that John did not 
like. John, upset that his team had lost to this rival the night before, began 
insulting Peter loudly and profanely. John made fun of Peter’s weight and 
growing bald spot, and completely humiliated Peter in front of the other train 
passengers. Peter exited the train at the next stop and contacted the police. 
John was later arrested and now faces this assault charge at trial. Peter testi-
fied that, seeing that John was on crutches, he was not fearful of being 
punched. But Peter also testified that since the incident, he has had recurring 
nightmares and traumatic memories about the experience. Peter now finds it 
difficult to ride the subway because of these bad memories. 
Defense Argument: John does not contest the facts of the case just present-
ed, admits to making the insulting statements, and does not challenge the is-
sue of intent. But John argues that he cannot be found guilty of assault be-
cause Peter did not experience any “bodily injury,” a required element of the 
statute. 
[Variation 1 of 3] No additional information on prosecution argument provid-
ed. 
[Variation 2 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the 
brain is a part of the body, that Peter's nightmares and traumatic memories 
are the result of biochemical changes in his brain cells, and therefore that he 
has experienced bodily injury as a result of John's insults. 
[Variation 3 of 3] Prosecution Argument: The prosecution argues that the 
brain is a part of the body, that Peter's nightmares and 
traumatic memories are the result of biochemical changes in his brain cells, 
and therefore that he has experienced bodily injury as a result of John's in-
sults. During the trial, an expert witness testified that the Peter's brain activi-
ty was abnormal. A brain scan showing abnormal activity was admitted into 
evidence. 
D  EXPERIMENT TWO: CONFIRMATORY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In the body of the Article, I presented a series of graphical 
figures related to the experiments in Study Two.377
 
 377. See supra Figures 3–4. 
 Here I pre-
sent the statistical analysis which provides more detail than 
can be offered in the graphical presentations. Logit regression 
models were used to examine the effect of jury instructions on 
the likelihood of a subject to label the crime victim’s harm as 
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bodily injury. To account for a variety of potential subject-level 
confounds, I ran models that included controls for: race, age, 
education level, political ideology, knowledge of law, and 
knowledge of neuroscience. Table C2 reports the regression re-
sults, in odds ratios.378
Burglary Scenario. Responding to the burglary scenario, 
within the context of no brain argument from the prosecution, 
we see that even here there is some differentiation by defini-
tion. Post-estimation chi-squared tests find that there is a sig-
nificant difference between Black’s definition and the federal 
definition (χ2(1) = 4.69, p < 0.05); between Black’s definition and 
the brain-inclusive definition (χ2(1) = 9.46, p < 0.01); and be-
tween Black’s 1990 definition and the brain-inclusive definition 
(χ2(1) = 6.71, p < 0.01). Subjects who received the brain-
inclusive definition were thus significantly more likely than 
those who received either of the Black’s definitions to view the 
victim’s injury as a bodily injury. 
  
Looking next at the condition in which the prosecution 
makes a brain-based argument, subjects exposed to the federal 
definition were significantly more likely to define the injury as 
bodily than Black’s 1990 definition (χ2(1) = 5.77, p < 0.05). Sub-
jects exposed to the brain-inclusive definition were significantly 
more likely to choose bodily injury than were those who were 
exposed to Black’s 1990 definition (χ2(1) = 4.18, p < 0.05).  
When subjects are told that a brain scan is added to the 
prosecution’s case, we again see a significant difference emerge 
between Black’s 1990 definition and the federal definition (χ2(1) 
= 4.62, p < 0.05). We see an even stronger gap emerge between 
Black’s 1990 definition and the brain-inclusive definition (χ2(1) 
= 13.23, p < 0.01). This finding supports the argument made in 
the text that while brain-based definitions combined with prof-
fered brain evidence can be an effective combination in promot-
ing an expansion of bodily injury,379
Assault Scenario. Similar, though not identical, patterns 
 this expansion can be sig-
nificantly limited with the introduction of the Black’s 1990 
definition. In the brain scan scenarios, there was also a signifi-
cant difference between the brain-inclusive definition and 
Black’s current definition (χ2(1) = 10.18, p < 0.01), as well as be-
tween the federal definition and the brain-inclusive definition 
(χ2(1) = 3.26, p < 0.10). 
 
 378. Odds ratios in this context can be understood as the ratio of the odds 
of choosing bodily injury to the odds of choosing not bodily injury. 
 379. See supra Part II. 
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emerged from the assault scenarios. With no brain argument 
from the prosecution, I find that there is a significant difference 
between Black’s definition and the federal definition (χ2(1) = 
4.77, p < 0.05); and between Black’s definition and the brain-
inclusive definition (χ2(1) = 5.88, p < 0.05). There is also a sig-
nificant difference between Black’s 1990 definition and federal 
definition (χ2(1) = 3.52, p < 0.10), and between Black’s 1990 and 
the brain-inclusive definition (χ2(1) = 4.39, p < 0.05).  
When the prosecution makes a brain-based argument, but 
does not yet introduce a brain scan, subjects again diverge 
based on the definition they are exposed to. There is a signifi-
cant difference between Black’s definition and the federal defi-
nition (χ2(1) = 2.71, p = 0.10); and between Black’s definition 
and the brain-inclusive definition (χ2(1) = 2.64, p < 0.10. There 
is also a significant difference between Black’s 1990 definition 
and federal definition (χ2(1) = 5.52, p < 0.05), and between 
Black’s 1990 and the brain-inclusive definition (χ2(1) = 5.51, p < 
0.05). 
Finally, as with burglary, the patterns in bodily injury de-
termination in the assault scenarios are even more pronounced 
when the subjects are told that the prosecution introduced a 
brain scan to support its argument. In this context, there is a 
significant difference between Black’s definition and the federal 
definition (χ2(1) = 4.77, p < 0.05); and between Black’s definition 
and the brain-inclusive definition (χ2(1) = 5.88, p < 0.05. There 
is also a significant difference between Black’s 1990 definition 
and federal definition (χ2(1) = 3.52, p < 0.10), and between 
Black’s 1990 and the brain-inclusive definition (χ2(1) = 4.39, p < 
0.05). 
Taken together, the results confirm the primary message 
emphasized in the Article: definitions matter in shaping subject 
responses to the bodily injury categorization question. Legisla-
tures thus have a powerful tool at their disposal in shaping the 










 380. See supra Part IV.C. 
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Table C2 
Comparison of Distribution of Subjects in Experi-
ment Two by State to Overall U.S. Distribution 
 
State % of U.S. Population % Of Study Subjects 
Alabama 1.5% 0.7% 
Alaska 0.2% 0.0% 
Arizona 2.0% 2.4% 
Arkansas 0.9% 0.5% 
California 11.9% 9.4% 
Colorado 1.6% 1.2% 
Connecticut 1.1% 0.2% 
Delaware 0.3% 0.5% 
Washington, DC 0.2% 0.2% 
Florida 6.0% 5.9% 
Georgia 3.1% 5.2% 
Hawaii 0.4% 0.5% 
Idaho 0.5% 0.0% 
Illinois 4.1% 4.5% 
Indiana 2.1% 1.6% 
Iowa 1.0% 0.9% 
Kansas 0.9% 1.4% 
Kentucky 1.4% 1.2% 
Louisiana 1.5% 0.7% 
Maine 0.4% 0.7% 
Maryland 1.8% 2.8% 
Massachusetts 2.1% 1.4% 
Michigan 3.2% 3.8% 
Minnesota 1.7% 3.3% 
Mississippi 0.9% 1.6% 
Missouri 1.9% 1.9% 
Montana 0.3% 0.5% 
Nebraska 0.6% 0.7% 
Nevada 0.9% 0.5% 
New Hampshire 0.4% 0.5% 
New Jersey 2.8% 1.9% 
New Mexico 0.7% 0.5% 
New York 6.2% 6.8% 
North Carolina 3.1% 3.1% 
North Dakota 0.2% 0.7% 
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State % of U.S. Population % Of Study Subjects 
Ohio 3.7% 4.7% 
Oklahoma 1.2% 0.5% 
Oregon 1.2% 1.9% 
Pennsylvania 4.1% 4.7% 
Rhode Island 0.3% 0.5% 
South Carolina 1.5% 1.9% 
South Dakota 0.3% 0.2% 
Tennessee 2.0% 1.9% 
Texas 8.0% 5.9% 
Utah 0.9% 0.5% 
Vermont 0.2% 0.2% 
Virginia 2.6% 4.9% 
Washington 2.2% 2.4% 
West Virginia 0.6% 0.5% 
Wisconsin 1.8% 1.6% 
Wyoming 0.2% 0.2% 
 
Note: 2010 Census data was downloaded and analyzed from the 
American Fact Finder Tool. See American FactFinder, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/ (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2013).  
 
Table C3 
Explaining Subject Likelihood to Identify Injuries as 
“Bodily” in Two Hypothetical Criminal Scenarios: Re-
sults of Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
 















































Def. -1.30 0.46 -1.13* -0.51 0.49 1.47 -2.70** -0.71 
 
(0.93) (0.59) (0.60) (0.36) (1.05) (1.19) (0.86) (0.46) 
Blac
k's -0.53 -0.22 -1.77** 
-
0.91** -0.34 0.01 -2.41** -1.42** 
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(0.81) (0.64) (0.70) (0.39) (1.30) (1.47) (0.86) (0.60) 
Fed-
eral 
Def. 0.78 1.30** -0.25 0.55 2.10** 2.67** -0.77 0.74* 
 





n 1.40** 1.04* 0.86 1.05** 1.36 2.69** -0.61 0.62 
 
(0.67) (0.56) (0.61) (0.33) (0.95) (1.12) (0.60) (0.38) 
Non-
Whit
e -0.21 -0.37 0.74 0.04 0.46 -0.11 0.20 0.28 
 
(0.62) (0.49) (0.50) (0.29) (0.63) (0.70) (0.56) (0.34) 
Fe-
male 0.76 0.09 0.19 0.22 0.50 0.26 0.35 0.36 
 
(0.55) (0.39) (0.45) (0.24) (0.65) (0.56) (0.53) (0.30) 
Ed-
ucat
ion -0.24 -0.12 0.16 -0.07 0.09 -0.41* -0.31* -0.23** 
 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.20) (0.22) (0.17) (0.10) 
Con-
serv
ative -0.03 -0.01 0.15 0.03 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.19** 
 





ro 0.05 -0.28* 0.16 -0.00 0.09 0.16 0.28 0.16 
 




Law -0.52** 0.16 -0.23 
-
0.19** -0.16 -0.42* -0.27 -0.23* 
 
(0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.10) (0.24) (0.25) (0.21) (0.12) 
Age -0.04* -0.02 -0.02 
-
0.02** -0.08** -0.00 -0.02 -0.02** 
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ent - - - 
0.97**
* - - - 0.24 
    








age - - - 
0.99**
* - - - 0.84** 
    





t 2.13 0.44 -0.23 0.18 -1.56 -1.33 0.79 -0.77 
 
(1.43) (1.10) (1.17) (0.68) (1.66) (1.81) (1.32) (0.82) 
N 144 142 139 425 144 142 139 425 
 
